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Abstract 
 
OBSERVATION INFLATION AND SELF-ACTION INFLATION. 
INVESTIGATION OF SOURCE MEMORY ERRORS AS A RESULT OF 
ACTION OBSERVATION AND ACTION PERFORMANCE.  
Kaja Julia Mitrenga 
Key words: Observation inflation, Self-action Inflation, Source Memory Errors, 
Mirror Neurons.  
This thesis investigates two source memory errors: observation inflation, where 
observed actions are misremembered as being performed; and self-action 
inflation in which self-performed actions are misremembered as having been 
performed by somebody else. It has been proposed that these inflations occur 
because of overlapping brain activity during observation and performance. This 
has been attributed to mirror neurone activity. To test this, observation and self-
action inflations are investigated for different types of actions (meaningful, 
meaningless and communicative) known to evoke different mirror neurone 
activity. Different age groups (young adult, and elderly) were studied as were the 
effects of relative ethnicity between observer and performer. The Remember-
Know-Guess paradigm was used. This showed that people make inflations with 
high qualitative details and confidence. As anticipated, elderly participants made 
significantly more observation inflations than young adults. Across both age 
groups, significantly more inflations occurred for communicative and meaningful 
actions than for meaningless actions supporting the idea that mirror neurones 
may be involved in formation of inflations.  However when the effects of relative 
ethnicity were included in the paradigm it was found that significantly more 
observation inflations were formed after observing different ethnicity actors. It has 
been hypothesised that if mirror neurone involvement is involved in observation 
inflations then the highest number of inflations are expected for the same ethnicity 
condition because of the overlap between participant and performer. This thesis 
therefore suggests a less simplistic explanation of the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for these types of memory error. 
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Chapter 1 
Thesis overview 
 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
The ability to correctly recall the source of information is essential for normal 
memory functioning.  Source monitoring error (SME) is the failure to correctly 
attribute the source of a memory trace (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, not 
being able to remember which friend told you a story, or if you actually have 
locked the door or only imagined it. Although occurring sporadically in the healthy 
population, elderly or Alzheimer's patients are more susceptible to suffer from 
SMEs (Ruiz-Gallego-Largo et al., 2012, Schacter et al., 1997; Haj et al., 2012).  
A type of SME that has only recently been researched by a handful of studies is 
the Observation Inflation effect (OI) (Lindner et al., 2010, 2012; Schain et al., 
2012; Lindner et al., 2014). In the OI effect, the observation of actions being 
performed by others results in strong and incorrect memories of actually 
performing those actions oneself. Lindner et al. (2010) attributes the OI effect to 
failures in source-monitoring, facilitated by mirror neurone activity. According to 
Lindner et al. (2010), the observation of actions triggers similar brain activity as 
when the action is actually performed i.e. mirror neurones. This leads to source 
confusion and results in a greater likelihood of remembering the actions as self-
performed (Lindner et al., 2010; 2012; Schain et al., 2012; Lindner et al., 2014).  
This thesis aims to investigate the OI effect further with regards to the possible 
involvement of mirror neurones. Specifically, the thesis aims to create 
behavioural experiments to investigate the nature of misattributions by looking at 
patterns of OIs for different action types: meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative emblems. Given that OI has only recently been studied, a strong 
focus of the thesis is on creating a successful experimental paradigm that allows 
for solid investigation of OIs. Additionally, this thesis will explore the effect of age 
on OI formation, social aspect of OIs, recollective experience, and the influence 
of instruction on the pattern of OIs. 
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To further test the mirror neurone hypothesis, the effect of ‘Self-action Inflation’ 
(SAI) is investigated, in which self-performed actions are incorrectly recalled as 
observed (performed by others). 
The four introductory chapters discuss background research relevant for 
contextualising the OI effect, including major research in the area of memory 
errors, mirror neurones and action type.  
The experimental chapters will consist of more detailed introduction of relevant 
research, followed by a description of methods applied, data analysis and results 
obtained; and finally the findings will be discussed in relation to the existing 
literature. 
The discussion will summarise the main findings and evaluate them in relation to 
existing research on the subject and highlight the implications and areas for 
improvement.  
1.2 Chapter overview 
Chapter 2 introduces different types of memory errors and theoretical 
background. It begins with a brief introduction to memory systems and a history 
of memory error research. Following that, major false memory research is 
discussed. The chapter then moves on to cover cognitive theories of memory 
errors, including the Source Monitoring Framework. Finally, existing 
neuroimaging research of memory errors is explored.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the discussion of memory errors and the imagination 
inflation effect. Imagination inflation has received scientific attention and could be 
considered similar to OIs. The existing literature on OI is then discussed. 
Chapter 4 introduces further concepts relevant to the OI errors, including motor 
cognition and mirror neurone theory. Motor priming is discussed in relation to 
action facilitation and action imitation. Studies that demonstrate an action 
facilitation effect resulting from action observation are also discussed. Lastly, 
research on action imitation and different types of actions will be explored due to 
its relevance to the investigation of OIs for different types of actions.  
Chapter 5 is concerned with the different states of conscious recollection of 
memories, considered important in memory research and used in the 
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experimental chapters. It covers research employing the Remember-Know-
Guess (R-K-G) paradigm to the study of the recollective experience.  
Chapter 6 is the first experimental chapter and presents the study on OI for 
different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and communicative). It was 
found that the highest number of OI formed was after observation of 
communicative and meaningful actions. The results are also presented for 
misattributions after different time delays and reveal highest level of OIs was 
formed after a two week time delay.  Additionally, correct source recall of actions 
is discussed. Interestingly, the communicative actions resulted in the highest 
level of OIs and correct source attributions.  
Chapter 7 is the second experimental chapter that tests the mirror neurone 
hypothesis in relation to source misattribution further. Here, the effect of SAI is 
examined. Similarly as in Chapter 6, the errors are examined with different action 
types and over different time delays. The highest number of SAIs was formed for 
meaningless and communicative actions. The correct source memory recall is 
also investigated.  
Chapter 8 further investigates the formation of OIs errors for different action 
types. It discusses the formation of OI errors in the cohort of elderly participants 
(mean age = 72.87 years). As will be seen in Chapter 6, numbers of OIs remain 
low, so an elderly cohort is used here.  The results show that they make a higher 
number of OIs compared to a young group and that testing elderly participants 
may makes for a better experimental paradigm for studying OIs. 
Chapter 9 examines the influence of having an option to differentiate between 
the sources of memory during the retrieval on levels of OI and SAI misattributions. 
This experiment controls for biases that may occur with the methodology in the 
recall phase of the experiment. 
Chapter 10 combines the experimental data from the OI and SAI experiments to 
investigate the recollective experience of OIs and SAIs (R-K-G responses). The 
recollections will be discussed in the context of action types. Additionally, false 
memory data obtained in the experiments will be analysed and compared. 
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Chapter 11 investigates the social aspect of OIs. The inflations are studied for 
different action types and actor’s race. The results show observation of 
communicative actions leads to formation of significantly more OIs than 
meaningless actions. Interestingly, observation of other race individuals’ results 
in more OIs than observation of own race actor.  
Chapter 12 summarises the main findings of each experiment and discusses 
them in relation to relevant literature. Finally, it will discuss possible areas of 
improvement and suggestions for future research 
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Chapter 2 
Memory errors – types and theories 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of memory errors. Knowledge and 
understanding of types and theories of memory errors are essential to 
comprehend the OI effect which itself is a specific type of memory error. This 
chapter will then briefly discuss the history of memory error research and false 
memory research, followed by the cognitive theories and physiological causes 
of memory errors.  
2.2 Memory classifications 
Memory is a cognitive ability that stores and retrieves information about past 
experiences (Baddeley et al., 2009). Different types of memory classifications 
are distinguished, usually depending on the duration of memory, 
characteristics and type of storage.  Three main stages of memory formation 
are defined according to information processes: (i) encoding, (ii) storage and 
(iii) retrieval of information (Schacter, 1992).  
Regarding the length of memory duration, the general classification based on 
the length of duration, includes three main types: (i) sensory memory, which is 
an ultra-short term memory lasting approximately half a second, (ii) short-term 
memory (STM), where the information is analysed and interpreted (some of 
the information contained in sensory memory is transferred) and finally, this 
information can be stored in (iii) long-term memory (LTM) (Baddeley et al., 
2014).  
The type of information that is being remembered constitutes another memory 
classification system (Baddaley et al., 2014). For example, two different 
memory types can be discriminated within the LTM: (i) declarative and (ii) 
procedural memory. 
Declarative memory includes (i) semantic memories which are abstract, 
general knowledge facts about the world; and (ii) episodic memories of specific 
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information related to a particular event or item (e.g. when and at what time 
something happened) (Baddaley et al., 2014). 
2.3 Early research on memory errors 
 Memory processes are not free from errors and people regularly experience 
various memory distortions (Garry et al., 1996). Many experience such 
distortions on an everyday basis, for example missing a dentist appointment 
or being unable to recall the name of a recently met person. 
 A rarer type of memory distortion is a source memory error (SME), which is 
an inability to attribute memory to its correct source (Johnson et al., 1993). An 
example of a SME would be a confusion between whether someone has 
dreamt about something or heard a friend telling them a story about it. 
One of the first experiments on memory distortions is credited to the British 
psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1932) who claimed that specific memories of 
events are stored in the brain as 'traces'. The traces would be created for all 
information and be associated with each other, as several traces would be 
formed for one particular event. When an individual encounters an event, they 
do not remember every detail of it, but instead based on how the event affects 
the individual, they form an 'attitude' about it. In other words they evaluate the 
event based on the beliefs or feelings they have about that particular event. 
These evaluations may in result influence the behaviour of individual towards 
a given event. Later, when one attempts to recall that event, the memory is 
reconstructed based on an individual’s initial attitude towards the event which 
may not be an accurate recollection of the event at all but the feeling of the 
individual's about it. Bartlett (1932) claimed that memory has either a 
reproductive or a reconstructive character. Reproductive memory refers to the 
accurately reproduced memories and reconstructive memory to the 
processes in which the details of a given memory are fabricated to make up 
for the loss of specific memories associated with that event.  Bartlett (1932) 
compared reconstructive memory to learning to play a sport game – for 
example when playing tennis, one does not reproduce the exact same 
movements as they did when they initially learnt to play the game, but creates 
new movements based on the current posture they have and what is required 
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of them in the moment of the game that they are playing there and then. Hence, 
every time the movement is repeated, it consists of different features, 
depending on the present conditions in which the movement is executed. 
Bartlett (1932) suggested that information with a great amount of detail and 
meaning is recalled using the reconstructive process whereas the information 
that contains less detail (e.g. words or lists) is recalled through the reproductive 
pathway. The general approach to research on memory distortions since then 
has been in accordance with Bartlett’s ideas.  
2.4 False Memory and the Misinformation Effect 
For many years, the research on memory distortions has focused on more 'real 
life' applicable stimuli to induce distortions, such as in the misinformation effect  
which is a change in the accuracy of memory recall caused by the information 
encountered after the initial encoding (Loftus et al., 1978).  
The research on the misinformation effect involves complex scenarios that are 
more likely to occur in real life situations. Loftus (1975) found that the 
suggestibility of a question can change the answer given by participants in 
regards to recall of past personal experiences. Loftus (1975) found that 
participants were more likely to report having many episodes of headaches if 
the question asked them how often they experience headaches, than when 
they were asked if they experienced headaches occasionally.  
The misinformation effect was also found to be present in eye witness 
testimony (Loftus and Palmer, 1974). In the experiment by Loftus and Palmer 
(1974), participants viewed a video of a car accident and were required to 
answer questions about the video. Among the questions asking details about 
the video, six critical questions were included, three of which were asking 
about a detail using the definite article 'the', and three using an indefinite article 
'a' when asking about objects that were not presented in the videos. For 
example, half of the participants were asked 'Did you see a broken head-light?’ 
and the other half were asked 'Did you see the broken head-light?' (Loftus and 
Palmer, 1974). The results revealed that participants were more likely to 
incorrectly remember the objects that were asked about using the definite 
article (the) than with the indefinite article (a) (Loftus and Palmer, 1974). This 
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shows that the mere suggestion that something 'definite' has been present 
before can lead to false recall of that item.  
Loftus (1975) has also investigated the effect of presupposition, where 
previously non-presented detail is included in the question, presupposing its 
existence in the initial event. An example of such a question would be: ‘How 
fast was the car going when it ran the stop sign?’ (Loftus, 1975). The question 
suggests that there was a stop sign involved in the accident when in fact it was 
an invented detail, included in order to confuse the participants. Using this 
presupposition, Loftus (1975) conducted a study where the participants viewed 
videos of car collisions and following this, the participants were asked about 
the speed of car involved in the collision.  Participants were split into two 
groups, 72 participants were asked about how fast the car was going when it 
turned right and 75 participants were asked how fast the car was going when 
it ran the stop sign. As stated earlier, detail about the stop sign was 
purposefully fabricated in order to presuppose the existence of a stop sign in 
the video. The last question given to participants was the same for the two 
groups: they were asked whether they saw a stop sign in the car collision. The 
results have shown that 53 % of the participants that were asked about the 
stop sign in the first question recalled seeing the stop sign in the last question 
where they were asked 'Did you see a stop sign for Car A?'. On the other hand, 
only 35 % of participants that had been asked about the speed of car when 
turning right recalled seeing the stop sign.   
In 1975, Collins and Loftus proposed a model (which is in line with the theory 
of reconstructive memory proposed by Bartlett (1932), as introduced in section 
2.3.) consisting of two main operations employed when memorising 
information.  These are (i) the acquisition of information and (ii) the retrieval 
process. In the acquisition stage, the individual perceives a visual stimulus 
from the visual field. According to this model (Collins and Loftus, 1975), the 
visual stimulus is then stored and organized in memory according to 'nodes' or 
'points'. The nodes represent different concepts in a semantic network, which 
consists of links between different conceptual nodes (Collins and Loftus, 
1975). Loftus (1975) points out that the acquisition of new information into 
memory could be influenced by previous events and memories already stored 
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in the brain. The formation of a new memory may be dependent upon prior 
information which has the ability to add details and alter true recollections. This 
relates to previous claims of Bartlett (1932) that memory is a reconstruction of 
an event based on the current situation and prior experience.  
More evidence supporting the idea of the misinformation effect comes from a 
study by Loftus et al. (1978) where participants were exposed to detailed slides 
of a car accident. Half of the participants viewed slides of a car driving next to 
a stop sign, and the other half viewed slides of a car travelling towards a yield 
sign. The participants were then given a questionnaire in which one of the 
questions suggested the appearance of a sign that had not been presented in 
the slides. This was given to half of the participants, while the rest of the 
participants received a question about the sign they have definitely seen. The 
questions were either about a stop or yield sign, depending on which sign the 
participants were shown in the study phase. One week later, participants were 
given a forced yes-no recognition task in which one of the questions was to 
identify whether a presented picture of either a stop sign or a yield sign  was 
previously seen in the initial slide presentation. The results showed that 71 % 
of correct pictures that were presented were correctly recognised as previously 
seen, while 70 % of non-presented pictures were falsely recognized as seen 
before (Loftus et al., 1978). This important finding shows that participants were 
not able to distinguish between presented and non-presented items.  Loftus et 
al. (1978) argued that such a high rate of false alarms may be a result of 
demand characteristics.  To elaborate, as the participants are presented with 
suggestive information during the study phase, they might feel obliged to 
answer that they have previously seen it as they believe this must be true 
instead of actually having the memory of it as a result of previous suggestion. 
However, in the latter experiment, Loftus et al., (1978), also showed that even 
if the participants are given a thorough explanation of the nature of the study, 
and are given a chance to answer what they remember seeing and also what 
was suggested to them, they still make errors. This shows that suggestibility 
can influence memory.  
As stated in the beginning of this section, the misinformation effect is an 
example of retroactive interference, which is a distortion of encoded memory 
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through interference of newly encoded information (Dewar et al., 2009). Time 
between encoding of information in the memory and the subsequent recall of 
that memory is filled with acquisition of new information from different sources. 
Retroactive interference theory (Muller and Pilzeker, 1900; in Dewar et al., 
2007) claims that the learnt information undergoes interference from new 
information obtained and therefore new 'false' memories are acquired in the 
time between the encoding of original information and recall of that information. 
Early memory experiments have demonstrated the effect of interference 
(Skaggs, 1933; Muller and Pilzecker, 1900; in Dewar et al., 2007) by 
comparing the recall accuracy between conditions where either (i) the 
encoding of information was followed by an unfilled time interval where 
participants did not perform any task or (ii) a filled condition where the time 
interval between information encoding and recall was filled with a task (e.g. 
reading a list of random syllables aloud with the aim of encoding further 
distracting information to memory). 
2.5 Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm – false recall in word lists 
Deese (1959) was the first to propose a method of testing false recall in word 
lists. In his study ‘On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions 
in immediate recall’ (Deese, 1959), he introduced a simple method of inducing 
false recall of critical lures.  An example of a word list (words that the 
participants were required to remember) would be thread, pin, eye, sewing, 
sharp, point, pricked, thimble, haystack, pain, hurt, injection and an example 
of a critical lure would be a needle. Participants were not presented with the 
critical lure at any point of the experiment. However, Deese (1959) found that 
presenting these word lists and the consequent free recall of the word list items 
led to false recollection of the critical lure. This demonstrates how easy it is to 
induce false memories of words. 
In 1995, Roediger and McDermott replicated Deese’s (1959) findings in two 
experiments. In a modified procedure, Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
included six lists of words associated with a word, for example, chair  (based 
on Deese’s ideas) and following that, gave a 42-item recognition questionnaire 
to participants (consisting of 12 presented words from the original list and 30 
un-presented words). The recognition questionnaire consisted of originally 
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presented words from the six word lists and in addition, three types of critical 
lures: (i) words of strong association with the originally presented words (e.g. 
armchair), (ii) words with weak association (sofa) and (iii) words unrelated to 
those presented in the original list (e.g. floor). The study showed that 
participants not only formed false memories of non-presented words on the 
original list but recalled them at the same level of accuracy as the presented 
words (both critical lures and presented word recalled at the same level of 
probability of .40)  (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). The high level of false 
recall was only present for the words strongly associated with the originally 
presented words, while the recall for weakly or not related words was much 
lower. The results have also shown a strong primacy effect, meaning that the 
words from the original list that were presented in the beginning were recalled 
with more accuracy than words located in the middle or end of the list 
(Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Additionally, in the second part of the 
experiment Roediger and McDermott (1995) asked participants to rate how 
confident they are about each recalled item being in the original list. The ratings 
were interesting.  The results indicated that the confidence rating of previously 
seeing the critical lures in the original list was equal to the ones that were 
actually presented.   
In the second experiment Roediger and McDermott (1995) then investigated 
the conscious recollection of critical lures by asking participants to identify 
whether they ‘Remember’ that they have seen the item in the original list or 
that they ‘Know’ that it was presented there. This became the Remember-
Know-Guess (R-K-G) paradigm and is still widely used as a tool to assess the 
conscious nature of memory recollection (Gardiner et al., 1996). The 
‘Remember’ judgements are used in relation to information that is consciously 
remembered, and the individual is able to remember full details and thoughts 
that they had at the time that the information was presented. The ‘Know’ 
judgements are thought to be recollections that seem familiar but yet the 
individual is unable to recall any qualitative details about the experience. 
Interestingly, Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that most of the critical 
lures recalled as previously seen items on the list were recalled with the 
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‘Remember’ response suggesting a conscious recollection and vivid memory 
for that word (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). 
A recent study by Bergert (2013) proposed that it is possible to eliminate the 
false recall effect in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) word lists  by 
increasing the co-operation between the right and left brain hemisphere. In her 
experiment, Bergert (2013) gave a word list related to non-presented critical 
lures to participants and tested their recollection of critical lures among studied 
words and new words (neither presented nor related). During the study and 
test phase, each of the hemispheres was exposed to either study (where they 
encoded the words) or retrieval. In order to achieve this, participants' eye gaze 
was monitored by an eye tracker, and words were displayed vertically. The 
results have shown that false recall of the critical lure was significantly 
decreased if the words were studied by the right hemisphere and retrieved 
through left hemisphere. Bergert (2013) suggests that such effect is present 
due to increased conservative response tendency caused by the interaction 
between the brain hemispheres.  
The spreading activation theory is a cognitive theory that has been proposed 
to explain the false recall effect in the DRM paradigm.  This will be introduced 
now. 
2.6 Cognitive theories of memory errors 
2.6.1 Spreading activation theory 
According to the spreading activation theory, all the memory processes are 
operated in cognitive 'units' which consist of 'unit nodes' and 'sets' of elements 
of a specific memory (Anderson, 1983). Each new cognitive unit that is formed 
is placed in working memory (WM) (Anderson, 1983). The basic assumption 
of encoding is that information in WM is transferred into information in LTM. 
After the memory is encoded, the already existing trace does not disappear, 
but is subject to degradation over time. In the process of retrieval, the already 
available memory trace in WM is traced back from the LTM and the contents 
of both traces overlap. The strength of the trigger from WM determines the 
strength of spreading activation and is always the source of that activation. 
The spreading activation theory has been demonstrated in several priming 
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experiments, where the prime words activate not only the memory for the 
specific word but also for words semantically related to those presented (e.g. 
Bodner and Masson, 2003; Balota, 1983).  
For example, Underwood (1965) presented 200 words to participants who 
were required to recognize whether each presented word had been shown 
previously in the presentation. Some of the presented words were critical items 
(lures), associated with the words in the original list and some had no 
association.  Those words that were associated were falsely recognized as 
previously seen more than critical items that had no association to the 
previously presented words (Underwood, 1965). 
2.6.2 Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) 
Correctly remembering the source of information is an essential ability for 
normal memory functioning. The term source monitoring refers to processes 
needed in order to recover the origin of a given memory (Johnson et al., 1993). 
Failure to correctly attribute the source of a memory can lead to serious 
consequences (for example, imagining having taken medication instead of 
actually doing it). Johnson et al. (1993) proposed a framework through which 
memory is remembered according to its correct source. The SMF  is often used  
as a theory explaining various memory distortions, for example, SMEs, 
misattributions, the misinformation effect, cryptoamnesia (memory bias when 
a person falsely recalls information as self-generated, for example writing a 
song or a written document), false memories, imagination and OI errors.  
The process of source monitoring depends on many aspects related to the 
characteristics of a given memory. For example, memory rich in perceptual 
detail and visual characteristics is more likely to be judged as a 'real' memory 
than memory in which characteristics are based on feelings or thoughts 
present at the time of experiencing an event. These characteristics enable an 
individual to make better decisions about the source of information. If the visual  
and perceptual details are available,  the source is more likely to be judged as 
real or external (in the outside world) because these characteristics are more 
likely to be derived externally rather than internally (as in the case of thoughts 
or feelings, poorer in perceptual detail) (Johnson et al., 1993). Two main 
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judgement processes are involved in making source monitoring decisions, 
namely automatic and controlled (Landau and Marsh, 1997). Automatic 
judgements, also called heuristic, are those that engage visual and perceptual 
details in order to make the decision about the source of memory. This is a 
type of source monitoring judgement that is most often used when recalling a 
memory. The controlled, also referred to as the systematic judgement process, 
as described above, engages the qualitative and sensory detail about a given 
recollection. For example, when remembering an event, all of the available 
information related to it is assessed as potentially originating from a given 
source. This type of monitoring judgement is used sporadically, usually 
requires more time and is more susceptible to distortions (Landau and Marsh, 
1997).  
The SMF describes three types of source monitoring, (i) reality monitoring, (ii) 
external monitoring and (iii) internal monitoring. Reality monitoring, also called 
internal-external monitoring, refers to the processes underlying the ability to 
discriminate between the source of memories derived either externally (e.g. 
observed events) or internally derived (e.g. thoughts or dreams) (Johnson et 
al., 1993).   
External monitoring refers to events only perceived in the outside world. An 
example of this type of monitoring would be remembering the place where you 
first met a close friend (Johnson et al., 1993). On the contrary, internal 
monitoring processes differentiate between internally generated information, 
for example, whether one has only thought about something or has in fact said 
the information aloud (Johnson et al., 1993). The inflation effects investigated 
in this thesis are examples of SMEs, specifically those where a failure occurs 
between internal and external monitoring.  
2.7 Neural basis of memory distortions 
Since the development of brain imaging techniques, memory distortions have 
been studied by cognitive neuroscientists. Three main approaches have been 
employed in this field.  These are (i) neuroimaging (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans), 
(ii) electrophysiology (Event Related Potentials (ERPs)) and (iii) 
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neuropsychology (case studies of brain damaged patients).  Each of the 
approaches will be introduced now. 
2.7.1 Neuroimaging studies of memory distortions 
One of the first studies applying neuroimaging techniques to studying memory 
distortions used PET to compare brain activity during true and false recognition 
of words presented using the DRM word lists (Schacter et al., 1996). In the 
experiment, Schacter et al. (1996) gave participants an auditory presentation 
of 20-word word lists containing words that were semantically related to a non-
presented critical lure (a non-presented word sharing semantics). Following 
this, participants were given a PET scan.  Whilst being scanned, participants 
were instructed to categorise the words they were hearing as ‘old’ (heard in 
the first part of the experiment’) or ‘new’ (heard for the first time). The 
presented words consisted of the words that were (i) previously shown to them 
in the lists, (ii) critical lures and (iii) additional words that were neither 
presented before nor were in any way related to the originally presented word 
lists. The behavioural results showed, as expected, that participants formed a 
significant number of memory errors for the critical lures, misattributing their 
source as originally presented in the first word list presentation (Schacter et 
al., 1996). 
The results of the PET scans revealed increased blood flow in the medial 
temporal lobes (MTL) for both recognition of true words, and critical lures. 
Schacter et al., (1996) found increased activation in the temporoparietal 
regions (that have previously been shown to be involved in the processing of 
auditory stimuli (e.g. Howard et al. 1992, Paulesu et al., 1993)) for the true 
recognition but not for the false target recognition. This indicates the memory 
for the auditory aspects of the words that participants have heard in the first 
part of the study but not for the false targets. To elaborate, the activation would 
only be present when recognising true words, since they have been heard 
previously unlike the 'new' words.  These findings reflect the brain activation 
differences during the recall of true and false targets (Schacter et al., 1996). 
Karanian and Slotnick (2014) investigated whether this difference in the 
activation of modality specific regions during the recall of true and false target 
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could be a consequence of the stimuli not being sufficiently engaging at the 
sensory level. The researchers hypothesised that given that there is a large 
number of behavioural studies on memory errors that show that the 
misremembered information contains the same amount of sensory detail as 
the correct information, fMRI scans should reveal a similar level of activity for 
both presented stimuli and critical lures, if the information is presented in an 
equally engaging way in the relevant sensory areas (Karanian and Slotnick, 
2014). To test whether the levels of sensory engagement are the source of the 
discrepancy in the previous findings on neural activation during the retrieval of 
true and false targets, Karanian and Slotnick (2014) presented participants 
with shapes, which were either moving on the screen or were stationary. 
During the retrieval phase, participants were presented with the shapes again 
and asked to specify whether, they had been moving or had been stationary 
in the encoding phase. The results did not support the a priori hypothesis, 
showing that the true memory movement produced greater activation in the 
MT+ area than the false memories (region associated with motion processing). 
These results further support the findings of previous research, which showed 
a distinction between the neural activation during recall of true and false 
memory and the behavioural data which suggest equal level of sensory load 
in the recall of false information (Karanian and Slotnick, 2014).  
It is also the encoding of information that shows a distinction between true and 
false memories at the neuronal level. Okado and Stark (2005) demonstrated 
that the neural activity during the encoding of original true information and false 
information can predict the latter recall of true and false memory. Okado and 
Stark (2005) showed participants eight still images in the ‘Original Event 
Phase’ and following that the same images with changed details within them 
in the ’Misinformation Phase’. For example, there would be an image of a man 
holding a DVD box in the ‘Original Event Phase’ and the same picture with a 
different DVD box in the ‘Misinformation Phase’. The participants’ brain activity 
during encoding in the two phases was studied with fMRI. Two days later, 
participants were given a memory test. The results revealed that increased 
activity in the tails of the left hippocampus and increased activity in the left 
perirhinal cortex during the ‘Original Event Phase’ was correlated with the 
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increased recall of true memories.  Furthermore, increased activity during 
encoding in the ‘Misinformation Phase’ predicted more false recall of details 
added in that phase. There was a significant difference in the activation of the 
left hippocampus tail between the true and false recall. These results show 
that it is possible to predict later reports of memory based on monitoring the 
neural activity during information encoding (Okado and Stark, 2005). 
The idea of differentiated encoding and prediction of true and false memory 
recall was further investigated by Baym and Gonsalves (2010), who used an 
experimental set up similar to that of Okado and Stark (2005).  They showed 
participants still images of events in the ‘Original Event Phase’, but instead of 
fabricating those images by adding details, they included sentences describing 
the previously presented images in the ‘Misinformation Phase’, some of which 
had the detail changed. The research further investigated if the quality of the 
encoding of the originally presented information could result in either lowered 
susceptibility or increased likelihood of developing misinformation errors, and 
if the misinformation presented through the verbal modality involves neural 
activity that could predict development of memory errors.  
Baym and Gonsalves (2010) found increased activity in the left fusiform gyrus 
and right temporal/occipital cortex, areas associated with visual processing, 
during the encoding in the ‘Original Event Phase’. At the recall stage it was 
shown that the increased activity was correlated with the correct recall of true 
memories of presented information. The authors suggest that the detailed 
encoding procedure may result in the 'immunity' to the formation of false 
memory (Baym and Gonsalves, 2010) This effect has been previously 
demonstrated through behavioural research, showing that repetition of 
information during the encoding results in a weaker misinformation effect 
(Pezdek and Roe, 1995).  
Further evidence of the MTL being involved in formation of memory errors 
comes from studies on the elderly, which show significant reduction of activity 
in these areas when compared to younger adults, during the retrieval of true 
memories (Dennis et al., 2007). The neural processes and the role of ageing 
in increase of susceptibility to formation of memory errors will be discussed in 
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Chapter 8, where the results of Experiment 3 ('Observation inflation in the 
cohort of elderly participants’) study will be presented.  
2.7.2 Electrophysiological studies of memory errors 
In addition to neuroimaging techniques, measures of electrophysiology, in 
particular ERPs, have been used to investigate cortical activity underlying the 
formation of memory errors. 
Evidence from research measuring ERPs suggests that the neural activity 
classically associated with visual imagery may lead to formation of memory 
errors directly associated with source monitoring failure (Gonsalves and Paller, 
2000). Gonsalves and Paller (2000) exposed participants to an experimental 
task in which they were required to imagine visually common objects when 
presented with a word describing that object. In some of the trials a picture of 
an object was presented to participants instead of a cue word (the word 
describing the object). Participants were then tested on their source recall 
accuracy, where they had to recall objects that they saw on a photograph 
(Gonsalves and Paller, 2000). The results revealed greater parietal and 
occipital activation related to the memory errors, at both the encoding and 
retrieval phase. Furthermore, results revealed the electrophysiological 
difference during the encoding phase, with higher posterior potentials recorded 
for the words that had required visual imagination for an object, and were 
subsequently inaccurately recalled as actually being seen on a photograph. 
On the contrary, during the retrieval phase, the posterior electrodes showed 
greater activation for the recall of true picture memories than imagined objects, 
in particular true pictures elicited more positive posteriors in the occipital and 
parietal regions. Gonsalves and Paller (2000) suggest the discrepancy in the 
posterior ERPs for correct and incorrect recall relates to a different level of 
perceptual details that are processed during encoding and retrieval of true and 
false memories. There is substantial evidence from behavioural research 
showing that people recall more perceptual details about true rather than false 
memories, even when they report being equally confident when recalling false 
memories (Norman and Schacter, 1997).  
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Particularly relevant to this thesis is the work of Leynes and Bink (2002) who 
investigated the electrophysiology of SMEs, by comparing the ERPs elicited 
for encoding and retrieval of actions that were either performed or planned to 
be performed. In the experiment, participants performed a series of actions 
and also planned to perform actions. The actions to either perform or plan to 
perform were randomly chosen from a pool of 111 actions. Examples of the 
actions used were 'bend the wire' or 'crack an egg'. Following this, the ERPs 
were measured during a source memory test where participants were 
presented with a list of originally (i) performed, (ii) planned to be performed 
actions and (iii) novel actions, neither performed nor planned in the test phase. 
They were then asked to recall which of the actions they had performed in the 
first phase of the experiment. The results revealed that underlying cortical 
activity differed for the performed and planned to be performed actions. 
Performed actions triggered more positive activity in the right frontal sites 
(frontal lobe) suggesting that action execution triggers more sensorimotor 
experience than planned to be performed actions, which elicited greater 
negative posteriors at the parietal sites (Leynes and Bink, 2002). However, the 
planned to be performed actions were more likely to be misattributed as 
performed actions than the novel items. This study shows that although it is 
possible to form source memory errors as a result of planning to perform an 
action, the advantage of sensorimotor experience elicited through action 
performance enhances the correct recall of the performed actions (Leynes and 
Bink, 2002). 
2.7.3 The neuropsychology of memory errors 
Much evidence of underlying brain structures responsible for memory error 
formation has come from case studies on patients with brain injuries. Schacter 
et al. (1996a) describes a case of patient BG who made more memory errors 
after suffering an infarction to his right frontal lobe. Patient's lesions covered 
the central sulcus, motor and premotor cortex, rostral precentral gyrus, part of 
postcentral gyrus (inferior frontal tip of the central sulcus). The lesions also 
affected inferior frontal gyrus and the upper Sylvian fissure was destroyed.  
During a series of experiments, BG showed higher false recognition than 
control subjects, after being asked to categorise previously presented and 
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unrepresented words as either  'Remembered', 'Known' or 'New'. Schacter et 
al. (1996a) found that BG made almost three times as many false recognitions 
for unrepresented words during encoding than control participants and also 
found that patient BG was more likely to recall unrepresented words with 
'Remember' responses than control participants indicating that his confidence 
levels were high. As discussed in section 2.5, research on R-K-G recollection 
suggests information recall with these responses represents different types of 
recollection. ‘Remember’ consists of conscious and detailed recollection of 
information while ‘Know’ is undetailed recollection based on the feeling of 
familiarity. This suggests that patient BG not only mistakenly remembered the 
non-presented words in the retrieval phase but also formed a conscious false 
recollection of the qualitative details associated with those words. The same 
pattern was seen in different experiments within the study, when BG's 
recollection was compared for novel words and words not associated to the 
presented words (Schacter et al., 1996a). However, Schacter et al. (1996a) 
found that it is possible to eliminate the false recollection for BG by 
manipulating the nature of the words presented. When BG was presented with 
a list of words belonging to one category in the encoding phase and then with 
a list containing a new word categorically unrelated at the retrieval phase, it 
was found that BG did not form any false recollections. Schacter et al. (1996a) 
argue that BG's tendency to form false recollections resulted from impaired 
frontal lobe functioning which is usually associated with categorising 
information and rejecting the irrelevant information (e.g. Conway and Rubin, 
1993; Shimamura et al., 1995). The initial poor encoding of the words seen in 
the study phase may also result in the inability to then retrieve the correct 
information. Encoding is also supported by frontal lobe which in this case is 
impaired in BG (Schacter et al., 1996a). 
The tendency for increased formation of memory errors has also been 
demonstrated through studies on participants suffering from closed head 
injuries (CHI) (Ries and Marks, 2006). In comparison with control participants, 
twenty CHI patients remembered fewer actual items that were presented to 
them assessed with the DRM word list paradigm.  CHI patients also made 
more false recognitions than control participants for non-presented 
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semantically associated critical lures. Additionally, CHI patients were found to 
report more confidence in recalling the critical lures as actual presented words 
than control subjects. The results suggest that patients with CHI have 
increased susceptibility to develop false memories and although the results 
are only behavioural, previous research such as the study of BG by Schacter 
et al., (1996a) shows that patients with frontal lobe damage demonstrate 
similar susceptibility to memory errors, and frontal lobe islikely to be damaged 
during CHI (Ries and Marks, 2006).  
2.8 Highlights 
 Different types of memory classifications are distinguished, usually 
depending on the duration of memory, characteristics and type of storage. 
 False memory research demonstrated the malleability of memory by 
studying the misinformation, suggestibility and presupposition’s effect on 
memory (Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975). 
 False memory research proposes the memory is a reconstructive process 
(Collins and Loftus, 1975). 
 False recall of non-presented words has been widely studied in word list 
paradigms (DRM paradigm) (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). 
 Two main cognitive theories of SME are Spreading Activation Theory and 
SMF. 
 SMF refers to processes needed in order to recover the origin of a given 
memory (Johnson et al., 1993). 
 False memories and SMEs have been studied in brain imaging, 
electrophysiological and neuropsychological studies.  
 Brain imaging studies suggest that true and false memories are processed 
differently on the neuronal level (Okado and Stark, 2005; Karanian and 
Slotnick, 2014). 
 ERP studies suggest the retrieval of true and false memories elicits a 
different electrophysiological activity (Gonsalves and Palmer, 2000; 
Leynes and Bink, 2002).  
 Neuropsychological research shows that susceptibility for forming memory 
errors is linked with frontal lobe damage (Schacter el al., 1996a; Ries and 
Marks, 2006).  
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Chapter 3 
Imagination inflation and observation inflation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced different types of memory errors and provided a review of 
the literature showing that memories are significantly prone to interference 
resulting in false memory formation.  This chapter will now focus very specifically 
on SMEs and will introduce the imagination and OI effect.   
One type of SME is imagination inflation, in which imagining an event leads to it 
mistakenly being attributed as an actual memory (Garry et al., 1996). Imagination 
inflation gained interest in the 1990s when it was considered a possible factor in 
the formation of recovered memories of sexual abuse during therapy sessions 
(Garry and Polaschek, 2000). This chapter discusses imagination inflation and OI 
in detail. The chapter begins with an overview of relevant theories and research 
in the field of imagination inflation. The OI effect, which is the main focus of this 
thesis, will then be introduced and the relevant developments in the subject area 
reviewed.  
3.2 Background research on imagination inflation 
When trying to remember an event people often imagine it. The same process 
occurs with events that have never happened. Imagery has been shown to result 
in false memories that an event actually happened (e.g. Hyman and Pentland, 
1996, Garry et al., 1996).  
Hyman and Pentland (1996) conducted a series of interviews with 65 participants, 
asking them to describe some true events that happened in their childhood, as 
well as false events that they have never experienced. Hyman and Pentland 
(1996) ensured that the false events had never happened to participants by 
asking their parents prior to the experiment to specify from a prepared list of 
events which have happened to the participants in the past. After being instructed 
to imagine the events that never occurred in the past, 20.5% of participants 
recalled imagined events as true events. Hymand and Pentland (1996) 
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suggested that remembering imagined events as real occurrences is a 
consequence of reconstructive efforts to remember an event.  This leads to 
imagination and subsequent failure to correctly monitor the source of that 
imagery, and mistaking it as really happening in the past (Hyman and Pentland, 
1996).  
Similar research by Garry et al. (1996) used fake childhood scenarios in an 
imagination task and measured participants' confidence level for the likelihood 
that the events have occurred in the past.  The results revealed that participants 
were more confident in recalling previously imagined events as likely to have 
happened in the past, compared to the events they did not imagine (Garry et al., 
1996). The authors argue that due to imagination, the information may become 
more familiar and accessible and consequently seem more real to the 
participants. The trace of familiarity may then result in inflated levels of confidence 
for the imagined events (Garry et al., 1996).  
Broader evidence from research on the imagination inflation effect leads to a 
conclusion that there are several factors and characteristics of information that 
can lead to increase in the size of the effect. 
For example, Marsh et al., (2014) investigated whether perspective changing in 
the imagination of childhood events can influence the ratings of the likelihood of 
occurrence in the past. The research compared the ratings for events that were 
imagined from the first person perspective to the ones imagined from third person 
perspective. The authors hypothesised that the ratings of 'likelihood that the 
events happened' in childhood would be higher after imagining the event from the 
third person perspective. The assumptions were based on previous research on 
the role of visual perspective in memory recollection which claims that the older, 
more distant memories are more likely to be remembered from the third person 
perspective than from the first person perspective, which is associated with 
memories for more recent events. (e.g. Nigro and Neisser, 1983; Robinson and 
Swanson, 1993; Sutin and Robins, 2010).  
Indeed, Marsh et al. (2014) found that only the events imagined from the third 
person perspective resulted in inflation of ratings of likelihood of occurring in the 
past. Marsh et al. (2014) argued that because the imagination from the third 
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person perspective shares the phenomenological characteristics of actual 
memories (that are visualised from third person perspective), it increased the 
similarity of imagined events to the actual ones. Such familiarity between the two 
could then result in source confusion, and attribution of the imagined events as 
actual childhood memories (Marsh et al., 2014). In further experiments, in 
addition to asking participants to imagine childhood events from different 
perspectives, Marsh et al. (2014) asked participants to also imagine recent events 
from first and third person perspectives. The results for imagining childhood 
events supported previous findings, while the recent events, contrary to the 
distant childhood events, were rated as more likely to occur if they had been 
imagined from the first person perspective. This is in line with previous research 
on visualisation and memory (Nigro and Neisser, 1983) and also highlights the 
role of familiarity and availability of information in susceptibility to source 
confusion (Marsh et al., 2014). As the visualisation shares phenomenological 
properties characteristic for a given type of memory, the information is more likely 
to be confused as a real occurrence.  
Additionally, another aspect influencing the susceptibility to form imagination 
inflation errors is the valence of the information and the time in which the 
imagined event is placed. Sharman and Barnier (2008) have shown the 
imagination inflation errors to be increased when the participants were asked to 
imagine positive life events compared to negative events. Also, the imagination 
inflation errors were more likely to be made for the events that were imagined to 
have happened in the recent past (adulthood) compared to the distant past 
(childhood) (Sharman and Barnier, 2008). Participants might have assessed the 
positive imagined events that supposedly happened in their adulthood as true 
memories because they seemed to them to be the most plausible and contributed 
to their own self-image (Sharman and Barnier, 2008).  
Horselenberg et al. (2000) looked at individual differences in relation to the 
imagination inflation effect. Their study replicated the results of previous studies 
on imagination inflation, indicating that the memory misattributions are 
significantly higher when preceded by imagination than when compared to control 
condition (no imagination). Additionally, Horselenberg et al. (2000) found that this 
effect is particularly inflated for participants who displayed higher imagery abilities 
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(as found using a personality test). The results suggest that individuals with more 
developed imagery abilities may be prone to develop imagination inflation errors 
(Horselenberg et al., 2000). Horselenberg et al. (2010) also investigated whether 
the social desirability personality trait could predict heightened imagination 
inflation errors (as was previously suggested by Sharman and Barnier (2008)). 
However, this factor was not found to be a predictor of imagination inflations 
(Horselenberg, 2010).  
A great deal of past research has focused on the aspects of information that might 
contribute to increased imagination inflation but there is also some research 
evidence suggesting ways in which the effect could be reduced. For instance, 
Sharman et al. (2005) showed that including source or familiarity cues in the 
experiment reduced the susceptibility to form errors. However, the effect was only 
present when the participants were given a source cue (either imagining from first 
or third perspective) and a familiarity cue (a plausibility questionnaire). As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, depending on the source of memory, different 
perspectives are imagined differently. Thus, recent events are more likely to be 
remembered from a first person perspective, while more distant, childhood 
events, are typically remembered from third person perspective. Different 
perspective taking when asked to imagine the events served as a cue in correct 
remembering. If the event was imagined in the perspective that matched the time 
of the imagined event (for example third person for distant events), this could 
result in reduction of imagination inflations. The familiarity cue was the plausibility 
questionnaire in which participants had a chance to provide a rating of plausibility 
for each of the events used further in the experiment. The purpose of this was to 
make participants aware of the familiarity for the imagined events (Sharman et 
al., 2005). The results demonstrated that it is possible to employ methods in order 
to reduce imagination inflation errors. This is particularly important in the context 
of the controversial notion of false memories formed during therapy sessions 
resulting from the suggestibility potentially employed by the therapists. Sharman 
et al. (2005) suggests that based on this knowledge, guided imagery therapy 
should use examples that make the source of imagined information distinct, in 
order to avoid source confusion errors and misattribution of imagined events as 
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real memories.  More applications of imagination inflation research will now be 
discussed. 
3.3 Applications of imagination inflation research 
The controversy surrounding instances of recovered memories of sexual abuse 
in the past decade has provided impetus for research on false memories. Often 
imagination techniques are used as a tool during those therapeutic sessions 
(Leavitt, 1997).  
For example, cognitive behavioural therapy uses imagination as a tool in tackling 
anxiety disorders such as phobias (Amiri and Dariyabari, 2013). Often through 
imagination of the feared object or a situation, one is able to get comfortable with 
the idea of it. Although effective (Hofmann et al., 2012), such imaginative 
sessions may lead to actually remembering a positive encounter with the 
imagined object and misremembering it as an actual experience.  
Special care should be taken as research on imagination inflation has 
demonstrated how easy it is to form a false memory based on brief imagination 
(Garry et al., 1996). In addition to the techniques applied during therapy sessions, 
many self-help resources rely on imagination (Pezdek, 2001). It is especially 
risky, as the individual using those techniques is doing it alone without any 
guidelines from a therapist. If the imagination is used, one must make an effort to 
establish the source of the imagination in order not to be confused with reality. 
3.4 Criticism of imagination inflation research 
There is critique regarding the misinterpretation of statistical results produced by 
imagination inflation research.  The previously discussed research by Garry et al. 
(1996), which suggested that brief imagination of events results in imagination 
inflation errors and increased confidence that they actually happened was 
criticised by Pezdek (2001) as really being a statistical artefact of regression 
toward the mean. Pezdek (2001) suggested that the inflation of confidence 
ratings of imagined events was not actually the imagination inflation effect and 
memory distortion but a failure to interpret the statistical results correctly.   The 
results of Garry et al. (1996) were replicated by Pezdek (2001) showing the same 
pattern of results. Similarly as in the results of Garry's et al. (1996) study, the 
confidence for events that were initially rated as  low increased between part one 
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and part two of the experiment, and conversely ratings that were high in the first 
part of the experiment decreased in the second part. The pattern was the same 
for the events that participants did not imagine.  Based on this research, Pezdek 
(2001) suggested that the results do not indicate that the inflation of memory 
errors in imagination inflation research is actually a memory error, but is a 
misinterpretation of statistical results. Thus, it should not be used as evidence 
that barely thinking about an event can result in false memories of it. 
3.5 Observation inflation effect – remembering observed actions as self-
performed 
The OI effect is a relatively novel type of source memory error. The effect has 
been proposed to be a failure in source monitoring, where observed actions are 
misattributed as self-performed actions (Lindner et al., 2010).  
An example of OI error would be observing someone taking medication and later 
remembering taking the medication oneself. This SME could result in some 
undesirable consequences.  
In sections 3.1-3.4, the plausibility of imagination being attributed as one's 
memory was demonstrated in supporting research. Since observation of actions 
is something people engage in on everyday basis, and it has been shown to elicit 
motor activation similar to when the action is actually performed (Rizzolatti et al., 
1996); source monitoring errors could be expected to occur between observation 
of action and self -performance. 
The OI effect, as far as I am aware, has only been researched directly in four 
studies until now (Lindner et al., 2010; Schain et al., 2012; Lindner et al., 2012; 
Lindner and Davidson, 2014). 
Drawing on the imagination inflation effect, Lindner et al. (2010) tested if observed 
actions can be misattributed as one's own memory of self-performance. In their 
first study on OI, Lindner et al. (2010) tested the OI in two phases. In the first 
phase participants either only read statements describing an action or performed 
the described actions. In the second phase of the experiment, the participants 
were required to either (i) observe an action, where 10 actions were shown, each 
twice during the presentation on average; (ii) imagine an action, where 
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participants were required to imagine themselves performing an action described 
in the action statement; (iii) generate, where participants were asked to 
unscramble a fragmented version of the action statement; or (iv) read an action 
statement repeatedly. After two weeks, the participants were tested on their 
memory in a source memory test, where they were required to specify which of 
the actions from the experiment they had performed. The results revealed both 
an imagination inflation and observation inflation effect were present in the 
experiment. Lindner et al. (2010) therefore demonstrated that it is possible to 
falsely remember observed actions as self-preformed.  
Additionally, Lindner et al. (2010) showed that the OI effect is not caused only by 
poor source monitoring abilities, such as when an individual does not pay enough 
attention to the source of memory. In another experiment within Lindner’s (2010) 
study,  a robust OI effect was found when participants were explicitly instructed 
to pay attention to the source of the presented actions and also when they were 
'warned' about the OI effect. Interestingly, and central to the remainder of the 
investigations of this thesis Lindner et al. (2010) explain the OI effect in relation 
to mirror neurone theory (which will be introduced in detail in Chapter 6). Lindner 
et al. (2010) suggests that shared motor activation during observation and 
execution of actions results in a source confusion between the two. The OI effect 
was also found in other research: (i) Schain et al., 2012, which will be discussed 
in Chapter 6; (ii) Lindner and Davidson, 2014 – discussed in Chapter 8 and (iii) 
Lindner et al., 2012 – discussed in Chapter 11.  
3.6 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter introduced the concept of imagination inflation and OI. The 
presented research has demonstrated that it is possible to form memory errors 
after imagining an action or event taking place. The OI effect draws on the 
imagination inflation research and demonstrates that a brief observation of action 
leads to remembering that action as self-performed. Given the novel hypothesis 
of Lindner et al., (2010), that mirror neurones could underlay an OI effect, and 
the aim of the thesis, the next chapter will introduce motor cognition, motor 
memory and mirror neurones. 
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3.6.1 Highlights 
 Imagining action can result in SMEs and remembering the actions as 
self-performed (Garry et al., 1996) (imagination inflation effect).  
 Observation of actions can result in memories of self-performance (OI) 
(Lindner et al, 2010). 
 OI has been proposed to be a result of failure in source monitoring 
facilitated by possible involvement of mirror neurones 
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Chapter 4 
Motor cognition, mirror neurones and action 
imitation 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the concept of motor memory and motor 
cognition. The discovery of mirror neurones (Gallese et al., 1996) revealed that 
observation of actions can result in motor activation similar to when an action is 
actually being performed. In this chapter, research showing facilitation (motor 
priming) of action execution resulting from prior action observation will be 
discussed. Since the observation of actions enhances later reproduction and 
imitation of actions, research within this area will also be discussed, especially 
regarding the difference in imitation of different types of actions, central to the 
hypotheses of this thesis. 
4.2 Motor cognition  
The term motor cognition refers to a set of processes essential for the production 
and understanding of a person’s own actions and the actions of others 
(Sommerville and Decety, 2006). This can include planning to execute an action, 
performing actions oneself, perceiving actions and understanding and 
anticipating actions of others. As mirror neurone theory suggests, action 
observation triggers overlapping brain activity similar to when the action is 
actually performed and cognition is a result of those mirroring mechanisms 
(Pulvermuller et al., 2014).  Similar to “babbling” seen in children  as they acquire 
language, the perception of actions being performed leads to a so-called ‘manual 
babbling’ and involves repetition of those actions (Pulvermuller et al., 2014).  
Research shows that the articulation of syllables activates brain areas 
responsible for articulating motor and speech areas (Pulvermuller et al., 2014).   
Action observation and the mapping of motor mechanisms of observed actions 
into one’s own motor repertoire are demonstrated through phenomena such as 
32 
 
motor priming and also play a role in action imitation. The following section 
discusses these terms in more detail. 
4.3 Action facilitation and imitation 
Priming is a type of implicit memory in which observation of one stimulus 
influences the responses to a stimulus presented later (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 
1971). In the case of motor priming, studies have shown that action reproduction 
is facilitated by the prior observation of a similar motor action (Brattan et al., 
2014). The research on motor priming supports the idea that action observation 
and execution share the same representational basis (Wilson and Knoblich, 
2005). For example, during execution of a simple action (e.g. tapping a finger), 
observation of a congruent action (tapping a finger) at the same time is likely to 
result in facilitation of that performance.  The opposite is seen if the observed 
action was incongruent (e.g. finger lifting), resulting in a longer time spent 
executing the action (Brass et al., 2001). 
Brass et al. (2001) showed that reaction times for performing movements are 
faster when participants are presented with a video of the same (congruent) 
action being performed prior to execution of the movements. In the experiment, 
participants were required to observe videos of finger movements being 
performed (finger lifting or finger tapping), and following that, they were required 
to perform movements themselves. The movements were either congruent or 
incongruent with the previously observed movement seen on the video. The 
reaction times showed that observing congruent movements had a facilitating 
effect on the speed of execution (reaction times (RTs) decreased).  However, 
observation of incongruent movements slowed down the RTs for movement 
execution. This shows that prior observation of simple movements facilitate its 
later reproduction.  Importantly this suggests that action observation shares the 
neural representations with those involved in action execution, hypothesised to 
be the result of mirror neurone activity (Brass et al., 2001).  
The same effect was observed in further research using a similar paradigm in an 
fMRI study (Brass et al., 2001a).  As in Brass et al. (2001), congruent and 
incongruent movements were shown to participants (on video frame sequences), 
however, participants were instructed to perform predefined (either finger lifting 
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or finger tapping) movements at the same time as watching the video frame 
sequences (Brass et al, 2001a). In addition to replicating this behavioural effect 
(decreased RTs for congruent movements and increased RTs for incongruent 
movements), Brass et al. (2001a) also found that the prefrontal cortex is involved 
in suppressing the tendency to imitate the observed action.  
In addition to having a facilitating effect on action imitation, observation of motor 
action may interfere with the executed action (Kilner et al., 2003). In a study by 
Kilner et al. (2003) participants were instructed to perform horizontal or vertical 
movements with their arms whilst observing congruent or incongruent 
movements performed by either humans or robots. Interestingly, in contrast to 
the previous studies discussed above, it was found that interference was present 
when the participants performed and observed the same actions simultaneously 
(the congruent condition).  However, the interference in performance was present 
only when the participants observed human stimuli and not when the action 
execution was simultaneous to the observation of a robotic hand. These findings 
suggest that action observation and action execution activate the same motor 
areas, which in turn causes the interference and impairment in the execution of 
actions. Kilner et al. (2003) hypothesised that simultaneous activation of motor 
areas when action is observed and performed leads to a ‘competition’ in 
activation of which the result is interference in the produced motor output. 
This effect could support the claim that the mirror neurones are activated when 
an individual is performing an action as well as when they are observing others 
performing the same action. The results of these studies provide evidence for two 
behavioural effects where (i) observation of a congruent action before execution 
of a similar action facilitates the action execution (Brass et al., 2001, 2001a) and 
(ii) the interference effect, when simultaneous observation and execution of 
congruent action leads to interference and impairment of the action that is being 
executed (Kilner et al., 2003).  
34 
 
Similarly, Press et al. (2007) hypothesised that imitation of actions will be primed 
following the observation of biological stimuli (for example a human hand) but the 
effect will be decreased if the action is imitated after observation of a movement 
executed by a robotic hand.  According to Press et al. (2007), facilitation of action 
imitation is a consequence of mirror neurone activity, and the effect of priming 
should be advantageous after observation of human movement because of years 
of sensorimotor experience and observation of human actions. This is contrary to 
experience of observation and imitation of actions in non-humans of which one 
has little experience. However, Press et al. (2007) found that exposing 
participants to brief sensorimotor training with the robot can in fact enhance the 
imitation of robotic actions. In the experiment, participants were presented with 
four different types of stimulus (i) human stimuli, (ii) robotic stimuli, both types 
subdivided into two subgroups, (i) naturalistic and (ii) schematic representations 
of a human and robotic hand.  See Figure 4.1 for examples of the stimuli used in 
this study. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Example of stimuli used by Press et al. (2007). (a) human natural 
stimuli, (b) robotic natural stimuli, c) human schematic stimuli, (d) robotic 
schematic stimuli.   
In the experiment, participants were required to observe movements being 
performed by human or robotic stimuli and following that, they were required to 
perform a movement either compatible or incompatible with the previously 
observed movement. The results of the experiment showed that participants’ 
responses were faster for trials in which they previously observed compatible 
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movements compared to the incompatible movements. Moreover, the 
movements were imitated better when the participants had previously observed 
the movements being performed by the human stimuli, both naturalistic and 
schematic, than when they observed movements being performed by the robotic 
stimuli (Press et al., 2007). However, a facilitation effect was still seen for 
compatible movements in the robotic stimuli.  As stated above, these results 
could be explained as an effect in which using information from a previously 
acquired motor memory emerging from observation of humans, unlike the novel 
robotic stimuli. 
Similarly, Press et al. (2006) showed a disadvantage in responding to robotic 
stimuli compared to human stimuli in congruent and incongruent trials despite 
participants’ rating of animacy for given stimuli. For example, when participants 
were asked to perform a predefined movement (participants were told which 
movement to perform before the trial. e.g. hand opening or hand closing) and the 
execution was preceded by observation of either robotic or human hand 
movements, the response speed after observation of the human hand was faster 
than for the robotic hand (Press et al., 2006). 
The same pattern of response to previously presented human and robotic motor 
stimuli was found by Press et al. (2005) in an electromyography (EMG) study, 
showing that both human and robotic compatible stimuli resulted in faster RTs 
than incompatible stimuli. The participants were supposed to perform a pre-
specified movement (either open or close hand) simultaneously with the onset of 
actions on the screen (either human or robotic stimuli). However, even though 
the motor priming was still present for the robotic stimuli, the magnitude of the 
effect was significantly higher for the human stimuli, where the actions were 
imitated faster (Press et al., 2005). 
 4.4 Motor memory  
Motor memory is memory for motor skills, for example riding a bicycle, playing an 
instrument, writing or simple reflexes (Krakauer and Shadmehr, 2006). Motor 
memory is a form of procedural memory, which is implicit memory of how to 
perform various tasks (Nudo, 2008). 
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Formation of motor memories usually involves repetition of a motor task. When a 
task is performed, this action execution is stored in STM. Repetition of the task 
then allows the information to then be stored in LTM (Sommerville and Decety, 
2006). 
Such encoding is referred to as motor learning and involves the activation of 
motor and somatosensory cortices as well as frontal and prefrontal cortices, 
essential for attention associated with learning a new task (Nudo, 2008). This 
activation decreases once the skill is learned (Nudo, 2008).   
It is not clear exactly where the motor memories are stored in the brain but it has 
been proposed that they may be stored within networks of the cerebellum and 
basal ganglia (Ma et al., 2010). Motor memory is thought to be formed because 
of a change in synaptic connectivity that is a result of neuronal firing when the 
action is repeatedly executed. To clarify, when a person repeats a movement, 
this stimulation causes neurons in motor areas to fire, and strengthens the inter-
regional connectivity of neurons, as shown in the fMRI study of Ma et al. (2010).  
Brain imaging studies investigating mirror neurone activity have found the motor 
cortices to be associated with the mirror neurone activity, in particular the primary 
motor cortex, the supplementary motor area and the premotor cortex. These are 
the areas that are primarily associated with the control and execution of 
movement, however, research has shown that they are also active when one is 
observing an action being executed (Doyon et al., 2009). However, this evidence 
comes mostly from fMRI studies which remain opaque at the precise neuronal 
level.  
The involvement of mirror neurones in formation of motor memories was 
suggested in a TMS study by Stefan et al. (2005). In the experiment participants 
were instructed to observe simple thumb movements. The TMS study found that 
short observation of simple movements led to kinematic motor memory similar to 
the memory trace triggered by the physical stimulation when the same action was 
performed (Stefan et al., 2005).    
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4.5 Mirror neurones and imitation 
As discussed above, the mirror neurone system can be an important factor in 
action priming and imitation (Sommerville and Decety, 2006).  Mirror neurones 
are neurones that are activated when one is performing an action as well as when 
the same action is observed (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Because 
of the overlapping neural activation of sensorimotor brain areas present in both 
action observation and execution, such motor matching activation can give the 
observer the experience of actually performing the action (Gallese et al., 1996). 
Thus, mirror neurones could play an important role in action recognition which is 
essential for the understanding of social behaviour (Buccino et al., 2004).  
Mirror neurones have been investigated in both monkeys and humans with the 
use of various brain imagining techniques as well as direct observation on the 
single cell level (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Molenberghs et al., 2009; Mukamel at al., 
2010). Most of the single neurone recordings of mirror neurones come from the 
studies on macaque monkeys but up until now, only one study has observed such 
activity on the cellular level in humans (Mukamel et al., 2010). Single cell 
recordings are the most reliable technique of observing the mirroring activity; 
however, due to its invasive nature and potential risks, they are difficult to perform 
in humans. Most of the data on mirror neurone activity in humans come from the 
fMRI or TMS studies, which allow for the observation of active brain areas during 
action observation and execution.  
The research on mirror neurones has provided scientific support for some 
psychological concepts proposed to explain human behaviour. For example, the 
ideomotor theory of imitation (Hommel and Prinz, 1997) claims that the observed 
stimuli are 'translated' into motor responses in the observer. This means, when 
one observes actions being performed by somebody else, they activate the 
responses in their own motor system that would be a consequence of action 
execution if they were the performers. This fits into the mirror neurone theory that 
claims that observation of actions trigger similar neuronal responses to when the 
action is actually performed (Iacoboni, 2009). Mirror neurones then, could explain 
more complex behaviour based on imitations of others, for example development 
of language (Perlovsky and Ilin, 2013) or empathy (Corradini and Anonietti, 2013) 
and play a crucial role in social cognition.  
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Past research on the subject of imitation has proposed that action imitation 
involves two main components (Sommerville and Decety, 2006). The first 
component is recognition of the goal of the action (for example, switching on a 
light) and the second is the reproduction of the action through the means in which 
the goal is achieved (for example, tapping the light switch with head) (Hobson 
and Lee, 1999; Sommerville and Decety, 2006). This ability to imitate the goal of 
the action and the means through which it is produced is a unique human ability 
that can be observed in different contexts. Research has shown that nonhuman 
primates do not possess the ability to both reproduce the goal and the 
movements necessary to imitate (Tomasello et al., 1997; Tomasello, 1999).  
Neuroimaging studies show that distinct neural processes are responsible for 
processing the goal of action and the movements through which it is reproduced 
when being imitated (Chaminade et al., 2002). In a PET study, participants 
observed a brief movement of actor's right hand manipulating a Lego block 
(imitation of the means of action) or were just shown a goal of the action 
(manipulated Lego block). Following the observation, they were required to 
imitate the just observed action (hand manipulation of Lego block). The results 
revealed overlapping activity in the cerebellum, both when the participants 
imitated the goal of the actions and the movements made in order to achieve the 
goal. However, activation was present in the medial prefrontal cortex only during 
the imitation of movements but not when just shown the goal of the action, and 
imitation of the goal of the action was characterised by distinct activation in the 
left premotor cortex (Chaminade et al., 2002). 
Research on action imitation suggests that the goal-directed actions are imitated 
better because of a prior acquisition of relevant motor memories, thus priming the 
reproduction (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). According to the associative learning 
hypothesis of mirror neurons (Heyes, 2010), the actions which one has previously 
been exposed to, either by performance or observation, trigger more mirroring 
responses than those that are unfamiliar to them (Ferrari et al, 2005). For 
example, pianists observing finger movements on a piano keyboard show greater 
activation of brain areas responsible for those specific hand-finger movements 
than control participants (Haslinger et al, 2005). Similarly, Calvo-Merino et al. 
(2006) found that ballet dancers show increased activity in the premotor cortex 
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when observing ballet movements that they have previously performed.  Such 
activation was absent when they observed Capoeira dance moves that they had 
never practised or were familiar with. This is considered to be a consequence of 
mirror neurone activity.    
4.6 Imitation of different types of actions 
Understanding actions and gestures is an essential part of human social 
cognition. The action has a meaning when it is goal-directed and has a specific 
purpose.  Research has shown that people imitate actions that are meaningful 
better than actions that carry no meaning (Rumiati et al, 2005). The main reason 
for this is thought to be that actions that are meaningful are stored in LTM and 
semantic memory, and their encoding requires involvement of visual analysis, 
LTM, STM, WM and the motor system before the action is imitated (Rumiati and 
Tessari, 2002). The meaningful actions are stored in LTM and are recognised 
because of their familiarity gained from previous experience in action 
performance and sensorimotor learning. According to the associative learning 
hypothesis of mirror neurones, the actions which one has been previously 
exposed to, either by performance or observation, trigger more mirroring 
responses than those that are unfamiliar to them (Ferrari et al, 2005, Haslinger 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, an fMRI study showed activation of brain areas during 
the observation of goal-directed actions even when the objects were absent 
(Molenberghs et al., 2012). This supports the claim that the observation of goal-
directed actions can trigger the activation of mirror neurones. This review will now 
look at different types of actions, in particular meaningless, meaningful and 
communicative. 
Meaningless actions are those that are not goal-directed and are not typically 
performed. According to Rumiati and Tessari (2002), meaningless actions are not 
stored in LTM because of a lack of any previous sensorimotor learning 
experiences.  Their reproduction therefore relies on direct encoding from the 
visual stimuli directly in working memory (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). Previous 
research has supported this assumption, showing that imitation of meaningless 
actions is significantly worse than the imitation of meaningful actions, as 
meaningless actions rely only on visual stimulation for their reproduction (Rumiati 
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and Tessari, 2002). See Figure 4.2 for the model of imitation proposed by Tessari 
et al. (2007). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Tessari et al. (2007), two-route model for imitation. The semantic 
route is used when meaningful actions are imitated and relies on visual 
recognition, retrieval from LTM into STM, and is reproduced as an output action. 
The direct route on the other hand involves only visual analysis and direct 
retrieval from STM/WM. This route would be used for imitation of meaningless 
actions.  
This was further supported by Tessari et al. (2006), who found that participants 
performing meaningless actions create a memory trace for them in LTM. This 
results in imitation of meaningless actions from LTM, as in the case of meaningful 
actions. Additionally, Tessari et al. (2006) found that the newly learnt meaningless 
actions are imitated even better than meaningful actions. This might be because 
unlike meaningful actions, which retrieval requires discrimination from more 
traces of these actions, there is only one memory trace present in the LTM of the 
meaningless actions (Tessari et al., 2006).   
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Communicative gestures are meaningful when there is a recipient of these 
actions toward whom they are expressed. There are different types of 
communicative gestures, for example, communicative emblems (showing a 
'thumbs up' sign), co-speech gestures (for example, moving hands to exaggerate 
something) and sign language gestures (Andric et al., 2013). Communicative 
emblems do not use linguistic features that are present in sign language gestures 
and also are not accompanied by speech to convey meaning like co-speech 
gestures (Andric et al., 2013). In order to understand meaning of communicative 
emblems, the brain must encode both the meaningful and symbolic expression 
as well as goal-directed hand actions (Andric et al., 2013). Research has shown 
that during the observation of communicative emblems, the brain areas that are 
active overlap with areas that are active during observation of both speech and 
grasping (Andric et al., 2013). The areas identified to be active during observation 
of emblems are both those involved in linguistics (the lateral temporal and inferior 
temporal frontal areas), and those involved in hand manipulation (parietal and 
premotor areas (Andric et al., 2013).  
Furthermore research on imitation of different types of actions shows that 
meaningful communicative (intransitive) actions are imitated better than 
meaningful goal-directed actions (transitive) (Carmo and Rumiati, 2009). Carmo 
and Rumiati (2009) suggest that communicative actions do not involve objects 
and do not require as advanced cognitive system processing as meaningful 
actions, which are associated with objects. This is further supported by the fact 
that meaningless communicative actions are imitated better than meaningless 
actions that involve object manipulation (Carmo and Rumiati, 2009). 
4.7 Summary 
Action observation can result in similar neuronal activation as that seen when the 
action is actually performed (Ferrari et al., 205). The discovery of mirror neurones 
has provided understanding of mechanisms involved in social cognition, action 
understanding and action imitation. By observing and performing the actions, 
humans are able to form motor memories and understand their own actions and 
actions of others. Research shows that actions are processed and imitated 
differently, depending on their type (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002; Tessari et al. 
2006; Tessari et al., 2007). 
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Lindner et al. (2010) proposed that mirror neurones can potentially stand behind 
OIs, therefore this thesis investigates this hypothesis further using different types 
of actions - meaningless, meaningful and communicative gestures with the 
hypothesis that more OIs will be made for communicative actions and meaningful 
actions (thought to have higher levels of mirror neurone activity).  Communicative 
and meaningful actions have been found to elicit similar mirror neurone activity 
(Montgomery et al., 2007). Additionally, some research proposes that 
communicative emblems elicit higher mirror neurone activation than meaningful 
actions (e.g. Husain et al., 2012; Andric et al., 2013). 
4.7.1 Highlights 
 Action observation triggers similar neuronal activity to when the action is 
performed (mirror neurones) (Gallese et al., 1996; Ferrari et al., 2005). 
 Mirror neurones are thought to be involved in motor cognition which is a 
set of processes essential for the production and understanding of a 
person’s own actions and the actions of others (Sommerville and Decety, 
2006). 
 Studies have shown that action reproduction is facilitated by the prior 
observation of a similar motor action (motor priming) (Brattan et al., 2014; 
Brass et al., 2001; Press et al., 2007). 
 Observation of motor movements has been found to result in motor 
memory of that movement (Stefan et al., 2005). 
 Familiar actions trigger stronger mirror neurone activity than unfamiliar 
actions (Haslinger et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino, et al., 2006).  
 Actions have been shown to be processed and imitated differently, 
depending on their type (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). 
 Meaningful actions are imitated better than meaningless actions (Rumiati 
and Tessari, 2002). 
 Communicative actions show imitation advantage over meaningful actions 
(Carmo and Rumiati, 2009).  
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Chapter 5 
Types of memory recollections – the Remember-
Know-Guess questionnaire 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Many studies on false memory employ assessment of memory recollection type.  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss different states of conscious recollection of 
memory, measured with the Remember-Know-Guess questionnaire (R-K-G) 
(Gardiner et al., 1996). The questionnaire allows the participants to decide on the 
type of the recollection they have for a particular memory, depending on the 
strength of the memory trace.  This can include the level of detail they are able to 
recall about it or feelings of familiarity. Given OIs can be considered a type of 
'false memory', or at least a SME, the type of recollection responses given by 
participants were recorded in the experiments of this thesis, in order to explore 
the type of recollection participants had for the OIs formed.  
5.2 Investigating the type of memory recollection – Remember-Know-
Guess responses  
The R-K-G paradigm is a methodology used to investigate the conscious 
recollection of tested stimuli. The paradigm aims to determine the strength of a 
memory trace (Gardiner et al., 2002). This methodology is especially useful in 
false memory and false recall studies (Roediger and McDermott, 1995).  
The Remember-Know procedure (without ‘Guess’) was originally proposed by 
Tulving (1972) who developed it as a technique to assess and distinguish 
between episodic and semantic memories. Episodic memory refers to the 
memories of oneself at a specific place and time and is thought to be more related 
to the 'Remember' response (Tulving, 1972). Semantic memories on the other 
hand are not self-referential, and are linked to more general knowledge (e.g. 
capitals of countries in the world) and are thought to be recollected with the 'Know' 
response (Tulving, 1972). Although the sense behind each of the judgements is 
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still related to the original purpose, the questionnaire is currently used to measure 
the type of memory recollection, rather than to differentiate between episodic and 
semantic memory (Mickes et al., 2013). 
The 'Remember' response refers to recollection of episodic memories with 
reference to the self. The information recollected is rich in qualitative information 
and is more detailed than the information retrieved with the 'Know' response. 
Contrary to the initial purpose of 'Know' judgements which was to investigate 
semantic memories without any self-reference, it is now considered an indicator 
of familiarity and recollection, but poorer in detail than ‘Remember’ responses 
(Mickes et al., 2013, McGabe et al., 2009). Thus, the ‘Remember’ recollection 
shows strong and conscious recollection of information about an event or item. 
'Know' responses imply the existence of the item or event and are marked by 
feelings of familiarity (McMillan et al., 2003). ‘Guess’ responses indicate 
recognition but are not based on any memories; they show no recollection or 
familiarity of presented stimuli (Horry et al., 2010). The ‘Guess’ responses are 
usually included for items that are judged to have been previously seen, but the 
source of the memory or memory of this item is not present. The purpose of this 
response option is really to strengthen the R-K-G questionnaire, since the 
absence of the 'Guess' response option could force the responses to be judged 
as not remembered at all – even though there is a trace of recollection (Horry et 
al., 2010). Furthermore without the ‘Guess’ option the pattern of Remember-
Know responses could also be incorrect as the recollections with 'Guess' 
judgements could erroneously be allocated to 'Know' responses instead. 
5.3 Different R-K-G procedures 
The R-K-G procedure differs in the number of steps it involves. The R-K-G can 
be carried out as  (i) a one-step procedure; (ii) two step procedure and include 
the ‘Guess’ option or  (iii) only include ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses (Bruno 
and Rutherford, 2010). 
The one-step procedure involves presenting an item to participants and asking 
them to specify whether they ‘Remember, ‘Know’ or ‘Guess’ that they recall the 
item or to classify it as a ‘new’ item (where they think that the item has not been 
seen previously). This type of procedure however, can implicitly suggest to 
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participants that the items have been seen before, because they are immediately 
asked whether they ‘Remembered’, ‘Knew’ or ‘Guessed’ that they encountered 
the tested stimuli (Bruno and Rutherford, 2010).  
A different kind of procedure using the R-K-G paradigm involves two steps (Java 
et al., 1997; Bruno and Rutherford, 2010). In the first step, after the participants 
have been presented with the stimuli, they are asked to decide whether each item 
is old or new. In this case, old and new refers to whether the item presented in 
the retrieval has been encountered in the previous stages of the experiment (old) 
or not (new). In the second phase of this procedure, the R-K-G paradigm is then 
given to participants to decide whether they ‘Remember’, ‘Know’ or ‘Guess’ (if 
‘Guess’ option is included in the paradigm) that they have previously encountered 
the item. Bruno and Rutherford (2010) attempted to compare the false recall rates 
between the two procedure types and found equal recognition accuracy, 
regardless of whether the one-step or two-step procedure was used. This means 
that the number of items correctly and falsely recognised as previously seen did 
not differ when the participants were asked with either of the two procedures 
(Bruno and Rutherford, 2010).  
Another important factor when using the R-K-G paradigm is the type of the 
instruction given to participants (Geraci et al., 2009). Interestingly, changes in 
how the R-K-G terms are explained or defined to the participants can affect what 
is actually being measured. Geraci et al (2009) tested this in two experimental 
sessions. In the first part they presented the participants with a list of 30 items (in 
which half of the items were real words and the other half were non-words). The 
participants were instructed to memorise the words from the list. After a retention 
interval (approximately 10 minutes), the R-K-G instructions were read to them 
and the participants completed the recognition test. One week later, they were 
invited for another recognition test, where they were again presented with a new 
list of 30 words. After a testing delay following the experiment, they were given a 
recognition test where they specified whether they were ‘sure’ or ‘unsure’ that 
they saw the word in the presentation before. The results revealed that 
participants were more likely to recall real words with the sure response that the 
non-words. In another experiment within the same study, Geraci et al. (2009) 
used the same procedure to test the recollection but used a different set of 
46 
 
instructions. The 'Know' responses were defined as indicators of lower 
confidence for recollection of particular words from the presented lists (Geraci et 
al, 2009).  
The results of both experiments showed that the type of the instructions used in 
the experiments give different results in terms of the pattern of confidence 
reflected by ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses (Geraci et al., 2009). This means 
that when participants were given instructions that suggested a ‘Know’ response 
as indicating high confidence of recollecting the tested words, the pattern of 
‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses differed from the one of ‘sure’ and ‘unsure’ 
judgements. However, when the instructions suggested that a ‘Know’ response 
reflects a lower confidence in recalling the word as previously presented, the 
pattern of ‘Remember’ – ‘Know’ responses was similar to the one of sure-unsure 
judgements. This means, participants were more likely to recall the studied words 
with 'Remember' and 'sure' responses than' Know' and 'unsure' (Geraci et al., 
2009). These results highlight the importance of the wording of the instructions 
given to participants in the R-K-G paradigm and the subsequent interpretation of 
the results.  
Furthermore, Frithsen and Miller (2014) found dissociation in the activation within 
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) when participants recalled words with 
‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses. In the study, participants were presented with 
a 300 words word list and took a ‘Remember’ – ‘Know’ test while in the fMRI 
scanner. The results revealed that the familiarity judgements (the ‘Know’ answer) 
showed greater activation in the intraparietal sulcus and superior parietal lobule. 
Recollection (words judged as ‘Remembered') caused activation in the ventral 
regions, especially the inferior parietal lobule and within angular gyrus. These 
differences suggest a variation in the cognitive demand that is a consequence of 
each retrieval type (for example, self-referential processing when making 
‘Remember’ judgements). The difference in activation found in the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) can be related to patient studies, where patients with 
damage to the PCC show difficulties in processing the conscious experience of 
remembering (Frithsen and Miller, 2014). For example, some of the symptoms 
parietal patients demonstrate include lack of detail in their memories or lack of 
confidence that the recalled events actually happened (Davidson et al., 2008). 
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Additionally, patients with parietal damage show difficulties in the ability to 
perform on the R-K-G paradigm, compared to other source memory tests. This is 
thought to be because R-K-G relies more on the processes related to the 
activation of ventral PCC, as demonstrated by Frithsen and Miller’s study (2014). 
5.4 Summary 
R-K-G questionnaire allows study of different types of memory recollections. 
‘Remember’ judgements are associated with a conscious recollection, when one 
remembers qualitative details associated with the information, for example 
thoughts or feelings. ‘Know’ judgements relate to recollection that is not detailed 
and associated with feelings of familiarity. Contrary, ‘Guess’ judgements indicate 
that one has guessed that they encountered information or event in the past.  
In the experiments of this thesis, the R-K-G questionnaire was used to investigate 
the type of recollection for OIs and SAIs.  
5.4.1 Highlights  
 R-K-G relates to different memory recollection types. 
 ‘Remember’ recollections are associated with conscious and detailed 
recollection of memory. 
 ‘Know’ responses express feelings of familiarity towards an item or event, 
but being unable to recall any specific details. 
 ‘Guess’ response indicates no recollection. 
 The instructions for the R-K-G paradigm can affect the meaning of 
collected data (Geraci et al., 2009). 
 Past research showed that retrieval of words with ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ 
activated different brain areas (Frithsen and Miller, 2014).  
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Chapter 6 
The observation inflation effect – memory for 
different types of actions 
6.1 Introduction 
This first experimental chapter investigates the OI effect in a healthy young adult 
sample. OI is a SME in which action observation results in memories of self-
performance. In this chapter, potential OI effects will be discussed as a result of 
the observation of different types of actions: meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative. Since previous research proposes that OI is a result of underlying 
mirror neurone activity (e.g. Lindner et al., 2010) triggered by action observation, 
it will be hypothesised that different pattern of OIs will be present depending on 
the action type that was observed, as different action types recruit mirror 
neurones differently (e.g. Husain et al., 2012; Montgomery et al., 2007; Rizzolatti 
and Arbib, 1998). 
6.1.1 Observation Inflation  
Lindner et al. (2010) demonstrated that it is possible to remember observed 
actions as self-performed and termed these SMEs as observation inflations (OIs). 
The first study of Lindner's (2010) on OI involved three experiments in which 
participants were subjected to a variety of conditions after which their memory 
was tested. In the first experiment of the original study, Lindner et al. (2010) 
exposed the participants to two conditions. In the first condition, all the 
participants observed videos of simple actions being performed depicted from the 
third perspective (i.e. performed by another person). The other conditions 
involved either (i) reading an action statement, (ii) performing a described action, 
(iii) repeatedly imagining performing a described action, or (iv) unscrambling an 
action statement from a fragmented version of an action statement. Lindner et al. 
(2010) found that the inflation effect for source memory errors was significantly 
higher when the participants observed and imagined the action, than if they 
simply read or unscrambled the word. These results demonstrated that it is 
plausible to form memories of self-performance by action observation (Lindner et 
49 
 
al., 2010).  
Potential causes of this effect were attributed to inattentive source monitoring 
processes resulting in source confusion and attribution of the observed action as 
self-performed. To minimise the potential influence of lax source monitoring on 
formation of OIs, Lindner et al. (2010) employed additional instructions to the 
procedure from Experiment 1. Two groups of participants were warned before the 
source memory test to either (i) try to remember any self-performance cues (e.g. 
their feelings, sounds or any specific detail about the observed/performed 
actions) and to pay attention to whether it was them or the actor performing the 
actions; or (ii) in the second condition, participants were specifically informed 
about the OI effect and warned to avoid making these source confusion errors. 
Interestingly, even with the 'warning', the results replicated the findings of the 
previous experiment, showing that action observation can result in memories of 
self-performance. Participants equally misattributed the actions in both warning 
conditions (Lindner et al., 2010). Although the results of this experiment would 
suggest that source-monitoring is not the primary reason for formation of OIs, the 
source memory error could still occur because action observation and 
performance are characterised by the same features. Lindner et al., (2010) 
suggested that the OI effect transpires because of motor stimulation activation 
taking place when observing an action that is similar to the motor activity present 
in the brain while the action is performed. This explanation could also account for 
the results of Experiment 3 by Lindner et al. (2010), that showed that more OIs 
are formed for actions observed from the third person perspective (the same 
perspective as when the mirror neurones are activated i.e. as in social interaction 
and observing another person) than the first person perspective (as if performed 
by oneself). Hence, the characteristics of observed actions could be misattributed 
as performed (Lindner et al., 2010). 
In another study on OI, Schain et al. (2012) investigated whether OI can be 
influenced by discriminatory features of self and the observed actors. For 
example, participants observed an action being performed by an actor, and 
discriminatory self-other features such as face or torso were visible to them. This 
is unlike the study of Lindner et al. (2010) where only arms and hands were seen 
manipulating the objects. Since observing the actor's face can provide more cues 
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for correct discrimination between the self and the actor, Schain et al. (2012) 
hypothesised that the observation of actions providing more distinct features will 
result in a decreased number of OIs when compared to actions not providing 
enough cues for self-other discrimination (when only actor's hand are visible). In 
order to test this, Schain et al. (2012) asked participants to either perform an 
action described in an action statement or read a statement describing an action 
and, following this, observe either (i) the action being performed by an actor 
where the face of the actor was visible or (ii) when only the hands of the actor 
were visible. Additionally, in the condition where the face of the actor was visible, 
participants’ attention was either drawn to the actors face by the actor saying a 
syllable (e.g. 'aka' or 'uku') or there was no focus on the face of the actor. The 
results of this experiment replicated the original finding of Lindner et al., (2010) 
showing that OIs can be formed after short observation of actions, and provided 
more insight into how discrimination can vary the patterns of misattribution. 
Schain et al. (2012) found a higher number of OIs were formed for actions where 
only actor's hands were visible compared to where an actor’s face was visible in 
the video as well. Interestingly, the OI was eliminated in the condition where 
participants observed actions being performed by the actor with the face visible 
and articulating the syllables. Schain et al. (2012) attributes this effect to source 
monitoring theory, which claims that distinctive features decrease the source 
confusion (Hashtroudi et al., 1990).  
More support for the OI effect comes from Manzi and Nigro's (2008) study where 
correct source recall of observed and performed actions was investigated. 
Although the misattribution of observed actions as performed was not the primary 
aim of the study, the memory errors for observed actions were recorded in 
addition to the correct source recall. This study is discussed in detail in Chapter 
10, where the recollective experience of OI is investigated.  
6.1.2 Imitation of actions 
Based on previous research on imitation in humans evidence suggests that 
actions are imitated differently depending on their type (e.g. Rumiati and Tessari, 
2002, Tessari et al. 2006). As the OI effect has only recently been studied in the 
field of false memory research, many of its features have not yet been 
investigated.  For example, does the type of the observed action affect the 
51 
 
number of OIs formed?   
Research on imitation of various types of actions shows disparity in imitation 
between different action types (Tessari et al., 2006; Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). 
Work by Rumiati and Tessari (2002) has shown a general advantage in imitation 
of meaningful actions over meaningless actions. Meaningful actions are thought 
to be goal-directed (for example stapling a document).  However, meaningless 
actions are not goal-directed, and are not usually performed in everyday life (for 
example brushing your arm with a toothbrush).  Meaningful actions are already 
stored in LTM and are recognised because they are well-known and familiar to 
participants, a consequence of executing and observing the actions in the past 
(Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). On the other hand, meaningless actions are not 
stored in LTM because of lack of previous sensorimotor learning experience and 
their reproduction relies on direct encoding from visual stimuli to working memory 
(Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). Because meaningless actions are neither goal-
directed nor commonly performed/observed, there is no memory for them.  Their 
imitation then relies solely on reproduction from STM, which results in an imitation 
disadvantage compared to meaningful actions, manifesting itself in a shorter 
imitation span and less accurate movement reproduction (Rumiati and Tessari 
(2002).  
This is further supported by the results of Tessari et al. (2006), which show that 
exposing participants to meaningless actions creates a memory trace for them in 
LTM. The meaningless actions are then imitated through the semantic LTM route, 
as in the case of meaningful actions. Tessari et al. (2006) found that learnt 
meaningless actions are imitated even better than meaningful actions. This might 
be because only one memory trace for those actions is present in the LTM, 
contrary to the meaningful actions, for which the retrieval from LTM requires 
discrimination and inhibition of more representations of those actions (more 
representations of those actions are likely to come from prior 
execution/observation of those actions in everyday life) (Tessari et al., 2006).   
Regarding the imitation of communicative emblems, Carmo and Rumiati (2009) 
found that meaningful communicative actions are imitated better than meaningful 
goal-directed actions. Carmo and Rumiati (2009) attribute this to the fact that 
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communicative actions are not associated with objects and hence do not require 
as advanced cognitive system processing as meaningful actions. This is further 
supported by the fact that meaningless communicative actions are imitated better 
than meaningless actions that involve object manipulation (Carmo and Rumiati, 
2009). The dual-route model of imitation (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002) was 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Furthermore, motor simulation research shows disparity in imitation of 
communicative emblems, meaningful and meaningless actions. Liepelt et al. 
(2010) investigated a motor priming effect in an experiment where participants 
reproduced previously presented actions. Each participant observed one action 
from each action type category which were (i) communicative emblems (a victory 
sign), (ii) meaningful (grasping an apple) and (iii) meaningless (a closed fist) 
performed by (i) a human hand and (ii) a wooden hand.  The results revealed that 
motor simulation is affected by the type of action that is being observed. 
Specifically, the results showed that motor priming had a stronger effect on the 
reproduced action if the observed stimuli were human hands than wooden hands. 
However, this effect was only present for the communicative emblems – 
meaningful and meaningless actions produced a similar motor priming effect for 
both stimuli types. Liepelt et al. (2010) proposes that the motor simulation 
processes are possible when the observer is able to make out the goal of the 
observed action and that action seems reasonable to them. This is demonstrated 
in another experiment from Liepelt et al. (2010) which also tested the motor 
priming effect with communicative stimuli being either a human or a wooden hand 
depicting the action of hand shaking. Interestingly, the motor priming was not 
present when participants observed the wooden hand since they could not make 
out the goal of the action, as the action of greeting was not associated with the 
wooden hand. In this case, even though the action was a meaningful 
communicative emblem, it was judged to be meaningless because it was enacted 
by a wooden hand (Liepelt et al., 2010).  
6.1.3 Mirror neurones and different types of actions 
There is also evidence that the observation of actions results in the formation of 
a motor memory of performing that action (Stefan et al., 2005). This is in line with 
the research on mirror neurones which has demonstrated through a wealth of 
53 
 
studies that observation of actions being performed by somebody else triggers 
similar activation in the brain of the observer as would be seen if the action had 
been performed by them themselves (e.g. Molenberghs et al., 2010; Bucino et 
al., 2004).  For example, pianists observing finger movements on a piano 
keyboard show greater activation of brain areas responsible for hand movements 
than control subjects (Haslinger et al., 2005). Communicative hand gestures have 
been found to produce more intense mirror neurone activity in monkeys as well 
as humans than meaningless or non-goal-directed actions (e.g. Rizzolatti and 
Arbib, 1998; Iacoboni, 2009).  
Montgomery et al. (2007) studied the brain activation during observation and 
execution of communicative emblems (e.g. thumbs up) and meaningful actions 
(e.g. stirring tea). The results of their fMRI experiment revealed similar mirror 
neurone activation for both types of actions in the inferior parietal lobule, frontal 
operculum activity and in the superior temporal sulcus. Montgomery et al. (2007) 
suggest that both types of actions activate the mirror neurone system to the same 
extent. However, it is important to note that the actions in their study did not 
actually involve object manipulation, but were mimed. This might have resulted 
in participants processing the goal-directed actions on the same level as the 
communicative emblems, hence the similar mirror neurone activity (Montgomery 
et al., 2007). In addition to recording the neural activity in the brain areas 
associated with mirror neurone activity, Montgomery et al. (2007) found neuronal 
activation in different brain areas for communicative and goal-directed actions. 
They found that brain activation for both types of actions significantly differed in 
terms of areas they activate. Object directed actions were found to activate 
cerebellum, putamen and premotor cortex, areas which are associated with motor 
behaviour. Communicative actions on the other hand, activated areas related to 
social cognition and theory of mind, such as medial prefrontal cortex, anterior 
superior temporal sulcus and temporal pole (Montgomery et al., 2007). 
A great deal of research on mirror neurone activity and type of action observed 
comes from studies on monkeys. For example, Ferrari et al. (2003) describes 
communicative mirror neurones in monkeys which are neurones that are active 
specifically for mouth communicative actions (e.g. lip smacking or tongue 
protrusions). These actions are clearly linked to ingestive actions which are 
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associated with food intake. Ferrari et al. (2003) explains that the monkey 
communication system might have developed from these ingestive actions, which 
are a central part of monkey's gestural repertoire and are familiar to them. 
Interestingly, human communication has also been suggested to arise from 
similar mechanisms, i.e. possible development of vocal syllables from lip 
smacking movements (Ferrari et al., 2003).  
Another study by Caggiano et al (2012) found that in monkeys, a reward value 
attached to the object in the action that modulates the magnitude of mirror 
neurone activation. The higher the reward associated with the object, the bigger 
the activation of mirror neurones. Thus, based on the value of the object, the 
monkey understands the goal of the action (Caggiano et al., 2012).  
More evidence on mirror neurone activation by different types of actions was 
found by Wriessnegger et al. (2013), who observed greater mirror neurone 
activation when participants observed grasping movements towards objects that 
were familiar (e.g. a glass of water) than abstract objects (e.g. a trapezoid). This 
finding suggests that even if one observes a motor action that is familiar, the 
objects towards which the action is executed have a strong impact on evaluating 
this action as either goal-directed or meaningless. In this case, the observation 
of grasping the abstract object did not activate the mirror neurone system to the 
same extent as grasping a meaningful and familiar object (Wriessnegger et al. 
2013). 
6.1.4 Aim of the present study 
This study will investigate the OI effect for different action types. As far as I am 
aware, the action type that is being observed or performed has not been 
considered in previous studies on OI effect (Lindner et al., 2010; Schain et al., 
2012). Neither of these studies specifies the type of the action used, nor does it 
provide a list of actions that were used in the experiments. From the examples 
given, it is assumed that the actions were considered meaningful (e.g. 'shake a 
bottle' in Lindner et al., (2010) or 'squeeze a sponge' in Schain et al., (2012)).  
Based on the evidence from imitation and mirror neurone research (Montgomery 
et al., 2007; Husain et al., 2012; Andric et al., 2013; Rumiati and Tessari, 2002), 
and the fact that Lindner et al. (2010) suggest that mirror neurones may stand 
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behind OI effect, the hypothesis is that the different types of actions will result in 
different number of OIs. Thus, this experiment will use three types of actions: 
meaningful (e.g. 'stapling a document’), meaningless (e.g. 'brushing one's arm 
with a toothbrush') and communicative emblems (e.g. 'thumbs up'). It is expected 
that the communicative and meaningful actions will produce more OIs since they 
have been shown to activate the mirror neurone system in humans (e.g. Husain 
et al., 2012). The lowest number of OIs is expected for meaningless actions as 
the participant will not have any previous memories for them and they are not 
goal-directed. Observation of non goal-directed actions shows little or no mirror 
neurone activity (e.g. Avanzini et al., 2012; Wriessnegger et al., 2013; Ocampo 
and Kritkos, 2011). 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-five participants took part in the study. The participants were recruited from 
the University of Bradford (mean age = 29.15, SD = 9.64). Twenty six females 
(mean age = 28.16 years, SD = 9.14) and nine males (mean age = 31.86 years, 
SD = 11.16) took part in the experiment. The volunteers were invited to take part 
in the study via E-mail invitations sent out by administrative secretaries of 
faculties at the University of Bradford. The experiment was also advertised in the 
Staff briefing and weekly Student Telegram. All participants gave informed written 
consent. The inclusion criteria for participation consisted of no history of autism 
(as this may suggest an impaired mirror neurone system) and no uncorrectable 
visual impairments. In order to ensure the participants’ anonymity, each of them 
was identified by a unique number. Ethical approval was given by Humanities, 
Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee at University of Bradford. 
6.2.2 Design 
A within-subject design was used. The different conditions were action type 
stimuli, in which participants were asked to (i) observe a presentation consisting 
of videos of three different types of action (meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative) and to (ii) perform specified actions (meaningful, meaningless 
and communicative) that were different to those actions observed in (i). The 
between-subject variable was different time delay of assessing OIs (one day, one 
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week or two weeks). The dependent variable was the number of OIs formed.  
6.2.3 Materials 
The stimuli used in the experiment were 30 short videos of simple actions being 
performed. The videos were created using a camcorder and put into a 
PowerPoint presentation. The actions that participants were asked to perform 
were written into statements and put on separate slides into a PowerPoint 
presentation. The time given for execution of the single action was 10 seconds 
and this was timed automatically in PowerPoint. The videos were preselected into 
three separate sets of presentations (for meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative) and the order of observation and performance conditions was 
counterbalanced across the conditions for each participant.  Participants 
performed 30 actions in total. The actions in the videos depicted a female actor 
in a sitting position from third person perspective (camera facing the actor). All of 
the videos were performed by the same actor.  
 
Figure 6.1 – Screenshots from the action recordings used in the experiment: (a) 
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example of meaningful action perspective; (b) example of communicative 
emblem perspective; (c) example of meaningless action perspective.  
6.2.4 Pilot study 
A pilot study was carried out on 10 people to be sure that the stimuli could be 
classed as meaningful and meaningless (as sometimes this remains unclear).  
Participants saw 80 videos of actions and rated them as meaningful or 
meaningless on a scale of 1–10 and were asked what they thought the goal of 
the action was. A set of stimuli were created from these results. 
6.2.5 Questionnaire  
In order to measure the OIs, a questionnaire was designed. The items in the 
questionnaire consisted of sentences written in the first person suggesting that 
participant performed the action (e.g. I opened a bottle; I stapled a document). 
To recap, OIs occur when a person remembers an action that they have observed 
as one they have performed themselves. The sentences contained 30 actions 
that participants performed and 30 actions that they observed. Additionally, 20 
actions that were neither observed nor performed were added to the 
questionnaire in order to test ‘real’ false memories (see Appendix 1 for OI 
questionnaire).  
6.2.6 Remember-Know-Guess 
The R-K-G (Gardiner et al., 1996) paradigm was adapted in order to determine 
the type of recollection. In the questionnaire, participants were asked to answer 
‘YES’ if they remembered performing the action or ‘NO’ if they did not remember 
performing the action. If the answer was ‘YES’, participants were asked to decide 
about the type of recollection they had. They were asked to answer ‘Remember’ 
if they could remember qualitative details about the performed actions and ‘Know’ 
if they could not retrieve any specific details about the action but it seemed 
familiar to them. They were instructed to answer ‘Guess’, if they guessed that 
they performed the action. The copy of the instructions and the questionnaire with 
R-K-G paradigm can be found in Appendix 1. For more information on the 
recollective experience and R-K-G see Chapter 5 and Chapter 10 for detailed 
analysis of R-K-G recollection scores from the experiments of this thesis.  
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6.2.7 Procedure 
The time of the participation was arranged with the volunteers that expressed an 
interest in participation after being provided with an information sheet. The 
experiments took place in the Psychology Laboratories in the Division of 
Psychology, University of Bradford. After the participants were greeted by the 
researcher, they were allocated to individual cubicle rooms with a computer. They 
were seated in front of the computer and given the information sheet and consent 
form. After the participants had given informed written consent and familiarised 
themselves with the purpose and nature of the study they were instructed to 
watch a video presentation of 30 actions and perform 30 actions. The order in 
which videos of actions and action statements were presented was 
counterbalanced. In the performance part, the researcher explained that they will 
have to perform the actions described on the PowerPoint slides. The participants 
were assured that they were not being observed nor recorded during the 
executions of actions. After the experiment was finished, the researcher arranged 
the time for a second session with the participants where they would need to 
complete the OI questionnaire. Participants came back to the Psychology 
Laboratories after one day, one week or two weeks from the first part of the 
experiment. 
In the second part, participants were asked to complete the OI questionnaire after 
familiarising themselves with the instructions. They were encouraged to ask 
questions if the instructions were not clear to them. When they had completed 
the questionnaire, they were thanked for their participation and escorted back to 
the entrance by the researcher. 
6.3 Results 
The primary aim of the study was to investigate the formation of OIs as a result 
of action observation of different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative). OIs are the number of misattributions of observed actions as 
ones that were performed i.e. where participants had stated on the questionnaire 
that they had performed actions when they had actually only observed them. 
The OIs were the actions that participant recalled with 'Remember' and 'Know' 
responses in the source monitoring questionnaire. The two responses were 
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summed to create the OI variable. The 'Guess' response was not counted as an 
OI error (See Chapter 5 which introduces the R-K-G procedure and Chapter 10 
which is dedicated to the results of the R-K-G responses specifically).  See Figure 
6.2 for the number of OIs formed for different action types. 
6.3.1 OI in different action types 
Figure 6.2 shows OIs for all action type conditions, showing that the highest 
number of OIs was formed after observing communicative actions. These results 
are from all time delays combined. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Mean number and standard errors of OIs in meaningful, meaningless 
and communicative conditions. 
The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions 
Standard parametrical tests were carried out alongside non-parametric test. For 
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this section both analyses showed the same results. The parametric analysis is 
reported.  
A 3-way (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative) repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant main effect of action type, 
F(2, 64) = 5.67, p<0.05, suggesting that there was a significant difference in the 
number of OIs formed after observing different types of actions. Pairwise-
comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference in the number of OIs 
formed after observing communicative and meaningless actions (p<0.05), where 
observation of communicative actions resulted in more OIs than observation of 
meaningless actions. The data did not reach a statistical significant difference for 
the number of OIs formed between meaningful and communicative actions 
(p>0.05) and meaningful and meaningless actions (p>0.05). 
This shows that participants were more likely to misattribute observed 
communicative actions as actions they had performed themselves rather than 
observed meaningless actions. From these results, they were as equally likely 
to misattribute observed meaningless and meaningful actions as performed 
and communicative and meaningful. 
6.3.2 OIs formed with different types of actions at different time delays 
Participants completed the questionnaire at different time delays (one day, one 
week and two weeks).  See Figure 6.3 for the number of OIs formed for different 
action types at different time delays.  
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Figure 6.3 – Mean and standard errors of OI errors after different testing time 
delays (one day, one week or two weeks) for all action types.  
The total number of OIs increases with time, (regardless of action type) especially 
between one week and two weeks (total of all OIs at one day = 2.0, total of all 
OIs after one week = 2.4, total of all OIs after two weeks = 4.8). It is interesting, 
(see Figure 6.3) that the mean number of OIs formed for both meaningful and 
meaningless actions is the same for both action conditions (0.6) after both one 
day and one week. Only in the communicative action condition does the number 
of OIs increase (one day= 0.8; one week=1.2; two weeks=2.85).   
Non-parametric results are reported for this section. The analysis with Kruskall-
Wallis test showed that there was a significant difference in the number of OIs 
formed between the three time delays, regardless of the action type, χ2(2) = 10.2, 
p<0.05. Post hoc test analysis with Mann-Whitney U tests showed that 
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significantly more OIs were formed after a two week time delay than one day (U 
= 11, p<0.05) and one week (U = 17.5, p<0.05). 
Further analysis with Kruskall-Wallis H test revealed that there was a significant 
difference in the number of OIs formed for different action types between the 
three time delays, χ2(2) = 12.2, p<0.05. Post hoc test was analysis with Mann-
Whitney U tests was conducted and revealed that significantly more OIs were 
formed for communicative actions after (i) two weeks rather than one day (U = 
13.5, p<0.05); (ii) two weeks than one week time delay (U = 25.5, p<0.05) and for 
meaningful actions after (iii) two weeks than one day (U = 30.5, p<0.05) and (iv) 
two weeks than one week (U = 30, p<0.05).  
6.3.3 Other measurements 
Although the primary aim is to investigate OIs, the other measurements recorded 
are important to report as they provide information about how easy/hard the 
stimuli are to remember in general. The other results were the numbers of actions 
that were (i) “performed correct”- where participants had performed the action 
according to the description of actions on the PowerPoint slides in the study 
phase of the experiment AND subsequently correctly recognised that they had 
performed the action on the questionnaire; (ii) “performed incorrect” – where 
participants indicate on the questionnaire that they had never performed the 
action (ticking ‘no’)  but in fact they had; (iii) “observed correct” – where 
participants remember correctly that they have not performed the action e.g. in 
response to the phrase  ‘I shook a bottle’  on the questionnaire which they had 
observed on the video in the study phase, participants tick ‘no’, and they indeed 
had only observed the action. The final measurement is (iv) “false memories”, 
where participants remember performing an action that they neither performed 
nor observed.  See Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4 for a breakdown of these 
measurements. 
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Table 6.1 – Other measurements for all action type conditions after different time delays. 
 
 
 Meaningful Meaningless Communicative 
 Day Week 2weeks total Day Week 2weeks total Day Week 2weeks total 
Performed correct 7.1 7.4 4.7 19.2 7.9 6.5 7.2 21.6 7.8 7.7 6.5 22 
Performed incorrect 2.7 2.2 4.5 9.4 1.6 2.2 2.4 6.2 1.5 1.1 2.4 5 
Observed correct 8.8 8.6 8.1 25.5 9.1 8.4 8.1 25.6 8.6 6.9 5.2 20.7 
* 
Figure 6.4 – Mean false memory after different time delays.  
False memory 
day week two weeks 
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6.3.3.1 Performed correct 
Friedman’s test showed that there was a significant difference in the number of 
correctly recalled different types of actions, χ2(2) = 7.23, p<0.05. Post hoc test 
was analysis with Wilcoxon tests was conducted with Bonferroni correction 
applied, resulting in significance level set at p<0.016.  The Wilcoxon tests showed 
that there was significantly more communicative actions were correctly recalled 
as self-performed than meaningful actions (Z = -2.42, p<0.016). There was no 
significant difference found between correctly recalled meaningful and 
meaningless action (p>0.016), and meaningless and communicative actions 
(p>0.016), which suggest that the correct recall of those actions was equally 
challenging.  
6.3.3.2 Performed incorrect 
It was found that the difference in the number of incorrectly recalled performed 
actions (where participants state that they had never performed the action but in 
fact they had) was significant between the performed meaningful and 
meaningless actions with, t(29) = 2.18, p<0.05 and meaningful and 
communicative, t(29) = -5.52 p<0.001. These results suggest that participants 
were more likely to not remember having performed meaningful actions 
compared than meaningless and communicative. There was no significant 
difference found in incorrect recall of meaningless and communicative actions 
(p>0.05). The corresponding non-parametric analysis was conducted and 
revealed the same results. 
6.3.3.3 Observed correct  
To recap, this value represents the actions that are correctly recalled as not 
having been performed. The results of the paired-samples t-test show that there 
was a significant difference between the observed communicative and 
meaningless actions correctly recalled as not having been performed with t(29) = 
-3.9, p<0.001 and between the meaningful and the communicative t(29) = 3.71, 
p<0.001, where fewer communicative than meaningless and meaningful actions 
were correctly recalled as not having been performed. This means participants 
were better at discriminating between the source of meaningless and meaningful 
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actions than communicative actions. The corresponding non-parametric analysis 
was conducted and revealed the same results. 
6.3.3.4 False memories 
It was found that the number of false memories increased as the testing time 
delay increased (see Figure 6.4). However, the results of an independent-
samples t-test have found this difference to only be significant between one day 
and two week testing delays, t(18) = -2.67. The difference in the recall of false 
memories has not been found to be significant between one day and one week 
(p>0.05) and one week and two weeks (p>0.05) testing delay. The corresponding 
non-parametric analysis was conducted and revealed the same results.  
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Summary of results 
The experiment aimed to investigate OIs formed following observation of different 
types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and communicative actions) after 
different time delays (one day, one week and two weeks). OI is a term introduced 
by Linder et al. (2010) where observed actions are misattributed as performed 
who also suggested that mirror neurone activity could stand behind any OI effect. 
It was hypothesised that observation of communicative and meaningful actions 
would result in significantly more OIs than observation of meaningless actions. 
The hypothesis was based on research on mirror neurone activation that shows 
intensified mirror neurone activity during action observation of communicative 
gestures and meaningful actions (e.g. Husain et al., 2012; Iacoboni, 2008; 
Montgomery et al., 2007).  
The results of the current study have found OIs to be present after observation of 
all three types of actions, demonstrating that it is possible to form memories of 
self-performance through observation of actions of others. The highest number 
of OIs formed was recorded for communicative actions, which was in line with our 
hypothesis. Observation of meaningful actions yielded a similar number of OIs as 
communicative actions (no significant difference between OI formation for 
meaningful compared to communicative). The lowest number of OIs was 
recorded after observation of meaningless actions, which again supports the 
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initial hypothesis with a significant difference found between OIs formed for 
meaningless actions compared to communicative. 
It must be noted that the mean numbers of OIs for all action types were relatively 
low, with a number of participants performing at floor in some conditions which 
will be discussed in more detail later in this section. 
6.4.2 OIs at different time delays 
Furthermore, the effect of time delay between the observation and performance 
of actions (phase 1) and the source memory test was also investigated. The 
number of OIs formed was compared between three different time delays (one 
day, one week and two weeks) and it was found that the highest number of OIs 
was formed after a two week time delay for communicative and meaningful 
actions. The formation of OIs after observation of meaningless actions was not 
affected by testing time delay. This is supported by previous research on memory 
errors which has demonstrated that memory deteriorates with time (e.g. Porter et 
al., 2010). For example, Underwood and Pezdek (1998) showed that participants 
recall significantly more 'false' stimuli after one month testing delay than when 
they are tested immediately. 
6.4.3 Results for other measurements 
The correct recall of actions that were performed in the experiment and correctly 
attributed to its source was also investigated. The results revealed that the 
highest number of correctly attributed actions to its source was after executing 
communicative actions. This would imply that communicative actions are the 
easiest to remember but interestingly communicative actions also formed the 
highest number of OIs.   
The analysis of observed actions correctly recalled as observed was the highest 
for meaningless actions, followed by meaningful and the lowest for 
communicative actions. This is because the observation of communicative 
actions resulted in the highest OI formation, contrary to meaningless and 
meaningful actions. These results imply that memories for communicative actions 
are the most accurate when recalling the actions that have been performed, 
however, the source attribution accuracy declines when one is recalling the 
source of observed communicative actions.   
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The results also showed that participants formed 'real' false memories, which 
means that they misremembered actions that were neither performed nor 
observed. 
6.4.4 Relation to other findings 
We propose that the OI effect in the present study is a result of source-monitoring 
errors, where observed actions are misattributed as self-performed. The source-
monitoring error in this instance is hypothesised to occur because the observed 
and performed actions share the same characteristics, and the observation of 
movement during execution of action may cause similar neural activity. As a 
result, shared motor activation between the observed and performed actions 
causes confusion between the sources and the observed actions are 
misremembered as self-performed. The OI effect was found to be present after 
observing all three types of actions, but it was found that significantly more 
communicative than meaningless actions were misattributed as self-performed.  
Participants formed more OIs for communicative actions than meaningful; 
however, this difference was not found to be significant. It is important to note 
that the mean number of OIs was generally very low and participants were 
performing at floor level. Improving the OI paradigm so that it yields higher means 
of OI misattributions could provide a stronger support for the hypothesis and 
possibly results with significantly more OI formed for communicative than 
meaningful actions. These results support the hypothesis that communicative 
and meaningful actions may trigger mirror neurone activity which leads to 
confusion between the sources of memory.  
Previous research shows that communicative emblems elicit mirror neurone 
activity to a greater extent than meaningless actions. For example Husain et al. 
(2012) found that observation of communicative emblems but not meaningless 
actions activated areas related to processing of auditory information in deaf 
participants, and brain areas associated with mirror neurone activity such as the 
premotor cortex and the inferior parietal lobule in hearing participants.  Husain et 
al. (2012) proposes that since communicative emblems are comparable to 
spoken words, deaf participants process it as linguistic information, and hearing 
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participants categorise the communicative emblems in terms of pictorial 
descriptions.  
Similar results were found by Andric et al. (2013) who found that observation of 
speech articulation, grasping and communicative emblems activated the same 
brain areas. The overlapping activation was present in the lateral temporal, 
inferior frontal, parietal and premotor areas when the speech, emblems and 
grasping were observed. Furthermore, communicative emblems but neither 
grasping nor speech activated areas thought to be associated with processing 
the intentions of others (Andric et al., 2013). Heightened correct recall of 
communicative actions as performed could suggest a generally stronger memory 
for these actions than for meaningful or meaningless in this experiment. 
Research shows that observation of meaningless actions triggers little 
corticospinal activity in comparison to observation of goal-directed actions and 
communicative emblems (Donne et al., 2011). Similarly Newman-Norlund et al. 
(2009) found that observation of meaningful and meaningless object-directed 
actions elicits different mirror neurone responses, showing different localisation 
of activation in bilateral sub-marginal gyrus.  
The results of this study show that it is possible to form memories of self-
performance by observing other people performing actions. This was first shown 
by Lindner et al. (2010) who used actions that are considered meaningful 
(although no full list of actions used was provided in that paper).    The study of 
this chapter extended this and looked at the formation of OIs for different types 
of actions.  If the hypothesis that mirror neurone involvement can stand behind 
and OI effect then it is proposed that there will be less source-confusion for 
meaningless actions (low or no mirror neurone activity, e.g. Donne et al., 2011; 
Husain et al., 2012) and greater source-confusion for meaningful (high mirror 
neurone activity, e.g. Buccino et al., 2004; Gallese et al., 1996) and 
communicative actions (highest mirror neurone activity, e.g. Husain et al., 2012; 
Andric et al., 2013) resulting in more OIs for the latter two than the former.  The 
highest number of OIs made was for communicative actions which were 
significantly different from the number of OIs made for meaningless actions.  The 
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OI effect is strongest for communicative actions and after longer time delays (two 
weeks). 
To continue the study it is necessary to encourage higher number of OIs to be 
formed as numbers were low overall.  This could be done by making the stimuli 
harder, for example by adding more which will tax the memory system more, or 
creating more interference between the initial phase and the second phase 
(questionnaire).  This could simply be done by extending the time delay even 
further to longer than two weeks or even months (it was clear from these results 
that more OIs were made at the longer time delay).  Another method to encourage 
larger number of OIs would be to look at the inflations in a group of participants 
more prone to forming source-confusion errors (for example the elderly, see 
Chapter 8). This is also important as one of the potential applications of the OI 
effect is in the elderly who see other people performing actions (e.g. taking 
medication) leading them to think that the actions were their own (e.g. they 
themselves have taken their medication which is false) (Lindner et al., (2010)).  
This has further implications for sufferers of memory disorders in the elderly such 
as Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and source confusions in this cohort need further 
investigation.   
It must also be noted that objects were used for both the meaningful and 
meaningless actions and no objects were used for the communicative emblems 
as these are gestural. Interestingly, previous research on monkeys show that 
continuous observation of an experimenter executing actions involving tools 
leads to formation of special tool-responding mirror neurones (Ferrari et al., 
2005). The authors suggest that such prolonged association of object and action 
can result in stronger mirroring activity and enable action understanding (Ferrari 
et al., 2005). 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed previous studies on the OI effect, which demonstrated 
that observation of other peoples' actions can result in memories of self-
performance. The results have demonstrated that correct attribution of the source 
of a memory can be challenging for participants. Based on the research on 
imitation and mirror neurones, it was hypothesised that observation of 
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communicative and meaningful actions would result in higher rates of OIs. This 
is because these types of action show enhanced mirror neurone activity (e.g. 
Husain et al., 2012; Andric et al., 2010) and an imitation advantage (e.g. Rumiati 
and Tessari, 2002; Carmo and Rumiati, 2009) compared to meaningless actions. 
The present study found that there were significantly more OIs formed after 
observing communicative actions compared to after observing meaningless 
actions. The highest number of OIs was recorded after a two week time delay 
rather than after one day or one week, suggesting that source memory accuracy 
decreases over time. This is not surprising and is in line with previous research 
on the effect of time on memory errors (e.g. Porter et al., 2010).  
6.5.1 Highlights 
 Research on OI demonstrates it is possible to form SMEs of self-
performance after observing actions being performed by somebody else.  
 Studies show higher misattribution rates for observed actions than read 
action statements as self-performed. This effect persists even in the 
presence of source monitoring instruction and specific OI warnings 
(Lindner et al., 2010). 
 Research on mirror neurones shows that observation of actions elicits the 
same or similar brain activity as when the action is actually performed. This 
activity has been found to be stronger for actions that are communicative 
or goal-directed than meaningless actions (e.g. Newman-Norlund, et al., 
2009; Husain et al., 2012).  
 This study hypothesised a higher rate of OI will be formed following 
observation of communicative and meaningful than meaningless actions.  
 This research replicates the finding that memories of self-performance can 
be formed after observing actions (e.g. Lindner et al., 2010, Schain e al., 
2012). 
 The experiment found that the highest number of OIs is for communicative 
actions followed by meaningful followed by meaningless with significance 
between the number of OIs formed for communicative and meaningless. 
 The highest number of OIs was formed after two week time delay for 
meaningful and communicative actions. 
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 Significantly higher number of misattributions for communicative than 
meaningless actions suggests possible mirror neurone involvement.  
 The highest number of correct source attributions was recorded for 
communicative actions. Interestingly, the highest number of 
misattributions of actions performed by others as self-performed was also 
for communicative actions.  
 OI has possible implications for elderly, who has been shown to exhibit 
problems with correct source-monitoring (this is discussed in Chapter 8). 
 Future research should aim to create OI paradigm that would yield higher 
mean number of OI than in the current study.  
 Possibly testing this paradigm on elderly sample would result in more OI 
formation as the elderly has been shown to exhibit problems with accurate 
source monitoring.  
Some of this information can be found in Mitrenga et al. (in prep) - The 
observation inflation effect – memory for different types of actions’ 
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Chapter 7 
Self-action inflation - misattribution of self-
performed actions as observed 
 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Background 
In Chapter 6, the OI effect was investigated by looking at the difference in 
misattributions of observed actions as self-performed between different types of 
actions (meaningful, meaningless and communicative) and comparing their recall 
over different time delays. Of particular interest was the difference in OIs formed 
between three types of actions, as research on mirror neurones (e.g. Montgomery 
et al. 2007; Andric et al. 2013; Ferrari et al. 2003; Wriessnegger et al. 2013) and 
imitation (e.g. Rumiati and Tessari 2002; Tessari et al., 2006; Carmo and Rumiati, 
2009) has shown that actions are processed differently depending on their type. 
If mirror neurones are involved in the formation of OIs as suggested by previous 
researchers (Lindner et al., 2010), it can be hypothesised that a different number 
of OIs between these different types of actions would be seen. If mirror neurone 
activity is greater during observation of actions that are communicative or 
meaningful as compared to meaningless, it would be plausible to assume that the 
similarity in activation between observation and actual performance in the actions 
with high mirror neurone activity could lead to source attribution failures and 
hence the finding that participants recall the observed actions as self-performed.  
This was tested in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) and the hypothesis was supported.  
A significantly higher number of OIs were made between communicative actions 
and meaningless actions, and although more communicative than meaningful 
actions resulted in OIs, this was not found to be significant. Meaningful and 
meaningless actions were equally likely to result in OIs.   
This chapter further investigates the mirror neurone hypothesis by studying the 
potential misattributions of self-performed actions as actions that are performed 
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by somebody else.   This will be referred to as self-action inflation (SAI). 
7.1.2 Misattribution of self-generated actions to others – evidence from 
schizophrenia patients 
Some existing research has studied a similar concept of attribution of self-
generated actions to other people or entities, particularly in schizophrenic 
patients. Misattribution of self-performed actions to others is a common 
occurrence in schizophrenic patients, a manifestation of so called positive 
symptoms, specifically hallucinations (Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). Patients 
demonstrate an inability to recognise their own actions as self-generated and 
attribute them to other people or 'entities' (e.g. alien forces) instead of 
themselves. This type of source attribution error is called 'under-attribution' in the 
context of schizophrenia. This is thought to be a product of action monitoring 
failure, where the patient is unaware of producing the movements.  
This effect has been studied experimentally in a number of studies. For example, 
Daprati et al. (1997) tested misattributions of self-performed actions in 30 healthy 
participants and 30 schizophrenic patients. In their study, participants of both 
groups were required to perform hand movements and monitor a hand movement 
on a nearby screen, which was performing either compatible or incompatible 
actions to the ones that participant was executing. An example of the movement 
would be extending index finger or opening hand wide. After each movement was 
executed/observed, participants were asked to judge whether the observed 
movement was performed by themselves or somebody else (hand on the screen). 
The results revealed that healthy control subjects successfully recognised their 
own actions if the observed actions were incompatible with the ones they were 
performing. However, when the observed actions were compatible with the one 
they were executing, they misattributed 30% of observed actions as having been 
performed by somebody else. Schizophrenic patients misattributed 80% of self-
generated actions as performed by somebody else. Frith (2005) suggested that 
this type of misattribution is a result of failure in 'self-monitoring', which is an 
inability to monitor one’s own intentions to execute the action. One does not 
anticipate performing the action and the movement is then surprising to the 
patient. Hence, it is likely to be interpreted as having been performed by 
somebody else.  
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Treur and Umair (2011) proposed a cognitive model for misattributions of self-
performed actions to others. According to Treur and Umair (2011), the 
misattribution happens through 'inverse monitoring' which is mapping of one’s 
own action repertoire onto another person, resulting in a mental image of them 
performing the action. This 'inverse monitoring' requires applying mental rotation 
of changing the perspective from self-performed (first person perspective) to 
being performed by somebody else (third person perspective) (Treur and Umair, 
2011). 
7.1.3 Other evidence of attributing self-performed actions to others  
Furthermore, some evidence on a SAI effect comes from Manzi and Nigro's 
(2008) study, where recollective experience of correct source attribution was the 
primary aim of their study. Manzi and Nigro (2008) not only found that participants 
misattributed observed actions as self-performed but also the actions they 
performed themselves as performed by somebody else. Additionally, it was found 
that participants misattributed self-generated actions as observed significantly 
more than they misattributed observed actions as self-performed.  
Manzi and Nigro (2008) attributed this effect to errors in source monitoring and 
mirror neurone activity. According to Manzi and Nigro (2008), observed actions 
provide more visual discriminatory features (the image of the person performing 
the action, and features such as their clothing as an example) than self-performed 
actions that only provide motor parameters as a basis for source differentiation. 
But on the other hand, Manzi and Nigro (2008) suggest that the inflated number 
of misattributions for self-performed actions could be caused by so called 'it-had-
to-be-you' effect, where weak memory  traces are misattributed to others because 
of lack of sufficient detail to be considered as self-performed (Manzi and Nigro, 
2008).  
7.1.4 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study is to further investigate the hypothesis that mirror neurones 
are involved in SMEs. If the mirror neurone hypothesis holds, then surely mirror 
neurone activation should be present whatever the mode of retrieval, either 
asking what the participants observed or asking what the participants performed. 
Therefore, instead of looking at source misattributions for the observed actions, 
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as was done in the experiment of Chapter 6, the source misattributions of 
performed actions will now be investigated. In the OI experiment of Chapter 6 
participants were asked, after firstly observing and executing actions, to indicate 
which actions they remember performing themselves and a significant number 
OIs formed for communicative as compared to meaningless were found. 
Observation of communicative actions resulted in more OIs than meaningful 
actions, however, this difference in OIs has not found to be statistically significant. 
Meaningful and meaningless actions were equally likely to result in OIs. In the 
present study participants will be asked which actions they remember observing 
(again after observation and execution of actions) in order to study the possible 
misattributions of performed actions as observed. If mirror neurone activity is 
involved in the misattributions of observed actions as performed actions (OI) 
because it activates overlapping brain regions responsible for motor control and 
motor memory, the same SME should be observed in reverse in the present 
study. As stated above, this will be referred to as a ‘self-action inflation’ (SAI) 
effect, where self-performed actions are erroneously attributed as observed, i.e. 
actions incorrectly recalled as being performed by another person.   
7.1.5 Hypothesis 
If there is mirror neurone involvement, the hypothesis is that the same pattern of 
results should be seen as that was found in the OI condition which is more source 
misattributions formed for communicative and meaningful actions than 
meaningless actions.  
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Participants 
Thirty participants (mean age = 27.92) which consisted of thirteen males (mean 
age = 27.78, SD = 5.54) and seventeen females (mean age = 27.92, SD = 11.28), 
recruited from the University of Bradford took part in the experiment.  As with the 
OI experiment of Chapter 6, the inclusion criteria for participation were no history 
of autism and no uncorrectable visual impairments. The participants were 
different from those that had participated in the OI experiment. Ethical approval 
was obtained from Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee at University of Bradford. 
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7.2.2 Design 
A mixed experimental design was used. The within-subject factor was different 
action type (meaningful, meaningless and communicative). Participants in this 
study were asked to observe a presentation consisting of videos of three different 
types of actions and to perform some actions themselves (the same stimuli as 
used in Chapter 6). The between-subject variable was a different time delay for 
assessing SAIs (day, week or two weeks). 
7.2.3 Materials 
The same videos and PowerPoint presentation used for the OI experiment were 
used.  The only difference was the wording of the memory questionnaire in the 
test phase of the experiment. This time, in order to test SAIs the items in the 
questionnaire consisted of sentences written in the impersonal form for example, 
‘a person opened a bottle’ and the questions asked whether the participant 
remembered observing the actions instead of performing them (Chapter 6). The 
sentences contained 30 actions that participants performed and 30 actions that 
they had observed in the PowerPoint presentation (See Appendix 2 for the full 
list of actions used in the experiment).  Additionally, as for Experiment 1 (Chapter 
6), 20 actions that were neither observed nor performed were added to the 
questionnaire in order to test true false memories.  
As in the OI experiment of Chapter 6, the R-K-G paradigm was included in the 
source memory questionnaire in order to test recollective experience of the 
formed misattributions. The recollection of SAIs will be discussed in Chapter 10.  
7.2.4 Procedure 
The same procedure as for the OI experiment of Chapter 6 was employed. 
7.3 Results 
The aim of the study was to investigate the formation of SAIs as a result of action 
execution for different types of actions.  SAIs are where participants state that 
they observed an action, when they had actually performed that action. Figure 
7.1 shows the number of SAIs formed.   
 The 'Remember' and 'Know' responses were summed to create the SAI variable. 
The 'Guess' recollection is discussed in Chapter 10.  
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7.3.1 Self-action inflations 
The results show that the highest number of SAIs was formed after execution of 
meaningless and communicative actions and fewest for meaningful actions (See 
Figure 7.1).  
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Mean and standard errors for SAIs for meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative action types. 
The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions 
Standard parametrical tests were carried out alongside non-parametric test. For 
this experiment both analyses showed the same results. The parametric analysis 
is reported.  
The data was further analysed with 3x3 mixed ANOVA, where the within-subject 
factor was the action type (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative) and 
the between-subject factor was the time delay in testing (day vs. week vs. two 
weeks). The analysis revealed a significant main effect of action type (F(2, 54) = 
31.1, p<0.001). 
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Pairwise-comparisons show significant differences in the number of SAIs formed 
between the meaningful and meaningless action (p<0.05) and between the 
meaningful and communicative action types (p<0.05).  No significant difference 
in the formation of SAIs was found between meaningless and communicative 
actions (p>0.05). This shows that the participants formed the highest number of 
SAI errors for meaningless actions and communicative actions and are less likely 
to form SAIs for meaningful actions. 
7.3.2 Self-action inflations over different time delays 
Participants carried out the SAI memory test after one day, one week and two 
weeks.  The results of this can be seen in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
*p<0.05 
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Figure 7.2 – shows that the mean number of SAIs increases with time in all action 
type conditions (mean SAIs for all actions combined for one day = 9, one week = 
11.6 and two weeks = 15.9).  
7.3.2.1. Main effects of testing delay 
The results revealed a marginally significant main effect of testing delay, F(2, 27) 
= 3.1, p=0.06. The pairwise-comparisons reveal that there is only a marginally 
significant difference between the number of SAIs overall (regardless of action 
type) found between one day and two weeks, (p=0.06). 
7.3.2.2 Action type and testing delay 
There was a significant interaction found between the action type and the length 
of time delay in testing participants, F(4, 54) = 2.75, p<0.05 showing that different 
types of actions resulted in different patterns of SAIs at different time delays.  
Independent-samples t-tests found a significant difference in the number of SAIs 
formed for meaningful actions between two weeks  and one day test delay, t(18) 
= -2.52, p<0.05. This means that participants formed more SAIs after performing 
meaningful actions after a two week delay in testing than after one day. It was 
also revealed that participants formed more SAIs for meaningless actions after a 
two week testing delay compared to a one week testing delay, t(18) = -3.18, 
p=0.05, and compared to a one day testing delay, t(18) = -2.26, p<0.05.  None of 
the other time delays for meaningful actions and meaningless actions reached 
significance. 
There was no significant difference found between the SAIs formed for 
communicative actions at any of the different time delays (p>0.05). 
7.3.3 Other measurements 
Although the primary aim was to investigate SAIs, the other measurements 
recorded are important to report.  The other results were the numbers of actions 
that were (i) “observed correct” which is where participants had observed the 
action in the PowerPoint slides in the study phase of the experiment AND 
subsequently correctly recognised that they had observed the action on the 
questionnaire (ii) “observed incorrect” – where participants indicate on the 
questionnaire that they had never observed the action (ticking ‘no’)  but in fact 
80 
 
they had during the PowerPoint stage of the study phase of the experiment  (iii) 
“performed correct” – where participants remember correctly that they have not 
observed the action e.g. in response to the phrase  ‘A person shook a bottle’  on 
the questionnaire, which they had performed in the study phase, participants tick 
‘no’, and they indeed had only performed the action. The final measurement is 
(iv) “false memories” where participants remember observing an action that they 
neither performed nor observed. These results are presented in Table 7.1.  
7.3.3.1 Observed correct 
Analysis with paired sample t-tests showed that significantly more meaningful 
actions were recalled correctly than meaningless (t(29) = -4.65 p<0.001) and 
communicative (t(29) = 2.89, p<0.05). More communicative actions were 
correctly recalled than meaningless actions (t(29) = 2.15, p<0.05). Interestingly 
in the Experiment 1, communicative actions were more likely to be correctly 
recalled than meaningful actions. Also more communicative actions were 
correctly recalled than meaningless, however this was not found to be statistically 
significant (p>0.05). The same as in the current study, more meaningful actions 
than meaningless actions were correctly recalled. This is interesting as the same 
actions were used in this experiment as in the OI experiment, but did not result in 
a same pattern of correct source attributions.  
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Table 7.1 – Mean SAIs and correct recall for all action type conditions after different time delays.  
 
 Meaningful Meaningless Communicative 
 Day Week 2 Weeks Total Day Week 2 Weeks Total Day Week 2 Weeks Total 
Observed 
correct 
6.4 4.2 4.2 4.93 8.4 7.1 5.7 7.06 6.6 5.9 5.9 6.13 
Observed 
incorrect 
3.6 5.8 5.8 5.07 1.6 2.9 4.3 2.93 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.87 
Performed 
correct 
8.6 7.2 6.6 7.47 6.3 5.8 2.9 5 6.1 5.4 4.6 5.37 
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7.3.3.2 Performed correct 
Paired sample t-tests revealed that there was a significant difference between the 
unperformed meaningful and meaningless actions correctly recalled as 
unperformed (t(29) = 6.69, p<0.001) and meaningful and communicative actions 
(t(29) = -8.45, p<0.001), where more meaningful than meaningless and 
communicative actions were correctly recalled as unperformed. There was no 
significant difference (p>0.05) in the number of meaningless and communicative 
actions, which suggests that participants found them equally challenging to 
attribute as unperformed.  
7.3.3.3 Observed incorrect 
There was a significant difference in the number of incorrectly recalled observed 
actions as unobserved between the observed meaningful actions and 
meaningless (t(29) = 4.7, p<0.001),  meaningful and communicative actions (t(29) 
= -2.98, p<0.05) and meaningless and communicative (t(29) = -2.15, p<0.05).  
These results suggest that participants were more likely to incorrectly recall 
observed meaningful actions as unobserved, rather than meaningless and 
communicative.   
7.3.3.4 False memory 
The number of false memories increased as the testing time delay increased (day 
mean = 4.1, week mean = 5.1, two weeks mean = 6.9).  However, significance 
was only found between a one day and two week testing delay, t(18) = -2.67, 
p<0.05. 
7.3.4 Comparison of OIs (Experiment 1) and SAIs (current study)  
The results of Experiment 1 (OI, Chapter 6) showed a mean score of all OIs to 
be 3.93 (SD = 3.23) and the results of the current experiment (SAI, Chapter 7) 
showed a mean score of all SAIs to be 12.71 (SD = 6.71). Statistical analysis with 
independent-samples t-test revealed that significantly more SAIs were made in 
the current study than OIs in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), t(61) = -6.45, p<0.001. 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Aim of the study 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate SAIs for different types of 
actions. As far as I am aware, the SAI effect has only been researched in the 
schizophrenia literature. SAIs occur when the source of a self-performed action 
is misattributed as being observed in other person. Based on the hypothesis of 
Lindner et al., (2010) that mirror neurones may stand behind an OI effect, it was 
hypothesised that if this is true, SAIs should also be formed with a same pattern 
of results. Again if motor areas are both activated when both performing and 
observing an action, and there is mirror neurone activity, then not only OIs but 
also SAIs should be formed with different patterns for different action types.  
7.4.2 Summary of results 
Firstly and importantly, the results of the current experiment have shown that 
execution of actions can result in SAIs, where participants remember observing 
a person performing an action, when it was in fact themselves who had performed 
that action.  It was found that significantly more meaningless than meaningful 
actions (p<0.05) resulted in SAIs formation, and significantly more 
communicative actions than meaningful actions resulted in SAIs (p<0.05). The 
highest number of SAIs was found after performing meaningless and 
communicative actions with meaningful actions forming the fewest SAIs.  The 
highest number of SAIs was formed after a two week time delay for all the action 
types. It was also found that the number of SAIs significantly increased for 
meaningless actions between one day, a week and a two week testing delays. 
Also, the number of SAIs formed for meaningful actions significantly increased 
between one day and two weeks. Interestingly, SAIs formed for communicative 
actions did not differ significantly between the three time delays. This is not in line 
with the results of Experiment 1, which showed that significantly more OIs were 
formed for communicative and meaningful actions after a two week time delay 
than one week and one day. 
It is especially interesting that the highest number of misattributions was observed 
for meaningless and communicative actions, meaning that participants were 
more likely to answer that they remember falsely observing meaningless and 
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communicative actions rather than meaningful.  It remains unclear if the source 
memory is particularly bad for meaningless and communicative actions or if the 
source memory trace is simply very good for the meaningful condition.  However, 
unlike the OI experiment in Chapter 6, participants were better at remembering 
the meaningful actions overall (as shown by the performed and observed correct 
score).  Although this is a potential explanation of the results here, it is an 
interesting finding in and of itself as the same actions were used in both 
experiments just the wording of the questionnaire changed between the 
experiments.  The wording changed from, for example, 'I shook the bottle’ in the 
OI experiment of Chapter 6 to 'A person shook a bottle' in this experiment.  Note 
also that the number of SAIs made were much higher than the number of OIs 
made in the experiment of Chapter 6 (on average, participants made significantly 
more SAIs), which is in line with the results of Manzi and Nigro (2008). This also, 
unfortunately for the original mirror neurone hypothesis, makes it clear that the 
wording of the questionnaire is having a priming effect that may be masking 
potentially more subtle effects, for example mirror neurone activity.  This also 
calls into question the results of the OI experiment (Chapter 6) as again the 
questionnaire is potentially masking other results.  Given that total SAI numbers 
were higher than total OI numbers (and that OI numbers were very low with 
participants performing at ceiling), leads to the suggestion that this paradigm may 
be better for studying source inflations. 
Although similar results to this experiment were found for the OI experiment of 
Chapter 6, in that communicative actions formed a high number of OIs, one 
strong difference is the increased number of SAIs formed for the meaningless 
action type. At this stage of the research it is unclear as to why this result was 
obtained and is potentially problematic for the idea of mirror neurones standing 
behind the effect (simply because the effect should be stronger for meaningful 
and communicative as seen in the OI experiment).  However as stated above, 
the wording of the questionnaire is clearly biasing the results so any effect of 
mirror neurone activity is weaker than the bias.  It is therefore difficult to make 
any strong conclusions regarding mirror neurone activity here. 
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Mirror neurone studies show that in order for mirror neurones to be activated, the 
action needs to be goal-directed and the observer needs to understand that goal 
(Gallese et al., 1996). For example, mirror neurones are not activated when an 
object or a person is visible alone nor when the action is mimed. It was found that 
mirror neurones are active when the monkey observes the experimenter grasping 
for a peanut, but not when the experimenter mimics grasping for a peanut or when 
the monkey sees the peanut alone (Gallese et al., 1996). A similar effect has 
been found by Ferrari et al. (2003) where mirror neurones were active when a 
monkey observed the experimenter drinking juice from the syringe but not when 
the syringe was presented alone nor when the experimenter mimed the gesture 
of drinking (Ferrari et al., 2003). Selective mirror neurone activation for 
meaningful transitive (requiring object manipulation) actions has also been found 
in humans. For example Enticott et al. (2010) found that mirror neurone activation 
was only present when participants observed meaningful hand actions and not 
meaningless actions nor a static hand. 
As previously discussed, meaningless actions are unfamiliar and novel to 
participants (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002) and execution or observation of them 
may be 'strange' to participants, which could result in a more detailed memory of 
them than of meaningful actions which do not share the distinctiveness of 
meaningless actions. They are the actions encountered in everyday life, being 
frequently observed and performed. Thus, when participants were presented with 
the statements of meaningless actions in the memory test, and asked whether 
they had observed someone performing the 'strange' action, they made a high 
number of SAIs. It seems likely that participants remember performing and 
observing a number of meaningless actions as a hierarchical entity but the 
strange nature of the individual features make them hard to discriminate. They 
seem to have less of a problem discriminating when asked of what they 
performed themselves in Experiment 1 than in this experiment, so they are using 
a different recall method.     
 
Regarding the high misattribution of self-performed communicative actions as 
performed by somebody else, the result of this study is similar to the findings of 
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Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), where the highest number of OI errors was made 
following observation of communicative actions. This supports the initial 
hypothesis of possible mirror neurone involvement, which stated that both 
execution and observation of actions elicit similar brain activity, which in result 
could lead to mistakes in memory source attribution. As previous research on 
mirror neurones and imitation indicates that communicative actions tend to elicit 
greater mirror neurone activation and have imitation advantage over meaningless 
or even meaningful actions, we can speculate that in both Experiment 1 (Chapter 
6) and the current study, the observation of communicative actions could have 
resulted in higher mirror neurone activation which made it more difficult for 
participants to find the correct source of their memory for the communicative 
actions. However, the clear bias of the questionnaire makes this more 
speculative. 
7.4.3 Summary and conclusion 
The results of the experiment show that the observation and performance of 
actions can lead to confusing the source of these actions. Specifically, self-
performed actions can be remembered as observed actions, the effect to which 
we refer as self-action inflation with the highest number for meaningless and 
communicative actions. Furthermore, people make higher numbers of SAIs as 
compared to OIs which fits firmly in the mirror neurones hypothesis.  This study 
revealed a strong bias effect from the questionnaire, therefore to avoid this in the 
next experiment we intended to control for this by creating a questionnaire that 
avoids these biases. 
7.5 Highlights 
 Observation of actions results in memories of actually performing those 
actions (Chapter 6). 
 Mirror neurones have been proposed to be behind OI effect.  
 Observation and execution of action share the same mirror neurone 
activity which could make the source memory differentiation more difficult.  
 It was hypothesised that if there is mirror neurone involvement the same 
pattern of results should be seen as that was found in the OI experiment 
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(Chapter 6). This is a higher level of misattributions formed for 
communicative and meaningful actions than meaningless actions. 
 The reverse of the OI effect, ‘self-action inflation’ (SAI) was demonstrated 
in this experiment. 
 SAI is an effect in which one falsely misattributes self-performed actions 
as performed by somebody else. 
 Significantly more communicative and meaningless actions than 
meaningful actions resulted in SAIs.  
 Unfamiliarity and lack of motor memory are potential explanations of the 
inflation for meaningless type of actions.   
 Clear bias coming from wording of the questionnaire.  
 On average, significantly more SAI errors were made in this experiment 
than OI errors in experiment 1 (Chapter 6). 
 
Some of this information can be found in Mitrenga et al. (in prep) – ‘Self-action 
inflation - misattribution of self-performed actions as observed’. 
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Chapter 8 
Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly 
participants 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Age and source monitoring 
Source monitoring in the elderly has been a subject of a great deal of memory 
research. The past research shows a decline in source monitoring accuracy in 
the elderly. For example, the elderly tend to recall the contents of memories 
better than the source of a given memory. This has been demonstrated in a study 
where young (mean age = 23.47) and elderly (mean age = 70.30) participants 
were asked to recall, recognize and identify the source of a sentence (e.g. who 
said a given word) (Ruiz-Gallego-Largo et al., 2012). The participants had a 
conversation with the researcher in which both the researcher and the 
participants were required to exchange statements describing themselves.  A 
source memory test showed greater impairments in identifying the source of the 
listened to description in older rather than younger adults (Ruiz-Gallego-Largo et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, on average, younger participants recalled more 
descriptive statements than older participants, and they recalled more statements 
about themselves than about the researcher. Younger participants were better at 
recognising the statements they read about themselves as compared to the older 
participants (Rui-Gallego-Largo et al., 2012). 
In another study on source monitoring accuracy in elderly participants, Mitchell et 
al. (2002) presented a video portraying a burglary to a group of young and elderly 
participants. Following this, the participants were asked a set of misleading 
questions about the depicted burglary. The questions were asked about non-
presented details in a way that suggested to participants that they had in fact 
been present during the video. The participants then took a source memory test, 
in which they listened to a male voice reading statements out loud describing (i) 
the actions which were presented in the videos and (ii) the misleading information 
about the burglary. The participants then had to decide whether or not they had 
89 
 
previously seen the information. The responses were recorded on an answer 
sheet with a seven-point scale which ranged from 'definitely not' to 'definitely yes'. 
The results showed that elderly participants were more likely than younger adults 
to recall the misleading information that was suggested to them in the questions 
as true events that they observed in the video. Additionally, older participants 
indicated higher confidence levels for the false memories than younger adults. 
In another study, Norman and Schacter (1997) presented young (mean age = 19) 
and elderly (mean age = 68) participants with a list of words and asked them to 
describe their memories in detail for words that they had recalled with 
‘Remember’ judgements. The results showed that older participants made 
significantly more recollection errors than younger adults. Also, older adults 
showed more recollection of associative details (e.g. visual details, smell and 
sound) rather than contextual details (e.g. location, spatial arrangements, setting) 
about falsely recollected non-presented words and the descriptions of 
‘Remembered’ non-presented words were of higher similarity to the observed 
ones than in younger adults (Norman and Schacter, 1997). 
The lower performance on source monitoring tasks in elderly participants may 
differ depending on which type of source monitoring is studied. Hashtroudi et al. 
(1990) suggest that older adults show a different pattern of source recall when 
they are tested on external reality monitoring.  External reality monitoring is the 
ability to discriminate between two external sources of information, for example, 
being able to discriminate between words one person says from words that 
another person has said. Internal reality monitoring is the ability to discriminate 
between internal sources, for example what someone has said themselves from 
what they had thought. In the study of Hashtroudi et al. (1990), participants were 
exposed to a list of words coming from different sources. A combination of 
internal-external, external-external and internal-internal source monitoring tasks 
was presented to them. For example, in the internal-external condition, 
participants were required to both say a list of words (internal) and listen to a list 
of words (read aloud by the researchers). In the test phase, they were asked to 
identify the correct source of those words, either external or internal.  In the within-
monitoring task, for example internal-internal monitoring, participants were 
required to both say a list of words and imagine saying the words themselves. 
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The results showed a greater deficit in correct source identification when the 
words that were of the within condition (internal-internal or external-external). No 
difference was found in correct source attribution between young and older adults 
when they were identifying the source between the monitoring (internal-external). 
Hastroudi et al., (1990) suggest that such deficit in correct attribution of source of 
information is specific (internal or external monitoring) rather than general (reality 
monitoring).   
Similar results were found by Haj et al. (2012), who studied source attributions in 
tasks involving (i) reality monitoring, (ii) external monitoring and (iii) internal 
monitoring. The performance was compared between young (mean age = 21.78 
years) and elderly participants (mean age = 73.28 years) and AD participants 
(mean age = 76.11 years). In the reality monitoring task, participants either 
observed a researcher placing objects in a bag or placed the objects in a bag 
themselves and subsequently had to recall whether it was them or the researcher 
who placed the objects in a bag. In the external monitoring task, participants 
observed the experimenter placing objects in a bag with a hand covered in either 
a black or white glove. Following this, participants had to remember whether the 
objects had been placed in a bag by a hand with a black or a white glove. Finally 
in the internal monitoring task, participants themselves placed the objects in a 
bag wearing either black or white gloves and had to remember which objects 
were placed into a bag while wearing either black or white gloved. The results 
revealed that elderly participants and AD patients made significantly more errors 
than young participants. Although AD patients made more errors than older 
participants, this difference was not found to be significant. Additionally, the 
results revealed that participants had more difficulty in attributing the correct 
source of their memories in the external and internal source monitoring. This 
means that they struggled to remember if the objects were placed in a bag with 
a white or black gloved hand when they observed the researcher and when they 
placed the items in a bag themselves. This is in line with results of Hashtroudi et 
al. (1989) who also demonstrated deficit in internal and external monitoring when 
compared to reality monitoring.  
Further research on source monitoring errors in the elderly and AD patients is 
important as it can have applications for early diagnosis of AD. Koide et al. (2010) 
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studied the effectiveness in source monitoring as a possible method of early 
detection of AD. In their study, healthy elderly, individuals with mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI) and AD patients were required to (i) observe the researcher 
arranging small drawings of furniture on a piece of paper, (ii) imagine arranging 
the drawings themselves and (iii) arrange the drawing themselves. Following that 
they took a source memory test where they specified the source of the memory 
for the drawing arrangements. The results revealed that both patients with AD 
and MCI formed significantly more errors than healthy elderly participants, where 
they misattributed actions of the experimenter as their own, and actions they 
imagined as actually performed by them. Koide et al. (2010) used the error scores 
to generate Receiver Operating Characteristics curves which discriminated AD 
patients from the MCI participants and the healthy elderly subjects. Koide et al. 
(2010) suggests this method can have applications as an early detection tool for 
AD.  
8.1.2 Age and OIs 
As OI is a relatively new concept in the area of SMEs, there is little research on 
this subject. As far as I am aware, the only study available looking directly at the 
effect of OI in older age is a recent study by Lindner and Davidson (2014). In their 
experiment, the researchers investigated whether elderly participants (mean age 
= 71.93) would be more prone to form OIs when compared to younger 
participants. The authors conducted a two stage experiment consisting of an 
experimental stage and a source memory test. In the first stage, which included 
two phases, participants either (i) read or performed action statements or (ii) 
observed videos of actions being performed. Along with reading or performing 
action statements, a picture of an object would appear on the screen for five 
seconds. Following this, the researcher put the object in front of the participant 
and instructed them to only look at the object. After this, the instruction to either 
read the action statement or perform the action, using the presented object 
appeared on the computer screen. In total, participants performed 15 actions and 
read 15 action statements. In the second phase of stage one, the participants 
observed videos of simple actions being performed. The presentation consisted 
of 60 actions. The actions used in the study were the same as in Lindner’s 
previous studies on the OI effect (Lindner et al., 2010). As stated previously in 
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this thesis, the authors do not discuss the nature of the presented actions, but 
from their descriptions and examples included in the article, it is assumed that the 
actions used were meaningful (e.g. ‘Stamp the paper!’, ‘Ring the bell!’) (Lindner 
and Davidson, 2014). In the second stage of the experiment, participants took a 
source memory test, where they answered which actions they remember 
performing.  
The results of Lindner and Davidson’s study (2014) showed a strong OI effect in 
both young and elderly participants. Additionally, Lindner and Davidson (2014) 
found that older participants were more prone to form OIs as compared to young 
participants (significant main effect of age on OIs). Lindner and Davidson (2014) 
propose that the OI effect in the elderly is a consequence of ‘self-other’ confusion 
when observed actions trigger similar motor response to when the action is 
actually performed.  
8.1.3 Mirror neurons and ageing 
Surprisingly, given the extensive research on mirror neurones published since its 
discovery almost two decades ago (Gallese et al., 1996), not many have 
published research on mirror neurone activity in the elderly population. However, 
the existing research on mirror neurones in the elderly points to similar patterns 
of activation as in the young adults.  
For example, Keerativittatayut et al. (2012) showed 20 healthy elderly 
participants (age between 60 and 70 years old) a video portraying an actor tearing 
a piece of paper. An analysis with fMRI found that elderly participants showed 
activation in the inferior parietal lobule, inferior occipital gyrus and supplementary 
motor area. Keerativittatayut et al. (2012) also found that observation of visual 
stimuli (video of an action) activated brain areas responsible for visual processing 
and further increased the activation into the motor areas.  
Additional evidence comes from studies investigating the effect of age on 
corticomotor facilitation as a result of action observation studied with TMS 
(Leonard and Tremblay, 2007). Leonard and Tremblay (2007) investigated the 
changes in the  motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in hand muscles during (i) 
resting; (ii) observation of videos depicting an action; (iii) imagining performing an 
action and (iv) imitation of the observed action (the same action of cutting material 
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with scissors was used in all conditions). Young (mean age = 24 years) and 
elderly (mean age = 62 years) participants were studied in all conditions. The 
results revealed that both action observation and imagination resulted in hand 
muscle activation similar to when the action is performed. It was found that the 
observation and imagery of action increased the MEPs by 55% on average when 
compared to when participants were resting. The activation was similar between 
young and elderly participants, again suggesting that the shared motor activation 
is not affected by age (Leonard and Tremblay, 2007).  
Similar results were found in an fMRI study on age differences in mirror neurone 
activation during observation and imagination of action execution (Nedelko et al., 
2010). Results revealed neuronal activation in the premotor and parietal cortex 
during both observation and imagination of actions. Moreover, the activation 
pattern did not differ between the young and elderly participants. However, 
Nedelko et al. (2010) found that the neuronal activation was stronger for the 
elderly participants, which they attribute to possible neuronal decline due to older 
age and compensation mechanisms coming into play (Nedelko et al., 2010). In 
order to maintain the same performance as younger participant, elderly 
participants need to recruit more cortical units to produce motor actions.  
8.1.4 Aim and hypothesis 
In this experiment, the OI effect in a group of elderly participants will be 
investigated.  Based on the mirror neurone and OI hypothesis of Lindner et al. 
(2010), it is hypothesised that the matching neuronal activity for observation and 
performance will result in the formation of SMEs for observed actions. In the first 
experimental chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6), it was found that participants 
formed SMEs for performed actions where they misattributed observed actions 
as self-performed.  However, the numbers of OIs made was very small (mean 
overall numbers for meaningful = 1.12, meaningless = 0.88 and communicative 
= 1.73). Therefore in order to create a paradigm that tests OIs better, more OIs 
need to be induced.  Given that source memory errors increase with ageing, if a 
group of elderly participants can provide data on OIs with higher numbers then 
this may prove to be a better method of testing OIs experimentally.  Given that 
source monitoring errors are seen in AD patients (Haj et al. 2012; Gallo et al., 
2007) it is also important to study this effect in healthy ageing. 
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Similar to the previous experiments, meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative emblems were used as stimuli and the memory for the source of 
the actions was tested with the R-K-G paradigm. The time delay between 
exposure to stimulus and testing was two weeks given that the previous 
experiments showed this longer testing delay results in formation of the highest 
number of OIs (see Chapter 6).  
 As previous research suggested a decline in source monitoring accuracy in the 
elderly, it is hypothesised that more OIs will be made in this group as compared 
to younger participants allowing for a better paradigm to study OIs.  Given that 
the majority of previous research (although there is relatively little) shows that 
mirror neurone activity is similar in the elderly as in the young, it is also 
hypothesised that this would be most apparent in the communicative and 
meaningful condition as seen from the results of Experiment 1 Chapter 6). 
8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Participants 
Sixteen participants took part in the study, 11 females and five males.  All 
participants were members of the University of Bradford, Division of Psychology 
over-60s cognitively healthy participant pool.  They had a mean age of 72.87 
years (SD = 5.29). Inclusion criteria included no uncorrectable visual impairment 
and no history of autism or dementia.   Ethical approval was obtained from the 
Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee at 
University of Bradford. 
8.2.2 Design 
A within-subject design was used. The independent variables were the types of 
actions participants observed and performed in the presentation (meaningful, 
meaningless and communicative). The dependent variable was the number of (i) 
OIs formed and (ii) correct source attributions. 
8.2.3 Materials 
The same experimental stimuli as in Experiments 1 (Chapter 6) and 2 (Chapter 
7) were used. Participants observed a video presentation of three types of actions 
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being performed and performed actions themselves. The source memory 
questionnaire used was the same as in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6).  
8.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure of the experiment was the same as in the Experiments 1(Chapter 
6) and 2 (Chapter 7). 
After the experiment, participants were given the R-K-G questionnaire in pre-
stamped envelopes and with the researcher's address. They were asked to fill in 
the questionnaire on a date two weeks from the experiment and send back to the 
researcher.  The participants were telephoned by the researcher one day prior to 
the agreed date who reminded them that the questionnaire was due to be filled 
in.  
8.3 Results 
The aim of this study was to investigate OIs in the cohort of elderly participants 
(over 60 years, mean age 72.87). 
8.3.1 OIs after observation of different types of actions in the elderly 
Figure 8.1 shows that the highest number of OIs was formed after observing 
communicative actions. The lowest number of OIs was formed after observing 
meaningless actions. This pattern of results is the same as in the Experiment 1 
of Chapter 6, where observation of communicative actions resulted in the highest 
number of OIs formed.  
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Figure 8.1 – Mean and standard errors of OIs formed after observing meaningful, 
meaningless and communicative actions in elderly participants. 
The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions 
Standard parametrical tests were carried out alongside non-parametric test. For 
this experiment both analyses showed the same results. The parametric analysis 
is reported. 
Formal analysis with a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of action type that participants observed (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. 
communicative) on the number of OIs formed, F(2, 30) = 9.15, p<0.05. The OIs 
are the misattributions of actions observed in the video presentation as self-
performed.  
Pairwise-comparisons revealed that observation of communicative actions 
resulted in significantly more OIs than observation of meaningful (p<0.05) and 
meaningless (p<0.05) actions. There was no significant difference between the 
number of OIs formed after observation of meaningful and meaningless actions 
(p>0.05). This pattern of memory errors is the same as the pattern of OIs formed 
in the study with healthy young adults in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6). However, the 
number of OIs formed is higher in the cohort of elderly participants.  Furthermore, 
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there was no significant difference between the communicative and meaningful 
actions in Chapter 6 which has reached significance with this cohort, even though 
there are fewer participant numbers for this study.  The differences in the young 
and elderly data will now be formally investigated. 
8.3.2 OIs in the elderly and young adults - a comparison 
Figure 8.2 shows the data from the present chapter and data from Experiment 1, 
Chapter 6; elderly vs. young respectively. It demonstrates that for both groups 
the same pattern of OIs were seen and that overall the elderly group form more 
OIs (OI mean = 4.94) than the young (OI mean = 3.73).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 – Mean and standard errors of OIs formed after observing meaningful, 
meaningless and communicative actions in the group of elderly participants and 
young adults.  The results from the young adults are those from the experiment 
of Chapter 6. 
* 
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8.3.2.1 Main effects of age group. The OIs in elderly participants (current 
study) and young participants in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) 
This was analysed with a 2x3 mixed ANOVA, where the age (young vs. elderly) 
was the between-subjects factor and the action type was the within subject factor 
(meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative). There was a significant main 
effect of participant group and the number of OIs formed with F(1, 47) = 10.62, 
p<0.05, showing that overall, elderly participants formed significantly more OIs 
than younger adults. The results support other studies (Mitchell et al., 2002; 
Norman and Schacter, 2007; Haj et al., 2012) which suggest source memory 
accuracy decreases with age.  These results highlight that, investigating this age 
group may make for a good paradigm to test OIs as larger numbers of OIs are 
formed. 
8.3.2.2. OIs for different types of actions and age 
The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between the type of action 
observed and age group on numbers of OIs formed with  F(2, 94) = 4.73, p<0.05. 
Further exploration of this interaction with independent-samples t-tests showed 
that there was a significant  difference in the number of OIs formed after 
observing communicative actions between the two age groups (p<0.05). Elderly 
participants formed significantly more OIs after observing communicative actions 
than younger participants. Although elderly participants formed more OIs 
(Meaningful mean = 2, Meaningless mean = 1.6) than younger participants 
(Meaningful mean = 1.12, Meaningless mean = 0.88) after observing meaningful 
and meaningless actions, this difference was not found to be significant (p>0.05). 
To summarise, elderly participants formed significantly more OIs than younger 
adults overall. The formation of OIs for different action types between groups 
differed significantly only after observing communicative actions, which resulted 
in more OIs in the elderly than young adult group.  
 
8.3.3 Correct recall of performed actions (elderly participants) 
The correct recall is the score for correctly recalled performed actions as self-
performed. These results are important as they provide more detail on general 
source attribution abilities.  
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Table 8.1 – Mean and standard deviation of correctly recalled performed actions 
(as performed) in elderly participants. 
Action type Mean Std. Deviation 
Meaningful 3.94 1.69 
Meaningless 5.19 2.83 
Communicative 6.94 2.69 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference in 
the number of actions correctly attributed to their source depending on the type 
of action, F(2, 96) = p<0.001. 
Pairwise-comparisons revealed that participants recalled significantly more 
communicative than meaningful (p<0.05) and marginally more meaningless 
(p=0.06) actions to their correct source. This suggests that communicative 
actions were the easiest to remember as performed. However they still created 
the highest number of OIs. 
A similar pattern of correct recall was observed in the young adult sample in 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) where the highest number of correct source attributions 
was recorded after performing communicative actions.  
8.3.4 False memory 
In addition to studying source memory accuracy, ‘real’ false memories were also 
studied in the experiment. Additional sentences that described actions that were 
neither performed nor observed in the experiment were included in the source 
memory questionnaire. The false sentences in the questionnaire were the same 
for young and elderly participants.  
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Figure 8.3 – Mean and standard error of false memories formed in group of 
elderly and young participants.  
The mean number of false memories formed by elderly participants was 4.25. 
This is almost twice as many false memories as formed by younger participants 
(Mean = 2.34).  
An independent-samples t-test was carried out, where the number of false 
memories was the dependent variable and age group (young vs. elderly) was the 
independent variable. The analysis revealed that this difference in false 
memories formed to be statistically significant between the two age groups, t(47) 
= 2.3, p<0.05 with elderly participants forming significantly more false memories 
than younger participants. See Chapter 10 for more discussion of the false 
memory data. 
8.3.5 Age as a predictor of OIs 
Age was also looked at as a continuous variable to investigate whether it could 
predict the number of OIs formed by the participants. In order to analyse this, the 
data from the experiment of Chapter 6 and this data were combined and a simple 
regression was carried out with age in years (age range = 20 – 83 years) as a 
predictor variable and number of OIs formed as the outcome variable (the 
variable was created from totalling OIs formed in meaningful, meaningless and 
false memory 
elderly young 
* 
*p<0.05 
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communicative conditions). The results indicated that age is not a significant 
predictor of the number of OIs formed.  
However, the multiple regression model of age as a predictor variable and type 
of actions as the outcome variables significantly predicted the number of OIs after 
observing only communicative actions (F(3, 44)= 4.93, p<0.05). The relationship 
was moderate (R=0.52) (t(44)= 3.44, p=0.001 99% CI 2.24 – 8.62). This means 
that as the age of participants increased, the number of OIs for communicative 
actions also increased. Age did not significantly predict OI for either meaningful 
or meaningless actions (p<0.05).  
8.4 Discussion 
8.4.1 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study was to investigate the formation of OIs in a group of elderly 
participants. As in the previous experiments, the number of OIs formed after 
observing meaningful, meaningless and communicative actions was 
investigated. Based on the previous research on source monitoring errors in the 
elderly (Haj et al., 2012; Mitchell et al., 2002) it was hypothesised that elderly 
participants will form significantly more actions than younger participants. This 
was further supported by the results of this study. Since the mean OI number was 
found to be small in Experiment 1 of Chapter 6 with many participants scoring at 
the floor level, one aim of this study was to create a paradigm that will allow for 
better investigation of OI errors by possibly generating greater mean OIs.  
8.4.2 Summary of findings  
The main findings are that (i) elderly participants formed significantly more OIs 
overall than young participants, demonstrating that it is a good cohort to use to 
study OIs, (ii) that elderly participants show the same pattern of OIs with respect 
to action type and (iii) that when compared with the young adult sample, elderly 
participants formed significantly more OIs than young participants after observing 
communicative actions.  
In terms of correct attribution of an action to its source, elderly participants 
correctly recalled significantly more communicative than meaningful and 
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meaningless actions.  This is interesting as they also made more OI errors for 
this type of action.  
It was also found that the age of participant significantly predicts the OI for 
communicative actions, i.e. the older the participant, the more likely they are to 
form OIs for communicative actions. Age was not found to be a significant 
predictor of OIs after observing meaningful and meaningless actions.  
The results of current study support the initial hypothesis in that more OIs were 
made in the group of elderly participants than young participants. Additionally the 
highest number of OIs formed following observation of communicative actions 
further supports the hypothesis. Since the communicative emblems used in the 
present experiments have been shown to elicit similar brain activation as when 
speech and other communicative movements are processed (Andric et al., 2013), 
this could result in easier misattribution of these actions as self-performed. 
Observation of communicative actions does not only trigger similar motor 
activation as when the action is produced, but is also familiar to participants and 
therefore could be another factor in the highest rates of misattribution. This could 
also be the explanation for the lowest number of OIs being formed after observing 
meaningless actions; since these are the least familiar and not stored in LTM 
therefore one is not mapping the action repertoire to their own motor system and 
thus is less likely to recall it as a self-performed action.  Research on imitation of 
actions has demonstrated that familiar and meaningful actions show imitation 
advantage over meaningless actions (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002).  Although 
there is little research on mirror neurons and elderly, it could be speculated that 
the same mechanisms are responsible for heightened attribution of 
communicative actions as self-performed. Perhaps general memory decline 
related to progressing age results in increased rates of OIs formed for these 
actions. Furthermore, the results are in line with the literature on memory 
accuracy decline with age (Husain et al., 2012, Haj et al., 2012, Norman and 
Schacter, 1997, Schacter et al., 1997).  The results show that elderly participants 
formed significantly more OIs after observation of communicative actions than 
younger participants (Experiment 1, Chapter 6).   
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Interestingly, the highest number of correctly attributed self-performed actions 
was following execution of communicative actions. Communicative actions also 
resulted in highest number of OIs in the current study. It is unclear as the highest 
score of correct attribution would suggest that communicative actions are 
remembered better than meaningful and meaningless actions and possibly result 
in stronger memory trace. The high level of misattributions of these actions 
suggests that the memory trace for communicative actions could be in fact strong, 
but the source attribution mechanisms are not working effectively.  
As predicted, observation of meaningless actions resulted in the lowest number 
of OIs, which could be due to a lack of storage of these actions in the LTM causing 
these actions to be unfamiliar to participants (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002). This 
could make the actions seem more unlikely to have been performed to 
participants and less likely to result in misattributions of self-performance. 
Furthermore, research on mirror neurones shows that observation of 
meaningless actions results in little to no mirror neurone activity when compared 
to goal-directed actions (Husain et al. 2012). 
Regarding the meaningful actions, previous research on mirror neurone activity 
show that observation of meaningful actions results in lower (Ferrari et al., 2005) 
or the same mirror neurone activation as communicative actions (Montgomery et 
al. 2007). Additionally, Carmo and Rumiati (2009) found that communicative 
emblems are imitated better than goal-directed meaningful actions, possibly 
because of absence of objects in communicative actions. The objects in 
meaningful actions could pose a greater cognitive processing demand when 
compared to communicative actions, execution of which does not involve objects. 
Also in the case of current study, the presence of objects could have made the 
meaningful actions more distinctive, hence resulting in a more accurate memory 
trace and correct source attributions as observed.  
The results of this study are also in line with the results of Lindner and Davison 
(2014) who also found OI effect in elderly and young participants. Similar to 
Lindner and Davison's (2014) study, the current experiment found that elderly 
participants formed significantly more OI errors than younger adults.  
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Additionally, the results revealed that elderly participants formed significantly 
more false memories for action statements that were neither presented to them 
nor performed by them than younger adult participants. This is in line with 
previous research on false memory and age, which shows that memory accuracy 
declines with age (e.g. Hamajima et al., 2005; Dennis et al., 2007). 
Future research should examine the OI effect in AD patients as previous research 
has shown that AD disease patients exhibit heightened susceptibility to form false 
memories (Plancher et al., 2009) and source monitoring errors (e.g. Haj et al., 
2012). Importantly, future studies on OIs should focus on adapting the OI 
paradigm as a possible tool for early detection of AD, since it has already been 
shown that source monitoring tests can be used for this purpose (Koide et al., 
2010).  
8.5 Summary 
Previous research on memory errors suggests that source memory accuracy 
declines with age (Mitchell et al., 2002, Norman and Schacter, 1997). In this 
study, it was hypothesised that observation of actions of different types will result 
in higher numbers of OIs formed by elderly participants as compared to young 
adults. The results showed that elderly participants formed more OIs. The highest 
number of errors formed was after observation of communicative actions. The 
effect is attributed to possible mirror neurone activity, resulting in source 
confusion due to similar neuronal activity during execution and observation of 
actions.  The results are in line with previous research on OI and the elderly 
(Lindner and Davison, 2014), and source monitoring literature (e.g. Haj et al., 
2012). 
Future research should examine the OI effect in AD patients as they exhibit high 
levels of SME formation (Haj et al. 2012, Koide et al., 2010). Possible applications 
of research in AD cohort could result in adapting the paradigm as an early disease 
detection tool. 
9.5.1 Highlights 
 Past research shows deficits in source monitoring accuracy for healthy 
elderly (Haj et al, 2012; Mitchel et al., 2002; Hastroudi et al., 1989) 
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 The current study aimed to investigate the patterns of OI formation in the 
elderly cohort. 
 Potentially higher rates of misattribution would allow for developing the OI 
paradigm better since the mean OI recorded in Experiment 1 were 
relatively low.  
 The present study found the highest number of OIs formed for 
communicative actions in the healthy elderly. 
 Higher number of OIs was formed in the group of healthy elderly than 
young adults. 
 Significantly more OIs were formed after observation of communicative 
actions in the group of elderly than younger adults. 
 The effect is attributed to possible underlying mirror neurone activity 
resulting in similar brain activation during observation and execution of 
actions.  
 Similarity in neuronal activation could result in confusion between the 
sources of memory in participants. 
 This seems to be supported by the inflation in memory error formation for 
communicative actions. 
 Results of this study showed similar results to those of Experiment 1 
(Chapter 6). However, significantly more OIs were made in the current 
study. Additionally, in the current study significantly more communicative 
than meaningful and meaningless actions resulted in OIs, when in 
Experiment 1, observation of communicative and meaningful actions was 
equally likely to result in OIs.  
 It was found that as the age of participant increases, so does the number 
of OIs formed, but only after observing communicative actions. 
 Age was not found to be a significant predictor of OIs for meaningful and 
meaningless actions.  
 Not only did the observation of communicative actions resulted in the 
highest level of OIs but also in the highest number of correct source 
attributions of self-performed actions.  
 Future research should consider testing the OI paradigm in AD patients. 
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Some of the information from this chapter can be found in Mitrenga et al. (in 
prep.) – ‘Observation Inflation in the cohort of elderly participants’. 
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Chapter 9 
The role of instruction in the formation of 
observation and self-action inflations 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters (Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8), it was found that 
both the observation and execution of actions can result in SMEs where the 
attribution of the source of action is incorrect. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 
(OI), it was found that source confusions of performing an action can be created 
by observing actions being performed by somebody else. These OIs were first 
shown by Lindner et al. (2010), who found that observation of meaningful actions 
results in more false memories of self-performance than when action statements 
are read. However in the study of Chapter 6 and the study of Chapter 8, OIs were 
investigated with different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative). In Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) it was found that significantly more 
OIs were made after observing communicative actions as compared to 
meaningless actions. Although more communicative than meaningful actions 
resulted in OIs, this difference was not significant. This difference has reached 
significance in Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) where OIs were investigated in the 
elderly cohort (mean age = 72.87).  Observation of communicative actions 
resulted in significantly more OIs than observation of meaningful and 
meaningless actions. Additionally it was found that, the elderly participants in 
Experiment 3 formed significantly more OIs than young participants in 
Experiment 1.  The OI effect was also found to degrade as the time between the 
experiment and study phase progressed in both Experiment 1 and 3, which is in 
line with previous research on source confusion errors (e.g. Porter et al., 2010).  
The OI effect has not been researched extensively, but the previous research in 
this subject area hypothesises that the effect is a consequence of mirror neurone 
activity and source monitoring failure (Lindner et al., 2010; Schain et al., 2012). 
The results of Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) and 3 (Chapter 8) supported the 
hypothesis as the highest number of OIs was formed after participants observed 
108 
 
communicative actions. It was found that the lowest number of OIs was formed 
after observation of meaningless actions which also supports the initial 
hypothesis. 
To further test possible involvement of mirror neurones, a similar experiment was 
conducted (Chapter 7) with the hypothesis that if mirror neurones are involved in 
OIs (misremembering observed actions as performed), they should also be 
involved the other way i.e. in misattributing performed actions as observed. 
Instead of asking the participants which actions from the experiment they 
remembered performing, participants were asked which actions they 
remembered observing. The results showed that execution of actions can also 
result in SMEs, where performed actions are misremembered as observed 
actions. This has been termed self-action inflation (SAI) (Mitrenga et al., in prep), 
as the self-performed actions are remembered to be from a different source. The 
pattern of SAIs was interesting.  It was found that significantly more meaningless 
and communicative actions resulted in SAIs than meaningful actions. 
Meaningless and communicative actions were equally likely to result in SAIs 
(although more meaningless actions than communicative resulted in SAIs, the 
difference was not statistically significant).  The effect was attributed to deficits in 
motor memory due to lack of expertise in performing those actions in everyday 
life (meaningless). The unfamiliarity of meaningless actions could result in a 
feeling of not being able to have had performed these actions, as their character 
and attributes seem unconventional. This is supported by previous findings on 
imitation of meaningless actions (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002).  
However, the inflation in misattributions for meaningless actions is against the 
initial mirror neurone hypothesis proposed for this effect. It was expected that a 
similar pattern of SAIs will be formed to the one in the Experiment 1 (OI) and 2, 
due to similar mirror neurone activity elicited by observation of actions as in the 
execution of these actions. Since communicative and meaningful actions have 
been shown to trigger greater mirror neurone activation than meaningless actions 
(e.g. Montgomery et al., 2007; Husain et al., 2012), a higher level of misattribution 
for these actions was also expected to be found in the Experiment 2.  It is likely 
that this is the result of a methodological issue hiding a potential finding and a 
further investigation is needed to study this. The exact same actions were used 
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in the experimental phase of both experiments, only the wording of the 
questionnaire changed between the two.  It would therefore appear that there is 
a strong bias or priming effect created by the wording of the two questionnaires. 
Whether this is hiding an effect of mirror neurone activity, enhancing it or negating 
it remains unclear at this stage.  This issue will be addressed in this chapter where 
the methodology and the mode of retrieval for source memories was controlled 
in the current experiment.  
An example of how the retrieval method can influence the results was 
demonstrated by Lindsay and Johnson (1989). They found that changing the 
instructions at the retrieval stage eliminated the effect of suggestibility in a false 
memory study. In the experiment, participants observed scenes and following 
that read a narrative suggesting false information about the previously presented 
scene.  Later, participants answered questions about their memory for the items 
that were presented in the scene in either picture or narrative presentation. The 
participants either (i) replied with 'Yes' or ‘No’ as to whether they saw the item 
previously or (ii) took a source monitoring questionnaire. In the source memory 
questionnaire they were required to decide whether (i) they had seen the item in 
the picture; (ii) the item was only present in the text; (iii) the item was present in 
both picture and text or (iv) the item was not presented in any modality. The 
results revealed that the source monitoring questionnaire eliminated a 
suggestibility effect and misattribution of the false information, which was present 
when participants answered with the 'Yes'/'No' paradigm. Lindsay and Johnson 
(1989) suggested this happens because when participants answer with 'Yes'/'No' 
they make the judgement about the item based on feelings of familiarity. On the 
other hand, when presented with source memory options, they evaluate the item 
based on the information specific for a given source.  
Therefore, the study of this chapter will give participants the option to retrieve the 
information about the particular source of the action – either observed or 
performed, instead of recognition of just one source, as was done in Experiment 
1, Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.  
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9.1.1 Aims and hypothesis 
Experiment 1, 2 and 3 showed that it is possible to create source confusion errors 
from short observation of actions along with performing actions, as well as 
attributing one’s own actions to a different source. In the OI experiments (Chapter 
6 and 8), as well as in the SAI experiment (Chapter 7), an adapted version of R-
K-G paradigm was used to investigate the memory errors. In the OI experiments, 
participants were asked to specify which actions they recall performing whereas 
in the SAI experiment they were asked to specify the actions they recall 
observing. Note that other than the wording of the questionnaire, the experiments 
were the same. As demonstrated in the research introduced in Chapter 2, 
memory is highly susceptible to suggestions and misinformation (Loftus et al. 
1978). Given the discrepancy between the results for OI and SAI and the fact that 
significantly more errors were made for the SAI experiment (Chapter 7) as 
compared to the OI experiment of Chapter 6 (p<0.05), this experiment will test 
both source memory errors (OI and SAI) with a questionnaire that involves 
participants recalling the source themselves i.e., they were given the name of the 
action and then asked to choose themselves whether they recall observing or 
performing that particular action. The rest of the experiment was the same as the 
OI experiments (Chapter 6 and 8) and the SAI experiment (Chapter 7). 
The hypothesis for this experiment is that assuming the involvement of mirror 
neurones in motor memory and the SMEs then a similar pattern of misattributions 
across the different types of actions for both observed and performed is expected. 
This means that if the observation and execution of actions results in similar 
neuronal activation, the experience of performing and observing would be similar 
and the level of misattribution produced for these actions potentially similar.  
Given the discrepancies between the OI and the SAI experiments, likely to be 
because of bias or suggestibility from the questionnaire, this experiment also acts 
as a controlled paradigm to avoid any methodological issues hiding any potential 
effect. 
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9.2 Methods 
9.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants recruited from University of Bradford took part in the 
experiment (mean age = 27.04). Four males (mean age = 24) and 17 females 
(mean age = 27.94) took part. The inclusion criteria were no uncorrectable visual 
impairments and no history of autism. The participants were different from those 
that had participated in Experiments 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 8). Ethical approval was obtained from Humanities, Social 
and Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee at University of Bradford. 
9.2.2 Design 
A within-subjects design was used, where dependent variables were (i) the 
number of OIs or SAIs formed and (ii) the correct source attributions of performed 
and observed actions. The independent variables were the types of actions which 
participants were exposed to in a video presentation, either (i) meaningful, (ii) 
meaningless or (iii) communicative actions. These are the same videos and 
PowerPoint presentation as used in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 2 
(Chapter 7) and Experiment 3 (Chapter 8).  
9.2.3 Materials 
The same materials used for Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 2 (Chapter 
7) and Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) were used here.  The difference in the 
experiment was the questionnaire given to participants.  This time the items in 
the questionnaire consisted of sentences written in the impersonal form for 
example, ‘flashing a torch’ and the questions asked whether the participant 
remembered observing the actions or performing the actions which they simply 
had to tick. Additionally, participants were instructed to decide whether they 
'Remember', 'Know' or 'Guess' that they either performed or observed each action 
(see Appendix 3 for a copy of the questionnaire used in the study). The sentences 
contained 30 actions that participants performed and 30 actions that they had 
observed in the PowerPoint presentation.  As for Experiment 2 (Chapter 6), 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and Experiment 3 (Chapter 8), 20 actions that were 
neither observed nor performed were added to the questionnaire in order to test 
real false memories. 
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9.2.4 Procedure 
The same procedure was used as in the OI and SAI experiments with young 
participants. The only difference in the procedure was the time delay after which 
the participants filled in the source memory R-K-G questionnaire. Here, the time 
delay was two weeks for all the participants.  
9.3 Results 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the formation of OIs and SAIs as a 
result of action observation and action execution for different types of actions, 
when recalled through a single questionnaire where the participants themselves 
had to recall the source of the action. The OI and SAI scores were, as for the 
previous chapters, created by summing 'Remember' and 'Know' responses for 
each action. The 'Guess' responses are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.  Figure 
9.1 shows the number of OIs and SAIs formed.  The OIs are the number of 
misattributions of observed actions as the ones that were self-performed and 
SAIs are the number of misattributions of self-performed actions as ones that 
were observed. 
9.3.1 Observation Inflation and Self-action Inflation 
The results show that the highest number of errors was the OIs after performing 
communicative actions. A similar pattern was observed for the SAIs, where the 
highest number of errors was formed for communicative actions (see Figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 – Mean and standard errors for OIs and SAI formed after observation 
and execution of meaningful, meaningless and communicative actions. 
9.3.1.1. Analysis of action type (independent of error type) 
The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions 
Standard parametrical tests were carried out alongside non-parametric test. For 
this section both analyses showed the same results. The parametric analysis is 
reported.  
Formal analysis with a 3 (action type: meaningful vs. meaningless vs. 
communicative) x 2 (error type: OI vs. SAI) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed 
that there was a significant main effect of the action type, F (2, 46) = 13.56, 
p<0.001. This means that there was a significant difference in the number of 
errors formed for different types of actions regardless of the error type (OI or SAI). 
The pairwise-comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference 
between the errors formed after observing and executing communicative and 
meaningful actions (p<0.05) and communicative and meaningless actions 
(p<0.05). No significant difference was found between meaningful and 
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meaningless actions (p>0.05). This shows that regardless of whether the 
participants recalled the actions as observed or performed, they were most likely 
to form errors for communicative actions. 
9.3.1.2 Analysis of error type (OI and SAI) 
There was no significant main effect found between the number of OIs and SAIs 
formed (p>0.05). This means participants were equally likely to form both types 
of errors when asked to specify whether they observed or performed an action.  
There was no significant interaction formed between the action type and the error 
type (p>0.05) which means that the number of OIs and SAIs formed for the 
different types of actions was similar.  
 
9.3.2 Comparisons with the results of Chapter 6 and 7 
The results of Experiment 1 (OI, Chapter 6) showed a mean score of all errors to 
be 3.93 (SD = 3.23) and the results of Experiment 2 (SAI, Chapter 7) showed a 
mean score of all errors to be 12.71 (SD = 6.71). Statistical analysis with 
independent-samples t-test revealed that significantly more SAIs were made than 
OIs (p<0.001; see Chapter 6 and 7 for more details).  Interestingly, in the current 
experiment there was no significant difference found in the number of OIs and 
SAIs formed (p>0.05), showing that once the questionnaire bias was eliminated 
the difference disappeared.  
9.3.3 Correct recall 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the OI and SAI errors, however, as 
in the two previous chapters, the correct recall is also important to report since it 
provides more information on overall source attribution. The other results 
obtained from the experiment were the (i)  observed correct – where the 
participants observed the action in the experiment and subsequently recalled it 
as observed in the questionnaire; (ii) performed correct – when the participant 
performed the action and correctly recalled it as performed. 
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Table 9.1 – Mean and standard deviations of actions where the source is correctly 
identified 
Source Action Type Mean Standard deviation  
Performed correct Meaningful 
Meaningless 
Communicative 
4.46 
6.88 
6.29 
1.47 
3.11 
2.09 
Observed correct Meaningful 
Meaningless 
Communicative  
2.13 
4.13 
3.08 
2.17 
2.38 
2.19 
 
Table 9.1 shows that the highest number of correctly recalled actions as 
performed was for the meaningless actions and communicative actions. The 
lowest number of actions correctly recalled as performed was for meaningful 
actions.   
The highest number of actions correctly recalled as observed was in the 
meaningless condition, followed by communicative and meaningful.  
9.3.3.1 Analysis of action type (independent of source) 
Formal analysis with a three (action type: meaningful vs. meaningless vs. 
communicative) x two (correct source type: performed vs. observed) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of action type F(2,46) = 
21,54, p<0.001.  Pairwise-comparisons showed that significantly more 
meaningless than meaningful actions (p<0.001) were recalled with their correct 
source overall, and significantly more communicative than meaningful actions 
were recalled correctly (p<0.001). This means that regardless whether 
participants correctly recalled self-performed or observed actions, they were 
more likely to recall either meaningless or communicative rather than meaningful 
actions.  
9.3.3.2 Analysis of source (regardless of action type) 
The analysis also found a difference in the number of correct answers given for 
performed and observed actions, F(1.23) = 29.63, p<0.001, showing that more 
performed actions were recalled correctly as performed than observed actions 
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were recalled correctly as observed. This suggests that participants are better at 
remembering actions they performed themselves than observed others 
performing.  
There was no significant interaction between the type of actions participants were 
exposed to, and the memory source (performed or observed). This means 
participants were equally correct with the recall of specific types of actions that 
were observed and performed. 
9.3.4 Comparing OIs from Experiment 1 and the current experiment 
(Chapters 6 and 9) 
This section investigates whether the pattern of OI formation between Experiment 
1 and the current study differed, given the controlled methodology of the current 
chapter.  
Table 9.2 – Mean and standard deviation of OIs in Experiment 1 and current 
experiment.  
Action type Experiment Mean Standard deviation 
Meaningful Experiment 1 
Current Experiment 
1.17 
1.5 
1.34 
1.1 
Meaningless Experiment 1 
Current Experiment 
0.92 
1.38 
1.15 
1.64  
Communicative Experiment1 
Current Experiment 
1.83 
2.96 
1.58 
1.78  
 
Table 9.2 shows that the highest number of OIs formed in both experiments was 
after observation of communicative actions. The lowest number of OIs in both 
experiments was formed after observation of meaningless actions. 
The results of non-parametric tests are reported for the comparison of OI recall between 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 3. 
The analysis with Friedman’s test showed that there was a significant difference 
in the number of OIs formed after observing the three different types of actions in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, χ2(3) = 42.86, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, 
resulting in a significance level set at p<0.005. The results of Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests revealed that significantly more OIs were formed for communicative 
actions in Experiment 3 than meaningful actions (Z = -3.34, p<0.001), 
meaningless actions (Z = -4.02, p<0.001) and communicative actions (Z = -3.56) 
in Experiment 1.  
9.3.5 Comparing the results of SAIs in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and the 
current experiment (Chapter 9) 
This section investigates whether the change in methodology had any effect on 
the pattern of SAI formation between Experiment 2 and the current study 
(Experiment 4, Chapter 9). 
Table 9.3 – Mean and standard deviations for all action type in Experiment 2 and 
the current experiment.  
Action type Experiment  Mean Std. Deviation 
Meaningful Experiment 2 
Current Experiment  
2.5 
0.83 
2.05 
0.91 
Meaningless Experiment 2 
Current Experiment  
5 
1.5 
3.09 
1.7 
Communicative Experiment 2 
Current Experiment  
4.6 
1.88 
2.27 
1.92 
 
Table 9.3 shows that the highest number of SAIs was formed for communicative 
actions in the current experiment (Chapter 9) and for meaningless actions in 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 7).  
The parametric tests are reported for this section. 
This was analysed with a 2x3 mixed measures ANOVA, where the between 
subject factor was the number of SAIs formed in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and 
the current experiment (Chapter 9) and within-subject factor was the action type 
(meaningful, meaningless and communicative). The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of action type, suggesting a different pattern of SAIs formed 
for different action types overall, F(2, 104) = 26.92, p<0.001. 
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The pairwise-comparisons revealed that significantly more SAIs were formed 
after performing communicative actions than meaningful actions (p<0.001).  
There was also significantly more SAIs formed for meaningless actions than 
meaningful actions (p<0.001). There was no significant difference in the number 
of SAIs formed between meaningless and communicative actions (p>0.05), which 
means participants were equally likely to misattribute self-performed meaningless 
and communicative actions as performed by somebody else in both experiments.   
It was also found that significantly more SAI errors were formed in Experiment 2 
than the current study F(1, 52) = 25.7, p<0.001. 
Furthermore, the results revealed a significant interaction between the action type 
and the experiment, F(2, 104) = 6.7, p<0.05, which means that there was a 
different pattern of SAIs for given action type in the two experiments. Further 
analysis with independent-samples t-tests revealed that significantly more 
meaningful actions (t(49) = 3.73, p<0.001), meaningless actions (t(47) = 5.25, 
p<0.001) and communicative actions (t(52) = 4.75, p<0.001) were formed in 
Experiment 2 than in the current study (Experiment 4).  
9.3.6 False memory 
False memories for actions that were neither observed nor performed in the 
experiment were studied. It was found that participants formed similar number of 
false memories of observation (mean = 3) and performance (mean = 2.54) of 
actions. The paired-samples t-tests did not reveal a significant difference in the 
number of false memories formed for either observation or performance (p>0.05).  
9.4 Discussion 
9.4.1 Aims of the study 
This experiment aimed to investigate source memory errors further where 
participants observed and performed a series of meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative actions and then had to recall themselves whether they had either 
performed or observed the said action. This acts as a control study for Experiment 
1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) where 
there appeared to be a strong bias from the wording of the questionnaire. 
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9.4.2 Main findings 
The results showed that significantly more source confusion errors (OIs and SAIs) 
were formed after executing or observing communicative actions than meaningful 
and meaningless actions. No significant difference in the number of source 
memory errors was found following execution and observation of meaningful and 
meaningless actions.  The total number of OIs and SAIs did not differ significantly, 
suggesting a similar pattern for both errors, as initially expected.  
As for the actions that were correctly attributed to their source, the source of 
meaningless and communicative actions was more likely to be correctly recalled 
than meaningful actions. Significantly more communicative and meaningless 
actions were correctly recalled than meaningful actions. Communicative and 
meaningless actions were equally likely to be correctly recalled to their sources. 
Even though this suggests that recalling the source of meaningful actions is 
hardest it is interesting that the meaningful actions do not provide the highest 
numbers of OIs and SAIs. This suggests a potentially weak memory trace for 
meaningful actions resulting in low number of misattributions as well as correct 
attributions. 
The OIs formed in this study and that of Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), were the 
highest after the observation of communicative and meaningful actions. 
Significantly higher mean number of OIs were formed in this experiment for 
communicative actions than communicative, meaningful and meaningless 
actions in Experiment 1, showing that this methodology is a better method of 
inducing these source memory errors. 
As for the SAI errors, the results revealed that more communicative and 
meaningless actions than meaningful actions resulted in formation of 
misattributions regardless of experiment. Furthermore, the results revealed that 
all action types resulted in higher mean SAI in Experiment 2 than in the current 
study.  Interestingly, the pattern of SAIs in Experiment 4 did not show as high a 
level of SAIs formed for meaningless actions as in Experiment 2, again showing 
that the methodology, in this case the wording of the questionnaire,  has a strong 
influence on the formation of these errors. 
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9.4.3 Mirror neurones and memory errors (OIs and SAIs) 
The results support the evidence of possible mirror neurone involvement by 
showing inflation of both types of errors for communicative action type. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, observation of communicative emblems 
results in activation of motor areas that are also active when the same actions 
are performed (Andric et al., 2013). Past research on mirror neurones has shown 
that observation of communicative actions shows greater activation of brain areas 
thought to be associated with mirror neurone activity (e.g. Donne et al., 2009, 
Andric et al., 2013). 
9.4.5 Wording of source memory questionnaire 
This study implemented a paradigm that controlled for suggestibility of the 
instructions given at the retrieval stage. Participants had to decide for themselves 
in a recall task as to whether they had performed or observed an action.   
In Experiment 2 where it was found that the highest number of SAIs were formed 
for meaningless and communicative actions, participants had to decide whether 
they recall observing the actions to have been performed in the video 
presentation. They did that by initially answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ and if their answer 
was ‘Yes’ they further specified whether they ‘Remember’, ‘Know’ or ‘Guess’ that 
they observed the actions being performed. According to Lindsay and Johnson 
(1989), ‘Yes’/’No’ recognition is based on feelings of familiarity. Thus, it is 
plausible that the high inflation in misattributions of meaningless actions could be 
a consequence of lack of familiarity of these actions even if they were self-
performed and attributing them to others. However in the current study where the 
method of retrieval in the questionnaire was changed to a source monitoring 
questionnaire where participants had to decide about the source of particular 
memories, the mean number of SAIs for meaningless actions was significantly 
lower (p<0.001). This could be because participants engage in memory source 
evaluation for each source separately (Lindsay and Johnson, 1989).  
As discussed in the chapter on SAIs (Chapter 7), where more SAIs were made 
than OIs (Chapter 6), it was hypothesised that  this result is because we are better 
at remembering items we ourselves have performed than what someone else has 
performed hence when the phrasing of the questionnaire is I performed 
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(methodology for the OI chapter, Chapter 6)  our recall system is more efficient 
than when the question is phrased I observed (methodology for the SAI chapter, 
Chapter 7) and the participant needs to remember what someone else has done.   
The present study eliminated this bias and showed that using a simple source 
memory recall task, both OIs and SAIs were equally likely to be formed.  The 
participant needs to recall the action and the source themselves which is harder 
than recognition (e.g. Cabeza et al., 1997), as was required of them in Experiment 
1, 2 and 3.  
9.5 Summary 
The study partially replicated the findings of Experiment 1, 2 and 3, in that it is 
plausible to form memory errors of self-performance (OI) after observing 
someone else performing an action and memory errors where self-performed 
actions are misattributed to other people (SAI). It was found that significantly 
more communicative than meaningful and meaningless actions resulted in 
source monitoring errors. The OI results are partially in line with the results of 
Experiment 1 but the SAI results are not in keeping with Experiment 2, where a 
high level of SAIs was formed after execution of meaningless actions. 
Participants formed a similar number of OIs and SAIs in the current experiment 
which was against what was found in Experiment 1 and 2, where significantly 
more SAIs where formed in Experiment 2 than OIs in Experiment 1. Importantly 
the change in methodology highlights the need for a controlled paradigm in 
research into SMEs and emphasises the strength of suggestibility in this sort of 
research. The results also provide support for the mirror neurone hypothesis as 
observation and execution of communicative actions resulted in the highest 
number of source memory errors (OIs and SAIs).  
9.5.1 Highlights 
 Previous experiments of this thesis found that observed actions can be 
misattributed as self-performed (OI); and self-performed actions can be 
misattributed to having been performed by other people (SAI). 
 It was proposed to be a result of source monitoring being more challenging 
due to mirror neurone activity. 
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 The hypothesis for this study was that the same pattern of OIs and SAIs 
will be found when participants recalled the source of their memory 
themselves, which supports the mirror neurone hypothesis. 
 The experiment further controls for any methodological issues hiding any 
potential effects (since the mirror neurone hypothesis was not fully 
supported by the results of Experiment 2). 
 Significantly more errors (OI and SAI) were made following observation 
and execution of communicative actions than meaningful and meaningless 
actions.  
 OIs and SAIs were equally likely to be formed supporting the initial 
hypothesis.  
 No specific action type resulted in higher formation of OIs or SAIs. 
 Significantly more OIs were formed in Experiment 4 than 1. 
 Significantly more SAIs were formed for all action types in Experiment 2 
than Experiment 4.  
 Results support the hypothesis that mirror neurones may stand behind OI 
and SAI formation, as the results show that both action and execution 
result in source misattributions. In particular, the high level of 
misattributions formed for communicative actions may suggest mirror 
neurone involvement in the OI and SAI effects.  
 Results highlight the importance to control for suggestibility from 
questionnaires in source memory error research. 
 
Some of this information can be found in Mitrenga et al (in prep.) – ‘The role 
of instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations’. 
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Chapter 10 
The recollective experience of OIs and SAIs. A 
study of R-K-G responses 
 
10.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) and Experiment 4 
(Chapter 9), the misattribution of observed actions as self-performed were 
investigated (OIs). The SAI effect, where self-performed actions are misattributed 
as being performed by other people was also examined in Experiment 2 (Chapter 
7) and Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). In these experiments, participants filled in a 
source memory questionnaire which employed the R-K-G paradigm.  Participants 
had to specify whether they 'Remembered', 'Knew' or 'Guessed' that they had 
performed (OI) or observed (SAI) the actions. To calculate both OIs and SAIs in 
the previous chapters, the 'Remember' and 'Know' responses were totalled, 
excluding 'Guess' responses which are thought to indicate no recollection (Horry 
et al., 2010). The OI and SAI chapters were discussed in relation to the type of 
actions, importance of instruction type and age differences in formation of 
misattributions. The current chapter focuses specifically on the recollection types 
(separate R-K-G responses) participants had for the misattributions they formed 
(OIs and SAIs) as well as for the correctly recalled actions (correctly recognised 
as self-performed and correctly recognised as having been performed by others). 
Studying the nature of memory recollection is important as different recollection 
types are indicative of the type of memory process used (Gardiner et al., 2002). 
For example, 'Remember' recollection suggests a stronger memory trace than 
'Know' or 'Guess' recollections (Geraci and McGabe, 2006). See section 10.1.1 
below for a brief recap of the R-K-G literature and Chapter 5 for a thorough 
review.  In the present chapter, the recollections for observed and performed 
actions made with (i) ‘Remember’, (ii) ‘Know’ or (iii) 'Guess’ responses will be 
analysed. The datasets used will be from Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
124 
 
10.1.1 Types of memory recollections 
The R-K-G questionnaire is a widely used tool which measures different types of 
conscious memory recollection (Gardiner et al., 2002). Tulving (1985) firstly 
proposed the ‘Remember-Know’ (R-K) paradigm as a method of distinguishing 
between two memory types; episodic and semantic memory. According to Tulving 
(1985), the 'Remember' responses indicate retrieval of episodic memories which 
contain autobiographical information as well as the qualitative details related to 
the memory. Remember indicates that a person can mentally 'relive' the memory, 
and recall specific details about it. The 'Know' response on the other hand, is 
associated with feelings of familiarity in relation to the memory and a sense of 
'knowing', but lacks detail about the information or event. Hence, 'Know' 
responses are more likely to express semantic memories (Tulving, 1985). Since 
the development of the R-K paradigm, it has been widely used in memory 
research to investigate the types of memory recollections and confidence 
judgments (e.g. Geraci and McCabe, 2006; Mather et al., 1997; Arnold and 
Lindsay, 2007; Dunn, 2004).  See Chapter 5 (Sections 5.2 and 5.3) for a more 
detailed introduction to the paradigm. 
Furthermore, past research suggests that recollection and familiarity engage 
different neural structures in the brain. For example, Yonelinas et al. (2005) 
investigated the neural activity during the retrieval of words in an fMRI study. In 
the experiment, participants first saw 150 words (e.g. 'harp') and following this 
took a memory test in which they had to decide whether they 'Remembered', 
'Knew' or 'Guessed' that they had previously seen the displayed words. In 
addition to the 150 words that they had previously seen, 150 new words were 
added to the list that had not been shown to participants previously. Yonelinas et 
al. (2005) found that recollection ('Remember' responses) and familiarity ('Know' 
responses), activated different brain areas. 'Remember' responses were 
associated with activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and 'Know' 
responses with left lateral prefrontal cortical activity. This finding is important 
because it highlights the distinctiveness between the two recognition memory 
types. It shows that the 'Remember' responses are not simply a reflection of high 
levels of familiarity one has, but a retrieval of specific details associated with the 
memory (Yonelinas et al., 2005).  Given that this thesis specifically looks at 
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'inflations' which are SMEs, it is important to now investigate how these errors 
are remembered/misremembered and which recognition types are being used by 
participants when they are making inflations.  Importantly, do these recognition 
types differ between different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative) when a participant makes an inflation?  Is there a difference 
between recollection type for OIs and SAIs?   
Regarding specifically the recollection and source monitoring for performed and 
observed actions, Manzi and Nigro (2008) provided 88 action statements to 
participants describing simple action commands (e.g. ‘Put the letter in the 
envelope’). Participants completed the experiment in pairs, where they took turns 
performing the actions on the instruction of the researcher. While one of the 
participants performed the action, the other participant observed, which was then 
alternated. After either one or two weeks, participants returned and were given a 
surprise source memory test. The test comprised of the following: (i) initial 
old/new item recognition (specifying whether the action was encountered in the 
test phase), (ii) an R-K-G recognition test and (iii) a source memory test. To 
clarify, in the beginning participants were required to class the given action 
statements as encountered or not encountered. They then had to decide whether 
they ‘Remembered’, ‘Knew’ or ‘Guessed’ that they had seen the action before 
and finally they were asked to attribute the action to its source – either self-
performed or performed by the other participant. The results showed that more 
actions were correctly attributed to their source overall after one week than after 
two weeks (consistent with the findings of this thesis). After a one week testing 
delay, participants correctly recalled 84% of all actions (performed and 
observed). More actions were recalled as ‘Remembered’ (60%) than ‘Known’ 
(24%); and more performed actions (89%) were correctly attributed to their 
source than observed actions (80%). After a two week testing delay, 76% of 
actions were correctly attributed to their source with 55% of actions recollected 
as ‘Remembered’ and 21% recollected as ‘Known’. Both performed and observed 
actions were equally correctly attributed to their source, the recall showing 76% 
accuracy for both conditions. To summarise, this means that correct attribution 
after both testing time delays was more likely to be with ‘Remember’ responses. 
As for the actions that were incorrectly attributed to their source (observed actions 
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recalled as performed and vice versa), these actions were equally as likely to be 
recalled with either ‘Remember’ or ‘Know’.  Additionally, Manzi and Nigro (2008) 
found that observed actions incorrectly recalled as performed were more likely to 
be recollected with ‘Remember’ than performed actions incorrectly recalled as 
observed which I term OIs and SAIs respectively. 
Although the main objective of Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) study was to investigate 
the recollection type for correct attribution, their results on misattribution of 
actions relate to the results reported in this thesis (the misattributions are not 
specifically named as OI or SAI in the experiment of Manzi and Nigro (2008) 
however). Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) study supports the claim that observation of 
actions can result in memories of self-performance (named OI in this thesis and 
by Lindner et al., (2010)); as well as the notion that actions that were self-
performed can be misremembered as performed by somebody else (named SAI 
in this thesis). Given the examples of the actions used by Manzi and Nigro (2008) 
(e.g. 'Put a letter in an envelope'), it could be assumed that the actions were of a 
meaningful nature. The results of Manzi and Nigro (2008) suggest then, that self-
performed meaningful actions are more likely to be misattributed to others (SAIs), 
than actions performed by others as self-performed (OIs). These results are 
consistent with the results of Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) and Experiment 2 
(Chapter 7), where more SAIs were formed in Experiment 2 than OIs in 
Experiment 2. However, the possible questionnaire bias was not controlled for in 
these experiments. In the control Experiment 4 (Chapter 7), the results have 
shown that the number of OIs and SAIs formed was similar. Both error types 
were more likely to be recollected as 'Remembered' in Manzi and Nigro’s study 
(2008).  This could suggest that misattributed actions are similarly 'vivid' and 
equally detailed as real memories (Mather et al., 1997).  
10.1.2 R-K-G recollections in the elderly 
The age of participants seems to be an important factor in the recollective 
patterns of information. Aizpurua et al. (2009), tested the R-K-G recollection in a 
group of elderly (mean age = 62.93) and young participants (mean age = 19.93). 
The participants were presented with a video depicting a robbery and following 
that they took a source recognition test and answered whether or not they 
'Remembered', 'Knew' or 'Guessed' the action statements described in the test. 
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The action statements were comprised of true descriptions of the events that 
were shown in the video and false fabricated statements about the robbery. The 
results revealed  that both elderly and young participants were more likely to 
recall false statements about the robbery as true with 'Remember' recollections, 
rather than 'Know' or 'Guess’. However, the elderly recalled almost twice as many 
false statements as 'Remembered' in comparison to younger participants. 
Additionally, the correct information about the robbery was more likely to be 
recalled with 'Remember' responses by both elderly and young participants 
(Aizpurua et al., 2009). Aizpurua et al. (2009) suggest that elderly participants 
experience strong feelings of familiarity towards the false statements and judge 
them as 'Remembered'. Also the age related deterioration of source monitoring 
abilities could result in the experience of re-living of the true information being 
misattributed to the false statements (Aizpurua et al., 2009).  
10.1.3 Aim of the current chapter 
In this chapter, the pattern of memory recollection is investigated for both OIs and 
SAIs, and action type that were recorded in the experiments in this thesis. In the 
experimental chapters of this thesis (Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8, Chapter 
9), the ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses were totalled to create an error 
variable, either OI or SAI. This chapter will now look at these recollections 
separately, as well as investigate the pattern of ‘Guess’ recollection which has 
yet to be formally analysed. The correct recollections of self-performed and 
observed actions will also be investigated.  
Additionally, the ‘true’ false memory recollections will be discussed and analysed 
in this chapter. The ‘true’ false memories are when participants recall either 
performing (OI) or observing an action (SAI), but in fact they have neither 
performed nor observed it in the experiment. These were statements included in 
the questionnaire that had not been in the test phase at any point. 
As far as I am aware, mirror neurones have not been researched in relation to R-
K-G recollection previously. Mirror neurones have been linked with different types 
of implicit memory, for example priming (Brass et al., 2001; Press et al., 2005; 
2006; 2007) and motor memory (Stefan et al., 2005). The R-K-G paradigm on the 
other hand, is used to measure explicit memory, and conscious recollection of 
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episodic memory. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that different 
memory strengths might be seen for different action types if mirror neurones are 
involved in the source memory errors. 
It is not clear what recollective pattern would be predicted here regarding the 
three action types. However, given the results between Experiment 1 (Chapter 6, 
‘The observation inflation effect – memory for different types of actions’) and 2 
(Chapter 7, ‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of self-performed actions as 
observed’) showed that significantly more SAIs then OIs were made (which is 
consistent with Manzi and Nigro’s findings (2008)), it is predicted that SAIs will be 
of a stronger memory trace i.e. more ‘Remember’ responses. However given the 
clear bias from the wording of the questionnaire, it is the, R-K-G responses from 
Experiment 4 Chapter 9 (‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation 
and self-action inflations’) that is of particular importance as this can be 
considered the control condition. 
It seems surprising that there is so little research on the R-K-G paradigm in the 
elderly but based on the study discussed above (Aizpurua et al., 2009), which 
found that the elderly made more ‘Remember’ recollections for false memories 
than ‘Know’ and ‘Guess’, it is predicted here that the elderly will make more 
‘Remember’ responses for their OIs than ‘Know’ or ‘Guess’ responses as 
compared to the young. However, the experiment of Aizpurua et al., (2009) was 
different from the experiments discussed in the thesis, making the two studies 
difficult to compare. 
10.2 Method 
10.2.1 Participants 
Data sets have come from Experiment 1 (Chapter 6, ‘The observation inflation 
effect – memory for different types of actions’), Experiment 2 (Chapter 7, ‘Self-
action inflation - misattribution of self-performed actions as observed’), 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 8, ‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly 
participants’) and Experiment 4, Chapter 9, (‘The role of instruction in the 
formation of observation and self-action inflations’). All participants were recruited 
from the University of Bradford except for the participants from Experiment 3, 
Chapter 8 (‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly participants’), who were 
129 
 
recruited from the Division of Psychology’s over 60s cognitively healthy 
participant pool. Inclusion criteria for all participants were no uncorrectable visual 
impairments and no history of autism. Ethical approval was obtained for each of 
the experiments separately, from the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee at University of Bradford. 
10.2.2 Design 
10.2.2.1 Remember vs. Know responses 
The results from the experiments of the previous chapters were based on the 
totalled 'Remember’ and Know' responses. Here I firstly look at the split between 
the 'Remember' and 'Know' responses and will then go on to investigate the 
'Guess' responses. Given the strong differences between the experiments of 
each chapter, the results from each experiment will be analysed separately.  For 
each set of the results respectively, the dependent variables are (i) the number 
of OIs recalled with ‘Remember’ and ‘Know; (ii) number of SAIs recalled with 
‘Remember’ and ‘Know’, (iii) correctly recalled performed actions with 
’Remember’ and ‘Know’ ( OI experiments) and (iv) correctly recalled observed 
actions with ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ (SAI experiments). The independent 
variable is the action type, either (i) meaningful, (ii) meaningless, or (iii) 
communicative.  
10.2.2.2 Guess responses 
The ‘Guess’ responses indicate little, none or very low confidence in recalling the 
action (Dunn, 2004). In the previous experimental chapters, the ‘Guess’ response 
was omitted in the calculation of OI and SAI scores, as well as in the correct 
attributions of performed and observed actions. In this chapter, the ‘Guess’ 
responses will be analysed separately from the ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ 
recollections. The ‘Guess’ responses will be compared across different action 
types (meaningful, meaningless and communicative) in each experimental 
chapter.   
10.3. Results 
The aim of this study was to investigate the memory recollection types for OIs 
and SAIs, particularly how different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless 
and communicative) are recalled by participants. Participants’ memories of action 
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source were tested with the R-K-G questionnaire. Participants answered that they 
(i) 'Remembered, (ii) 'Knew' or (iii) 'Guessed' that they had incorrectly performed 
(OI) or incorrectly observed (SAI) actions. Below are the results of the analysis of 
participants' recollections from all experiments reported in this thesis.  
10.3.1 Recollection of OIs 
This section reports the recollection of OIs. See Figure 10.1 for OI.  Significance 
is demonstrated with the significance stars.  No stars indicates no significance. 
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Experiment 1, Chapter 6 
 
‘The observation inflation effect – memory for 
different types of actions.’ 
Experiment 3, Chapter 8 
 
‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly 
participants.’ 
Experiment 4, Chapter 9 (just the OIs) 
 
‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and 
self-action inflations.’ 
 
Figure 10.1 – Mean  OIs for different types of actions, (i) meaningful, (ii) meaningless and (iii) communicative recalled with (i) 'Remember', (ii) 'Know' or (iii) 'Guess' 
in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 3 (Chapter 8)  and Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). 
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Experiment 1, Chapter 6 
 
‘The observation inflation effect – memory for 
different types of actions.’ 
 
Experiment 3, Chapter 8 
 
‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly 
participants.’ 
 
Experiment 4, Chapter 9 
 
‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and 
self-action inflations.’ 
 
Figure 10.2 – Mean correct source attributions of performed actions for different types of actions, (i) meaningful, (ii) meaningless and (iii) communicative recalled 
with (i) 'Remember', (ii) 'Know' or (iii) 'Guess' in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), Experiment 3 (Chapter 8)  and Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). 
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The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions 
Standard parametrical tests were carried out alongside non-parametric test. For 
this section both analyses showed the same results. The parametric analysis is 
reported.  
For each experiment, the results were analysed with a 3 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA, where the independent variable was the action type (meaningful vs. 
meaningless vs. communicative) and the mean number of inflations formed for 
the two recollection types was the dependent variable ('Remember' vs. 'Know'). 
For the results of Experiment 1, Chapter 6, (‘The observation inflation effect – 
memory for different types of actions’) and Experiment 3, Chapter 8 (‘Observation 
inflation in the cohort of elderly participants’), there was no significant main effect 
of recollection type (p>0.05) and no significant interaction between the action type 
and recollection type, suggesting that different action types were equally likely to 
be recalled with either ‘Remember’ or ‘Know’. 
However, the experiment of Chapter 9, the control experiment entitled ‘The role 
of instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations’, for the OI 
condition, showed a significant interaction between the recollection type and 
action type, F(1, 46) = 3.39, p<0.05, showing that inflations/errors for different 
types of actions were recalled differently with the ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ 
recollections. See Figure 10.1. Post-hoc analysis with paired samples t-tests 
revealed that for all action types significantly more OIs were made with 
'Remember' judgements as compared to 'Know' with (i) meaningful (t(23) = 2.53, 
p <0.05 (ii) meaningless  (t(23) = 2.87, p <0.05 and (iii) communicative (t(23) = 
3.48, p<0.05). See Figure 10.1.  Furthermore, (i) significantly more 
communicative actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ responses than 
meaningless actions (t(23) = -3.44, p<0.05); (ii) significantly more communicative 
actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ responses than meaningful actions (t(23) 
= 3.9, p = 0.001). There was no significant difference between OIs recalled with 
the 'Remember' response between meaningful and meaningless actions (p>0.05) 
This shows that the communicative inflations as compared to meaningful and 
meaningless were of the strongest trace and participants were more likely to 
recall qualitative details associated with those actions.   There was no significant 
difference found for 'know' responses for any action type. 
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10.3.1.1 Correct attribution of performed actions in OI experiments 
For comparison of recollection type/confidence judgments of correct responses 
with those made for inflations (errors) made, formal analysis of the correct 
responses are now analysed. Non-parametric analysis is reported for the correct 
attribution of performed actions. For each experiment, the results were analysed 
with Friedman’s tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests where the independent 
variable was the action type (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative) and 
the mean number of correct attributions formed for the two recollection types was 
the dependent variable ('Remember' vs. 'Know'). Non-parametric analysis is 
reported in this section.  
In Experiment 1 of Chapter 6 (‘The observation inflation effect – memory for 
different types of actions’) the analysis with Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed 
that significantly more correctly performed actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ 
than ‘Know’ responses overall, Z = -4.35, p<0.001. The analysis with Friedman’s 
test showed that there was a significant difference in the number of different 
responses made for the three types of actions, χ2(5) = 74.18, p<0.001. Post hoc 
analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with Bonferroni 
correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p<0.003. The results of 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that significantly more correct actions were 
recalled with ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ for meaningful actions (Z = -3.78, p<0.001), 
meaningless actions (Z = -4.66, p<0.001) and communicative actions (Z = -3.76, 
p<0.001). Additionally, it was found that significantly more meaningful actions 
were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than meaningless actions recalled with ‘Know’ 
(Z = -4.33, p<0.001) and communicative actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -3.52, p<0.001). 
Significantly more meaningless actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than 
communicative actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -4.02, p<0.001). Additionally, significantly 
more communicative actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than meaningful (Z 
= -4.08, p<0.001) and meaningless actions (Z = -4.65, p<0.001) with ‘know’ 
response. 
Similarly in Experiment 3 of Chapter 8 (‘Observation inflation in the cohort of 
elderly participants’), it was found that more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ 
recollections were made for the correctly attributed actions overall, Z = -2.37, 
p<0.001. The results of Friedman’s test showed that there was a significant 
difference in the number of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses given for the three 
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types of actions, χ2(5) = 106.56, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests was conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a 
significance level set at p<0.003. The analysis showed that significantly more 
‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ responses were made for meaningful (Z = -4.65, 
p<0.001), meaningless (Z = -5.42, p<0.001) and communicative actions (Z = -
4.72, p<0.001). Additionally, it was found that significantly more communicative 
actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ response than meaningful actions (Z = -
3.35, p<0.004); significantly more meaningful actions were recalled with 
‘Remember’ than meaningless actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -5.08, p<0.001) and 
communicative actions with ‘Know’ recollection (Z = -3.98, p<0.001). Significantly 
more meaningless actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ recollection than 
communicative actions with ‘Know’ recollection (Z = -4.72, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, it was found that significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections were 
made for communicative actions than ‘Know’ recollections for meaningful (Z = -
5.22, p<0.001) and meaningless actions (Z = --5.6, p<0.001). This demonstrates 
that correct responses were remembered with high confidence and the 
participants were able to recall qualitative details associated with these actions.   
Furthermore, a similar pattern was seen for the control experiment, Experiment 
4 of Chapter 9 (‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and self-
action inflations’) where the questionnaire was designed to avoid bias. The results 
revealed that overall, significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollections 
were made regardless of the action type, Z = -3.8, p<0.001. The analysis with 
Friedman’s test revealed that there was a significant difference in the number of 
‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections formed for different types of actions, χ2(5) 
= 65.68, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was 
conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set 
at p<0.003. The analysis showed that significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ 
recollections were made for meaningful (Z = -3.81, p<0.001), meaningless (Z = -
3.6, p<0.001) and communicative actions (Z = -3.61, p<0.001). Additionally, 
significantly more meaningful actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than 
meaningless actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -3.51, p<0.001); significantly more 
meaningful actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than communicative actions 
with ‘Know’ (Z = -3.45, p=0.001); significantly more communicative actions were 
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recalled with ‘Remember’ than meaningful (Z = -3.97, p<0.001) and meaningless 
(Z = -3.53, p<0.001) actions with ‘Know’ recollection.  
10.3.2 Recollection of SAIs 
The pattern of R-K-G recollections for SAIs in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 9) is analysed in this section.  If mirror neurones are 
involved in the inflations, we expect a similar pattern of recollection judgements 
for SAIs; in particular for the control experiment, Experiment 4 (Chapter 9) where 
bias of the questionnaire was controlled for and where no significant difference 
was found between the number of OIs and SAIs made.  See Figure 10.3 for SAIs 
and Figure 10.4 for the recollection for actions correctly recognised as observed.  
For each experiment, the results were analysed with a 3 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA, where the independent variable was the action type (meaningful vs. 
meaningless vs. communicative) and the mean number of inflations formed for 
the two recollection types was the dependent variable ('Remember' vs. 'Know'). 
Parametric analysis is reported for in this section. 
For the results of Experiment 4, Chapter 9 (‘The role of instruction in the formation 
of observation and self-action inflations’), there was no significant main effect of 
recollection type (p>0.05) and no significant interaction between the action type 
and recollection type, suggesting that different action types were equally likely to 
be recalled with either ‘Remember’ or ‘Know’.  This was surprising given the 
results from the OIs of this control experiment.  See Figure 10.1 and section 
10.3.1 which shows and interaction between action type and recollection type 
with the communicative OIs remembered with more qualitative details (more 
'Remember' responses as compared to meaningful and meaningless actions). 
However, the results of Experiment 2, Chapter 7 (‘Self-action inflation - 
misattribution of self-performed actions as observed’) showed that there was a 
significant main effect of recollection type, F(1, 29) = 36.45, p<0.001. Pairwise-
comparisons revealed that significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections were 
made than ‘Know’ recollections (p<0.05) overall. 
The results of Experiment 2 also revealed that there was a significant interaction 
between SAI for action type and recollection type, F(2, 58) = 21.81, p<0.001, 
suggesting that there was a significant difference in the recollections participants 
had for the three action types. 
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Post-hoc analysis with paired-samples t-tests revealed that SAIs for all action 
types were recalled, although incorrectly, with significantly more 'Remember' 
responses than 'Know' responses with (i) meaningful (t(29) = 3.74, p<0.001); (ii) 
meaningless actions with (t(29) = 6.53, p<0.001) and (iii) communicative actions 
with (t(29) = 5.77, p<0.001).  Furthermore, (i) significantly more SAIs for 
meaningless actions were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than meaningful actions 
(t(29) =-6.74, p<0.001); (ii) significantly more SAIs for meaningless actions were 
recalled as ‘Remembered’ than communicative actions (t(29) =2.08, p<0.05); (iii) 
significantly more SAIs for communicative actions were recalled as 
‘Remembered’ than meaningful actions (t(29) =7.92. p<0.001); (iv) significantly 
more meaningless actions were recalled as ‘Known’ than communicative actions 
(t(29) = -2.76, p<0.05) and (v) significantly more communicative actions were 
recalled as ‘Known’ than meaningful actions (t(29) = 2.84, p<0.05.  
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Experiment 2, Chapter 7 
‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of self-performed actions as 
observed.’ 
Experiment 4, Chapter 9 
  ‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations.’ 
Figure 10.3 – Mean SAIs for different types of actions, (i) meaningful, (ii) meaningless and (iii) communicative recalled with (i) 'Remember', (ii) 'Know' or (iii) 
'Guess' in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7), Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). 
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Experiment 2, Chapter 7 
‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of self-performed actions as observed.’ 
Experiment 4, Chapter 9 
  ‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and self-action 
inflations.’ 
Figure 10.4 – Mean SAIs for different types of actions, (i) meaningful, (ii) meaningless and (iii) communicative recalled with (i) 'Remember', (ii) 'Know' or (iii) 
'Guess' in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7), Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). 
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10.3.2.1 Correct attribution of observed actions in SAI experiments 
To investigate recollection types for errors (SAIs) and correct responses, for each 
experiment, the results were analysed with Wilcoxon signed ranks tests and 
Friedman’s tests, where the independent variable was the action type 
(meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative) and the mean number of correct 
attributions formed for the two recollection types was the dependent variable 
('Remember' vs. 'Know'). Non-parametric analysis is reported in this section.  
Results of Experiment 2, Chapter 7 (‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of self-
performed actions as observed’) revealed that significantly more ‘Remember’ 
than ‘Know’ recollections were made overall, Z = -4.65, p<0.001. Further analysis 
with Freidman’s test showed that there was a significant difference in the number 
of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections for the three different types of actions, 
χ2(5) = 83.84, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was 
conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set 
at p<0.003. The analysis revealed that (i) significantly more meaningful actions 
were correctly recalled with ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ (Z = -4.37, p<0.001); (ii) 
significantly more meaningless actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than 
‘Know’ (Z = -4.56, p<0.001); (iii) significantly more communicative actions were 
recalled with ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ (Z = -4.06, p<0.001).  Furthermore, (i) 
significantly more meaningless actions were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than 
meaningful actions (Z = -4.14, p<0.001); (ii) significantly more meaningless 
actions were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than communicative actions (Z = -4.45, 
p<0.001); (iii) significantly more meaningful actions were recalled with 
‘Remember’ recollection than meaningless with ‘Know’ (Z = -4.42, p<0.001) and 
(iv) communicative with ‘Know’ (Z = -3.8, p<0.001); (v) significantly more 
meaningless actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than communicative actions 
with ‘Know’ (Z = -4.42); (vi) significantly more communicative actions were 
recalled with ‘Remember’ than meaningful actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -4.45, 
p<0.001) and (vii) meaningless actions with ‘Know’ (Z = -4.6, p<0.001).  
For the results of Experiment 4, Chapter 9 (‘The role of instruction in the formation 
of observation and self-action inflations’), there was a significant difference in the 
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number of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections made overall, where significantly 
more SAIs were recalled with ‘Remember’ recollection, Z = -2.2, p<0.05. Further 
analysis with Freidman’s test revealed that there was a significant difference in 
the number of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections formed for the three types of 
actions, χ2(5) = 23.29, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests was conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance 
level set at p<0.003. The results showed that there was significantly more 
‘Remember’ recollections were made for meaningless than meaningful actions (Z 
= -3.47, p=0.001). 
10.3.3 Summary of the results so far (OIs and SAIs) 
The results revealed that the OIs were equally recalled with either ‘Remember’ 
or ‘Know’ in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) and Experiment 3 (Chapter 8). However, 
in the control Experiment 4 (Chapter, 9) all action types were recalled with 
significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollections suggesting a strong 
memory trace when misattributing observed actions as self-performed. This 
pattern was only found in Experiment 4 when possible questionnaire bias was 
controlled for. Here, when participants had to differentiate for themselves 
between the sources of their memory, they clearly made stronger recollections 
with ‘Remember’ for OIs. Additionally, the control experiment, Experiment 4 
revealed a significant interaction between action and recollection types, showing 
that all action types were recalled with more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ 
recollections. Importantly, communicative actions were recalled with 
significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections than meaningful and 
meaningless actions. Regarding correct source attributions of self-performed 
actions, significantly more actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ 
recollections for all experiments. 
Regarding SAIs, all action types were similarly recalled with either ‘Remember’ 
or ‘Know’ in Experiment 4 (Chapter 9). However, in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7), all 
action types were recalled with significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ 
recollection. Additionally, significantly more meaningless actions were recalled 
with ‘Remember’ than meaningful and communicative actions. More 
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communicative actions were recalled with a ‘Remember’ recollection than 
meaningful actions.   
As for the correct attribution of observed actions, significantly more actions were 
correctly recalled as ‘Remembered’ rather than ‘Known’ in all action type 
conditions in Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and in Experiment 4 (Chapter 9).   
10.3.4 ‘Guess’ recollections for OI experiments 
This section reports the ‘Guess’ recollection in OIs experiments. See Figure 10.1.  
For each experiment, the results were analysed with a repeated-measures 
ANOVA, where the independent variable had three levels which was the action 
type (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative).  The dependent variable 
was the mean numbers of responses made with a ‘Guess’ recollection. 
Parametric analysis is reported in this section. 
The results revealed that there was a significant main effect of action type for , 
Experiment 1 of Chapter 6 (‘The observation inflation effect – memory for different 
types of actions’) F(2, 64) = 12.94, p<0.001, Experiment 3, Chapter 8 
(‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly participants’) F(2, 30) = 3.31, p=0.05  
and Experiment 4, Chapter 8 (‘The role of instruction in the formation of 
observation and self-action inflations.’) F(2, 46) = 6.38, p<0.05. For Experiment 
1, pairwise-comparisons revealed that significantly more communicative actions 
were recalled with ‘Guess’ than meaningful (p=0.001) and meaningless actions 
(p=0.001) in. For Experiment 3, pairwise-comparisons revealed that significantly 
more communicative than meaningful actions were recalled with ‘Guess’ 
(p<0.05). There was no significant difference found between communicative and 
meaningless actions (p>0.05) and meaningful and meaningless actions (p>0.05).  
For the control experiment, Experiment 4, pairwise-comparisons showed that 
significantly more communicative actions were recalled with ‘Guess’ than 
meaningful actions (p<0.05). There was no significant difference in ‘Guess’ 
responses between communicative and meaningless actions (p>0.05) and 
meaningful and meaningless actions (p>0.05). 
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10.3.4.1 ‘Guess’ recollections of self-performed actions in OI experiments 
This section reports the ‘Guess’ recollections of self-performed actions in the OI 
experiments. See Figure 10.2. The non-parametric analysis is reported. For each 
experiment, the results were analysed with Wilcoxon signed rank tests, where the 
independent variable had three levels which was the action type (meaningful vs. 
meaningless vs. communicative). The dependent variable was the mean 
numbers of responses made with a ‘Guess’ recollection. Non-parametric analysis 
is reported in this section.  
There was no significant difference (p>0.05) in the number of ‘Guess’ 
recollections formed between the three types of actions in Experiment 3, Chapter 
8 (‘Observation inflation in the cohort of elderly participants’). 
However the results of Experiment 1,  Chapter 6 (‘The observation inflation effect 
– memory for different types of actions’), revealed that there was a significant 
difference in the number of ‘Guess’ recollections formed between meaningful and 
communicative actions (Z = -2.11, p<0.05), suggesting that significantly more 
‘Guess’ responses were made for communicative than meaningful actions.  In the 
Experiment 4, Chapter 9 (‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation 
and self-action inflations’), the analysis with Wilcoxon signed ranks test revealed 
that (i) significantly more meaningless actions were ‘Guessed’ than meaningful 
actions and (ii) significantly more ‘Guess’ recollections were formed for 
communicative than meaningful actions. 
10.3.5 ‘Guess’ recollections for the SAI experiments 
 This section reports the ‘Guess’ recollection in SAIs experiments. The same as 
with OIs, for each SAI experiment, the results were analysed with a repeated-
measures ANOVA, where the independent variable had three levels which was 
the action type (meaningful vs. meaningless vs. communicative). The dependent 
variable was the mean numbers of responses made with a ‘Guess’ recollection. 
Parametric analysis is reported in this section.  
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There was no significant main effect of action type in Experiment 4, Chapter 9 
(‘The role of instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations’), 
suggesting that all action types were equally recalled with ‘Guess’ recollection.  
However in Experiment 2 of Chapter 7 (‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of 
self-performed actions as observed’), the results revealed a significant main 
effect of action type, F(2, 59) = 4.18, p<0.05. Pairwise-comparisons showed that 
significantly more communicative actions were recalled as ‘Guessed’ than 
meaningful actions (p<0.05). There was no significant difference found in the 
‘Guess’ recollections between communicative and meaningless actions (p>0.05); 
and meaningful and meaningless actions (p>0.05).  
10.3.5.1 ‘Guess’ recollections for observed actions in SAI experiments  
This section reports the ‘Guess’ recollection for correctly recalled observed 
actions in SAIs experiments. The same as with SAIs experiments, the results 
were analysed with a repeated-measures ANOVA, where the independent 
variable had three levels which was the action type (meaningful vs. meaningless 
vs. communicative). The dependent variable was the mean numbers of 
responses made with a ‘Guess’ recollection. 
The results of Experiment 2, Chapter 7 (‘Self-action inflation - misattribution of 
self-performed actions as observed’) and Experiment 4 of Chapter 9 (‘The role of 
instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations’), revealed 
that there was no significant main effect of action type (p>0.05) suggesting that 
different action types were equally recalled with the ‘Guess’ recollection in these 
experiments.  
10.3.6 False memory 
In addition to recollective experience of OIs and SAIs, the current Chapter 
examines the formation of false memories reported in the experimental chapters 
in this thesis.  These were statements written on the questionnaire in the test 
phase that had neither been performed nor observed in the study phase. 
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10.3.6.1 False memories of self-performance  
The false memories of self-performance are when participant neither observed 
nor performed the actions in the experiments but indicated in the source memory 
questionnaire that they had performed them. The false statements were included 
in Experiment 1, Chapter 6 (‘The observation inflation effect – memory for 
different types of actions’), Experiment 3, Chapter 8 (‘Observation inflation in the 
cohort of elderly participants’) and Experiment 4, Chapter 9 (‘The role of 
instruction in the formation of observation and self-action inflations’). Parametric 
analysis is reported in this section.  
Figure 10.5 shows that the highest number of false memories was formed in the 
elderly cohort in Experiment 3 (Chapter 8). Almost the same number of false 
memories was formed in OI experiments of Chapters 6 and 9.    
 
Figure 10.5 – Mean and standard errors for false memories formed in Experiment 
1 (Chapter 3), Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) and Experiment 4 (false memories of 
self-performance only). 
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This was analysed with an independent samples t-tests which revealed that there 
was; (i) a significant difference in the number of false memories formed between 
the inflations made by the young participants in Experiment 1 and the elderly 
participants in Experiment 3, t(49) = 2.36, p<0.05, where more false memories 
where formed in Experiment 3 by elderly participants (Chapter 8); (ii) 
unsurprisingly a significant difference in the number of false memories formed in 
the elderly cohort of Experiment 3 and the young participants in Experiment 4, 
t(38) = 2.09, p<0.05). Elderly participants in Experiment 3 formed more false 
memories than young participants in Experiment 4; (iii) no significant difference 
was found in the false memories formed between Experiments 1 and 4 (p>0.05).   
This is interesting as it seems to imply that the controlled nature of the 
questionnaire had no effect on the false memories formed in Experiment 4.  
10.3.6.2 False memories of observation of actions 
The false memories of observation are when participants recalled observing 
another person performing an action when in fact they neither observed the action 
nor performed the action themselves.  
 
Figure 10.6 - Mean and standard errors for false memories formed in Experiment 
2 (Chapter 7) and Experiment 4 (false memories of self-performance only). 
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This was analysed with an independent-samples t-test which showed that there 
was no significant difference between the number of false memories formed in 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 (p>0.05). This means participants were equally 
likely to recall observing someone performing actions in the video presentation, 
when in fact they did not observe the actions, neither had they performed it and 
the wording of the questionnaire had no influence on the results. 
10.3.6.3 Comparison between false memories of action observation and 
self-performance  
The false memories of self-performance from Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 8) and Experiment 4 (Chapter 9) and action observation 
from Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) and Experiment 4 (Chapter 9) were summed to 
create a total error variable of two false memories types. 
The total false memories of self-performance and false memories of action 
observation were compared with independent-samples t-test which showed that 
overall, participants were equally likely to form false memories of either self-
performance or observation of action performance (p>0.05).   
10.4 Discussion 
10.4.1 Summary of results 
The recollective pattern of OIs and SAIs was investigated in the current study 
along with the results for the correct source attribution.  Overall, the observed 
actions were equally likely to be recalled with ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollection 
as self-performed in Experiments 1 and 3. Significantly more actions were 
recalled as ‘Remembered’ than ‘Known’ in all action type conditions in the control 
experiment, Experiment 4. Additionally, significantly more communicative actions 
were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than meaningful and meaningless actions in 
Experiment 4. The correct attribution of performed actions was the highest with 
‘Remember’ recollections in all experiments. The high rate of ‘Remember’ 
responses may possibly suggest strong level of confidence about performing 
these actions. This shows that the OIs formed and retrieved as ‘Remembered’ 
shared a similar level of detail as the actions that were actually performed. The 
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recollective pattern of OIs did not differ between young and elderly participants, 
showing that the actions were recollected at the same rate between the two 
groups.  Interestingly and importantly this interaction effect was only seen for the 
inflations and not in the correct responses. 
The SAI errors were also more likely to be recalled as ‘Remembered’ in 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) suggesting high qualitative detail of misattributions 
formed, which might have been due to the fact that participants had actually 
performed the actions, thus leaving a stronger memory trace. It is unclear why a 
different pattern of recollection was found in the control study (Experiment 4), 
where the actions were equally recalled with different recollection types. This is 
surprising, since the OI recollection in the same experiments resulted in 
significantly more ‘Remember’ recollection than ‘Know’ recollections and the 
questionnaire in Experiment 4 was well controlled for.  This is problematic for the 
mirror neurone hypothesis as it would be predicted that both types of error would 
be formed with similar strategies so needs further investigation. 
The ‘Guess’ recollections for OIs, SAIs and  both correct recollections of observed 
and performed actions showed that significantly more communicative actions 
were recalled as ‘Guessed’ than meaningful actions. This may suggest less 
detailed and less confident memory in general for communicative actions when 
unsure.  
In the case of false memories, it was found that elderly participants (Experiment 
3, Chapter 8) formed significantly more false memories than younger participants 
(Experiments 1, 2 and 4). Participants were equally likely to form false memories 
of either self-performance or action observation. 
10.4.1 Discussion of the OI results 
This chapter aimed to investigate the ‘Remember’, ‘Know’ and ‘Guess’ 
recollection types for OIs and SAIs across the data from all experiments in the 
thesis.  
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The results indicate that in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, observed actions 
were recalled similarly with either ‘Remember’ or ‘Know’ responses. This is in 
agreement with the results of Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) study which  also found 
that observed actions are equally likely to be recalled as performed with either 
‘Remember’ or ‘Know’ responses. The results of Experiment 4 are not in line with 
Manzi and Nigro’s findings, since it was found that all action types were recalled 
with significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ responses. Although Experiment 
4 used a similar source differentiation procedure in the source memory 
questionnaire as Manzi and Nigro (2008), methodological differences such as 
different action types used in Experiment 4 as opposed to only meaningful actions 
in Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) study could have contributed to a different pattern of 
recollection in the two studies, in particular the interaction effect which showed 
that more communicative actions were recalled with a 'Remember' response.  
As for the recollective experience in the elderly cohort in Experiment 3, the 
actions were equally likely to be recalled with either ‘Remember’, ‘Know’. This 
finding is not line with previous research on recollection in the elderly, which 
suggests that elderly tend to make more ‘Remember’  recollections than ‘Know’ 
or ‘Guess’ recollections (Aizpurua et al., 2009). Additionally, it has been shown 
that the elderly make more ‘Remember’ responses when compared to younger 
participants (Aizpurua et al., 2009), which again is not supported by the results of 
this study, as it has been found that there was no significant difference in the 
recollections participants formed between the elderly and young participants 
group. It is unclear why the elderly did not form more ‘Remember’ recollections. 
One of the explanations could be that they simply did not remember the actions 
due to age related memory decline and recalled some of the actions with a 
‘Guess’ response.  
Interestingly, in the Experiment 4, where the bias in the questionnaire was 
controlled for, all action types were recalled with significantly more ‘Remember’ 
than ‘Know’ responses and an interaction between action type and recollection 
was found which showed that communicative actions were recalled with 
significantly more ‘Remember’ responses than meaningful and meaningless 
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actions. The interaction between the action type and recollection was not found 
in either Experiment 1 or 3. The high recollection rate with ‘Remember’ suggests 
that participants formed detailed misattributions of the observed actions as self-
performed. This result further supports that the questionnaire from Experiment 4 
was a better method of investigating the memory errors, and eliminated the 
questionnaire bias present in Experiment 1 and 3.  
Importantly for the investigation of mirror neurone involvement, the controlled 
methodology of Experiment 4 showed that observation of communicative actions 
rather than meaningful and meaningless actions, resulted in significantly more 
recollections of self-performance with ‘Remember’. The possible and 
hypothesised increase in mirror neurone activity during observation of 
communicative actions could lead to heightened misattribution levels because of 
shared neural activation between observation and performance (Husain et al. 
2012; Andric et al., 2013). This could explain why significantly more 
communicative actions resulted in OIs of self-performance with a strong, detailed 
memory trace and high confidence.  One potential explanation which would need 
further investigation  could be  that the lack of distinguishable features in the case 
of communicative actions (no objects present), might lead to a higher number of 
misattributions, as the action is familiar to the individual but lacks the detail that 
would allow for discrimination between self and observed performance.   
Comparing it to correct source attributions of actions that were actually performed 
which were predominately recollected as ‘Remembered’, the results show that 
the recollective experience of OIs is similarly detailed as memories of actual 
action execution. The high rate of performed actions correctly attributed to their 
source with a ‘Remember’ recollection type in all OI experiments hints at strong 
and detailed memory for these actions. Unsurprisingly as this effect has been 
widely demonstrated in cognitive research and has been termed the ‘self-
reference recollective effect’ (SRRE). SRRE shows that self-reference during 
encoding of memory results in advantages in further retrieval of that memory 
(Conway and Dewhurst, 1995).  However the interaction of confidence judgement 
and action type was only significant for the inflations, i.e. the errors. 
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10.4.2 Discussion of SAIs results 
As for the SAIs in Experiment 2, the highest number of all errors was recollected 
as ‘Remembered’. This suggests detailed memories of self-performance 
misremembered as performed by somebody else.  Similarly as in the case of OIs, 
it could potentially be a consequence of mirror neurone activity, with the sources 
of actions being confused between performance and observation. The actions 
were recollected as ‘Remembered’ because the execution left a strong memory 
trace for the action. The source confusion might have occurred because of 
familiarity with the actions (meaningful and communicative), and also 
distinctiveness of meaningless actions and seemingly having higher plausibility 
to have been performed by somebody else (especially in Experiment 2, where 
most of the misattributions were for meaningless actions) (Rumiati and Tessari, 
2002).  The same pattern was seen for correct responses, showing that for 
memory errors and correct responses, 'Remember' and 'Know' judgements of the 
actions were similar.  This suggests that it is part of the recollection and the 
wording of the questionnaire interfering with the confidence judgments of the 
participants with quite a strikingly number of high confidence judgements made 
for meaningless actions (both for correct responses and SAIs). 
However, in the control condition (Experiment 4), no significant difference was 
found between the different recollection types, nor was there a significant 
interaction between the recollection and action types. This suggests that all action 
types were similarly recalled with different recollections.  This result is different 
from the pattern of recollections of OIs in the same experiment, which showed a 
significant interaction between the action and recollection types. This is a 
surprising result, and potentially problematic for the mirror neurone hypothesis as 
it was expected, because of the wording of the questionnaire being controlled for 
in this experiment, that the recollective pattern for OIs and SAIs should be similar, 
especially  given that the number of OIs and SAIs formed overall (R+K totalled) 
showed no difference.  Importantly and interestingly, the same pattern was seen 
for the correct responses i.e. interaction between recollection and action type as 
was seen for the inflations.  For the OI experiments, a significant interaction was 
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seen only for the inflations in this control experiment and not for the correct 
responses showing that an effect was only apparent when a memory error 
occurred.   
It was also found that the false memories recorded in the OI experiments, were 
significantly higher in the elderly cohort (Experiment 3, Chapter 8) than young 
adult participants (Experiments 1 (Chapter 6) and 4 (Chapter 9)). This is in line 
with previous research on false memories and ageing, which generally indicates 
higher susceptibility to formation of memory errors and source monitoring errors 
as age increases (e.g. Jacoby and Rhodes, 2006; Jacoby et al., 2012). As 
memory accuracy decreases with age, the available information (e.g. false 
statement in a questionnaire) may be misattributed as a real memory (Jacoby, 
1999).  This has potential implications for AD patients and healthy ageing.   
10.4.3 Conclusions and future research 
As far as I am aware, this is the first study to look at any possible role of mirror 
neurones in the memory recollection with the R-K-G paradigm. Since the current 
study investigated it behaviourally only, future research should examine neural 
underlying retrieval with R-K-G recollections for different types of actions. The 
main finding is that in the controlled experiment, Experiment 4, significantly more 
OIs for communicative actions were recalled with a 'Remember' response 
compared to the other action types.  The results highlight the importance of 
studying SAIs in comparison to OIs as the results of the control study (OI and 
SAI) of Experiment 4 failed to concur, which was unexpected.  Further paradigms 
should be created to test mirror neurones and R-K-G for instance in the context 
of in-group vs. outgroup setting (see Chapter 11) and by implementing 
neuroimaging.  Neuroimaging is commonly used in investigating both mirror 
neurones and the RKG paradigm although to date, as far as I am aware, no 
neuroimaging studies have looked at these two together. 
 
10.5 Highlights 
 R-K-G allows study of different types of memory recollections.  
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 'Remember' recollections indicate detailed memories and a sense of 
'reliving' particular event. 
 'Know' responses are associated with feeling of familiarity.  
 'Guess' indicates little to no recollection. 
 R-K-G was used to study the misattributions of actions performed by other 
people (OIs) and self-performed actions (SAIs). 
 The analysis of OI recollection in Experiments 1 (Chapter 6) and 3 
(Chapter 8) suggests that OIs were equally likely to be misattributed as 
‘Remembered’ or ‘Known’. 
 Significantly more meaningful, meaningless and communicative actions 
were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than ‘Known’ in Experiment 4 (Chapter 9).  
 Significantly more communicative actions were recalled with ‘Remember’ 
response than meaningful and meaningless actions in Experiment 4 
(Chapter 9). 
 Elderly participants were equally likely to recollect actions with either 
‘Remember’, ‘Know’ or ‘Guess’ (Experiment 4, Chapter 9). 
 No significant difference was found in the pattern of recollection between 
young and elderly participants (Experiments 1 and 4). 
 In Experiment 4, observation of all action types resulted in significantly 
more ‘Remember’ recollections as self-performed than ‘Know’ and ‘Guess’ 
recollections. 
 This supports that the questionnaire in Experiment 4 might be a more 
efficient tool to test OI and SAI.  
 Self-performed actions correctly attributed to their source were   more 
likely to be recollected as ‘Remembered’ than 'Known' or 'Guessed' to 
have had been performed in Experiment, 1, 3 and 4.  
 SAIs were more likely to be ‘Remembered’ than 'Known' or 'Guessed' in 
Experiments 2 and 3.  
 Elderly participants formed more false memories than young participants. 
 The results suggest that participants overall formed detailed recollections 
of actions that they misattributed to a wrong source. 
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 Correct attributions were more likely to be recollected as 'Remember' 
which may suggests a similarly detailed memory between the correct 
source attributions and misattributions of actions.  
 Significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections of OIs for communicative than 
meaningful and meaningless actions in Experiment 4 suggests it is a better 
method of studying OIs.  
 Future research should investigate the neural processes underlying R-K-
G retrieval for different action types.  
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Chapter 11 
The social aspect of observation inflations. 
Misattributing the actions of in-group and out-
group actors 
 
11.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, it was demonstrated that both observation 
and execution of actions can results in SMEs, where the observed actions are 
either misattributed as self-performed (Experiment 1, Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4) or self-performed actions are falsely remembered to have been 
performed by other people (Experiment 2 and Experiment 4). These results 
supported the speculative hypothesis of mirror neurone involvement in the OI and 
SAI effects, showing that observation of both meaningful and communicative 
actions results in more OIs and SAIs than meaningless actions (Experiments, 1, 
3 and 4). Although this was only partially demonstrated in Experiment 2, where a 
high number of SAIs was found to have been formed following execution of 
meaningless actions, this was possibly due to the wording of the questionnaire 
biasing the results. However, this was resolved in Experiment 4, where the 
questionnaire bias was controlled for. The results of Experiment 4 showed a 
similar pattern of OI and SAI formation, where significantly more communicative 
actions resulted in error formation than meaningful and meaningless actions.  
The possible involvement of mirror neurones in the OI effect will now be 
investigated further in this thesis. Past research on mirror neurones and race has 
shown that the brain activity can be modulated by the race of an individual that 
one is observing. 
For example, Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) studied the mu suppression in the motor 
cortex during action observation of in-group (Caucasian) and out-group (East 
Asian, South Asian and African) actors. The actors performed a simple action of 
drinking from a glass of water which was presented to the participants in a video 
presentation. Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) found that participants showed activity 
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in the motor cortex when (i) they performed the action themselves and (ii) 
observed individuals belonging to the same ethnic group as themselves (in-group 
condition) but not when they observed members of other races perform the 
actions (out-group condition). Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) suggested that mirror 
neurones might not be active to the same extent for individuals belonging to a 
different race. However, it is not clear whether it is a natural predisposition to 
exhibit a weak neural stimulation for members of out-group, but the prejudice 
towards these groups that causes the lower stimulation (Gutsell and Inzlicht, 
2010). 
Similar findings were demonstrated in imitation research. For example,  Losin et 
al. (2012) showed that participants exhibited different neural activity when they 
imitated actions of individuals belonging to the same racial background as 
themselves (European American) compared to when they observed individuals 
of different races (African American and Chinese American). In the fMRI 
experiment, participants either (i) observed and imitated actions of the three 
actors; (ii) passively observed the action execution; or (iii) observed still 
photographs of the actors’ faces. The actions performed by participants were 
derived from New Zealand Sign Language and were considered as meaningless 
to both actors and participants. Losin et al. (2012) found that the frontal, parietal 
and occipital brain areas were activated to a different extent when imitating 
actions of individuals of different races.  
Avenati et al. (2010) showed that the perceived race of individual modulates the 
empathetic responses to the individual’s pain. In a TMS study, participants 
observed videos of three different types of hands that showed induced pain with 
a needle.  These were (i) a white individual’s hand; (ii) a black individual’s hand 
and (iii) a purple gloved hand. The results showed that observing an individual of 
the same race group being inflicted pain activated the corticospinal system to the 
same extent as if they were experiencing the pain themselves. This effect was 
present for both black and white individuals.  A similar activity was registered 
when both black and white individuals observed the unfamiliar purple gloved 
hand. However, when the individuals observed the opposite race, no such activity 
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was present. The authors suggest that the difference in empathetic reaction is 
not due to the unfamiliarity of the opposite race, as the same reaction would be 
exhibited for the unfamiliar purple glove. Rather, Avenati et al. (2010) suggest 
prejudice towards races as a factor contributing to the implicit empathetic 
responses. 
Different results were found by Desy and Lepage (2013), however, who showed 
that imitation is not affected by racial prejudice. In an EEG experiment, Caucasian 
participants performed a simple imitation task in which they observed finger lifting 
and tapping movements performed by either a hand of either the black or white 
race. The results showed that neither RT for imitation of both types of hands nor 
the mu suppression exhibited any difference between the races. This suggests 
that the differences in neural processing for other races found in different studies 
are a product of cultural aspects not solely a physical dissimilarity (Desy and 
Lepage, 2013).  
The aspect of race in the context of OIs has been previously research in, as far 
as I am aware, only one study by Lindner et al. (2012). The social conditions of 
the OI effect were investigated in an experiment where participants (N = 58) were 
required to perform and observe 20 actions in each condition. The observed 
actions were performed by either a (i) white female actor, (ii) dark skinned Sri-
Lankan female actor or (iii) an actor wearing black gloves concealing the skin 
colour (Lindner et al., 2012). The videos only depicted the actor’s torso and 
hands. A two-week testing time delay was administered after which the 
participants filled in a source memory test where they specified which actions 
they performed themselves. The results revealed that the OI effect was 
significantly lower for the actions that were performed by the out-group actor i.e. 
more OIs were made when the actions were performed by the in-group actor 
which is the actor of the same race as the participant. Interestingly, this was not 
observed for the black gloved hands, suggesting individual’s group memberships 
has a stronger effect on processing of actions of others than physical 
characteristics only (Lindner et al., 2012). These results are thought to support 
the mirror neurone hypothesis of Linder et al., (2010) as there is more overlapping 
158 
 
 
 
neural activity in the brain during the observation of the same race (Gutsel and 
Inzlicht, 2010). Thus, the similar brain activity could lead to more misattributions 
of the observed actions.  
11.1.1 Aim of the current study 
The current study will investigate the social aspect of the OI effect. Since the 
mirror neurone and imitation literature shows that observation of different races 
results in different neural processing, it is logically plausible to assume that this 
would affect the source memory for those actions as well. This was shown in the 
study by Lindner et al. (2012), where the OI effect was reduced following the 
observation of out-group individuals, supporting the mirror neurone hypothesis 
proposed by Linder et al. (2010). The current study will investigate this further not 
only in the context of the actor’s race but also the type of action that is being 
performed. Thus, communicative actions (which were associated with highest 
rate of OIs formation in the experiment of this thesis) and meaningless actions 
(which resulted in the lowest mean OIs) will be used in this study.  Based on the 
previous findings of experiments in this thesis, it will be hypothesised that 
observation of communicative actions will result in significantly more OIs than 
observation of meaningless actions. Furthermore, it is expected that the number 
of OIs will be higher in the in-group condition than out-group condition due to 
overlapping activation.  This study was carried out at the International School for 
Advanced Studies (SISSA), Trieste, Italy in the Neuroscience and Society Lab. 
11.2 Method 
11.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-four participants took part in the study. The participants were recruited 
from the Twins Italian Database (Registro Nazionale Gemelli) (mean age = 22.76, 
SD = 5.41). Twenty-seven males (mean age = 18, SD = 0.00) and 57 females 
(mean age = 24.23, SD = 5.4) took part in the experiment. All of the participants 
were of Italian origin. The participation was voluntary and the participants 
responded to invitation letters sent out by the Twins Italian Database.  All 
participants gave informed written consent. The participants were compensated 
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160€ each for their participation. The inclusion criteria included no previous 
history of autism, uncorrectable visual impairments, neurological or psychiatric 
disorders and no addiction to psychoactive substances. Ethical approval was 
granted by the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee at University of Bradford and SISSA Ethics Committee. 
 
11.2.2 Design 
A within-subject design was used. Participants were asked to (i) observe a 
presentation consisting of videos of an actor performing two different types of 
action (meaningless and communicative).  The actor was of either in-group 
(Italian) or out-group (East Asian and African) membership. The participants 
performed specified actions (meaningless and communicative) that were different 
from those actions observed in (i). The dependant variable was the number of 
OIs formed. 
11.2.3 Materials 
The stimuli used in the experiment were 108 videos of simple actions being 
performed.  Fifty-four actions were of meaningless nature and another 54 actions 
were communicative emblems. The videos were created using a camcorder. 
Each action was recorded being performed by Italian, East Asian and African 
actors. In total participants observed 54 actions. The actions that were to be 
performed by participants were written into command statements. Participants 
performed 54 actions in total, of which 27 actions were meaningless and 27 
actions were communicative emblems. All of the action commands were 
translated to Italian. Part of the actions used in the experiment was adapted from 
Mitrenga et al. (in prep.) and Papeo and Rumiati (2012), the remainder of the 
actions were invented accordingly. The communicative emblems aimed to 
portray the typical Italian gestures.  The action videos and actions statements 
were put into an E-prime presentation. Two preselected sets of actions were 
created. Depending on the set, specific preselected actions were either to be 
performed or observed. The observed actions were randomised for the actor 
type, and the order of observation and execution of actions was counterbalanced.  
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The actions in the videos depicted a male actor of Italian, Asian or African 
ethnicity. The actors were recorded in a standing up position, showing full body 
facing the camera. The stimuli and appearance of actors was standardised (such 
as white t-shirt and neutral facial expressions).  All of the videos were performed 
by the same actor of a given ethnicity.  
11.2.4 Pilot study 
A pilot study was carried out on 10 people to ensure that the stimuli could be 
classed as communicative and meaningless.  Participants saw 150 videos of 
actions and rated them as communicative or meaningless on a scale of 1–10 and 
were asked what they thought the goal of the action was. A set of stimuli were 
created from these results. 
11.2.5 Questionnaire  
In order to measure the OIs, a questionnaire was designed. The items in the 
questionnaire consisted of sentences written in the first person suggesting to 
participants that they performed the action (e.g. I brushed my arm with a 
toothbrush; I waved hello). The sentences contained 54 actions that participants 
performed and 54 actions that they observed. Additionally, 20 actions that were 
neither observed nor performed were added to the questionnaire in order to test 
‘real’ false memories (see Appendix 4 for the OI questionnaire). The instructions 
and the action list were translated to Italian. The same as in the previous 
experiments, the questionnaire included the R-K-G recollection.  
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a)  
 
b)  
c)  
 
d)  
e)  f)  
 
Figure 11.1 – Screenshots from the recordings of actions used in the 
experiment: (a) Italian actor performing a communicative action; b) Italian 
actor performing a meaningless action; c) East Asian actor performing a 
communicative action; d) East Asian actor performing meaningless action; e) 
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11.2.6 Procedure 
The time of the participation was arranged with the volunteers that expressed an 
interest in participation after being provided with an information sheet. The 
experiments took place in the EEG laboratories at the International School of 
Advanced Studies (SISSA), Trieste. After the participants were greeted by the 
researcher, they were allocated to an individual room with a computer. They were 
seated in front of the computer and given the information sheet and consent form. 
After the participants had given informed written consent and familiarised 
themselves with the purpose and nature of the study they were instructed to 
watch a video presentation of 54 actions and perform 54 actions. The order in 
which videos of actions and action statements were presented was 
counterbalanced. In the performance part, the instructions explained that they will 
have to perform the actions described in the action statements in E-prime 
presentation. The participants were assured that they were not being observed 
nor recorded during the execution of actions. After the experiment was finished, 
the participants were handed a questionnaire in a pre-stamped envelope and 
were given a date on which they were due to fill it in (two weeks from the date on 
which experiment took place). A researcher phoned them one day prior to the 
agreed date to remind them to fill it on.   
 
11.3 Results 
The primary aim of the study was to investigate the formation of OIs as a result 
of observation of different types of actions (meaningless and communicative) 
performed by an actor of either in-group (Italian) or out-group (East Asian and 
African) membership.  
The OIs were the actions that participant recalled with 'Remember' and 'Know' 
responses in the source memory questionnaire. As for the previous experiments 
of this thesis, the two responses were totalled to create the OI variable. The 
African actor performing a communicative action; f) African actor performing 
a meaningless action.  
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'Guess' response was not counted as an OI error (See Chapter 5 which 
introduces the R-K-G procedure and Chapter 10 which is dedicated to the results 
of the R-K-G responses specifically).  See Figure 11.2 for the number of OIs 
formed for different action types and according to actor’s group membership. 
11.3.1 OIs for different action types  
Figure 11.2 shows that observation of communicative actions resulted in 
formation of more OIs in both group membership conditions. A similar number of 
actions was misattributed after observing actors of in-group (Italian) and out-
group (East Asian and African) membership.  
 
Figure 11.2 – Mean and standard errors of OIs formed after observing 
communicative and meaningless actions performed by in-group (Italian) and out-
group (East Asian and African) actors.  
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The assumption of normality has not been met for the sample conditions. Non-
parametric analysis is reported for this experiment.  
The analysis with Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed a significant difference in 
the number of OIs formed for communicative and meaningless actions, Z = -2.69, 
p<0.005, suggesting that more OIs were formed for communicative than 
meaningless action overall.  
11.3.2 OIs and group membership 
Furthermore, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test was carried to test a difference in 
the number of overall OI attributions between the in-group and out-group 
participants. The results showed that significantly more OIs were formed after 
observing actors of out-group (East Asian and African) than in-group (Italian) 
membership. This does not support the hypothesis and is in contrast of the results 
of Lindner et al. (2012) who found that significantly more OIs were formed 
following observation of the in-group actor rather than out-group actor.  
Further analysis with Friedman’s test showed that there was a significant 
difference in the number of OIs formed following observation of the two action 
types performed by actors of in-group and out-group membership, χ2(3) = 64.06, 
p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with 
Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p<0.008. The 
results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that significantly more OIs were 
formed following observation of (i) communicative actions than meaningless 
actions for the in-group actor membership (Z = -2.66, p=0.008); (ii) 
communicative actions for the out-group than in-group membership (Z= -5.72, 
p<0.001); (iii) meaningless actions for the out-group membership than 
communicative actions for the in-group membership (Z = -3.4, p<0.001); (iv) 
communicative actions for the out-group actors than meaningless actions for the 
in-group actor (Z= -6.1, p<0.001); and (v) meaningless actions for the out-group 
membership than meaningless actions for the in-group membership (Z = -5.73, 
p<0.001). There was no significant difference in the number of OIs formed 
following observation of meaningless and communicative actions for the out-
group membership (p>0.008). 
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11.3.3 Memory for self-performed actions 
In addition to investigating the OIs, the correct recall of self-performed actions 
was studied. See Figure 11.3 for the number of self-performed meaningless and 
communicative actions that were correctly recalled as self-performed in the 
source memory questionnaire.  
This was analysed with a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, which did not reveal a 
significant difference between the recall of the two action types (p>0.05). 
11.3.4 R-K-G analysis 
To investigate the recollection judgements of the OIs, the data was analysed with 
Friedman’s test and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, with recollection judgment 
scores 'Remember' and 'Know' as dependent variables and action type 
(meaningless and communicative) and group (in-group vs. out-group) as 
independent variables.  The results showed of Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
showed that participants of both groups more 'Remember' judgements than 
'Know' judgements overall, Z = -3.73, p<0.001.   
Further analysis with Freidman’s test showed that there was a significant 
difference in the number of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections formed for 
different types of actions performed by actors of in-group and out-group, χ2(7) = 
89.34, p<0.001. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was 
conducted with Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set 
at p<0.002. The results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that significantly 
more OIs were recalled with (i) ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollections for the 
meaningless actions in the out-group condition (Z = -4.07, p<0.001); (ii) 
‘Remember’ recollections for the communicative actions in the out-group 
condition than ‘Know’ recollections for the communicative action in the in-group 
condition (Z = -4.78, p<0.001); (iii) ‘Remember’ recollections for the meaningless 
actions than ‘Know recollections for the communicative actions in the in-group 
condition (Z = -3.48, p<0.001); (iv) ‘Remember’ recollections for the meaningless 
actions in the out-group than ‘Remember’ recollections for the communicative 
actions in the in-group (Z = -3.85, p<0.001); (v) ‘Know’ recollections for the 
communicative actions in out-group than in-group condition (Z = -3.69, p<0.001); 
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(vi) ‘Remember’ recollections for the meaningless actions in the out-group than 
‘Know’ recollections for the communicative actions in the in-group (Z = -4.42, 
p<0.001); (vii) ‘Remember’ recollections for the communicative actions in out-
group than ‘Remember’ recollections for communicative actions in in-group 
condition (Z = -5.38, p<0.001); (viii) ‘Remember recollections for the meaningless 
actions in the out-group than in-group condition (Z = -5.38, p<0.001); (ix) 
‘Remember’ recollections for the communicative actions in the out-group than 
‘know’ recollections for meaningless actions in the in-group condition (Z = -5.23, 
p<0.001); (x) ‘Know’ recollections for communicative actions in the out-group than 
‘Know’ recollections for meaningless actions in in-group (Z = -4.22, p<0.001); (xi) 
‘Remember’ recollections for meaningless actions in out-group than ‘Know’ 
recollection in in-group condition and (xii) ‘Remember’ recollections for 
communicative actions than ‘Know’ recollections for meaningless action in out-
group condition. These results suggest that for all action types, participants were 
more likely to ‘Remember’ actions performed by the actors of out-group as having 
been performed by themselves.  
The ‘Guess’ responses showed that participants were significantly more likely to 
'Guess' actions performed by the out-group as having been performed by 
themselves (Z = -6.52, p<0.001). Additionally, more ‘Guess’ responses were 
made for communicative actions than meaningless actions, Z = -5.97, p<0.001.  
This is an interesting finding and similar to the findings of the previous 
experiments. 
Further analysis showed that there was a significant difference in the number of 
‘Guess’ recollections formed for the different action types and actor membership 
groups, χ2(7) = 89.34, p<0.001. Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests showed that there were more guess responses (participants guessed that 
they had performed the action when they had only observed it) made for all action 
types for out-group stimuli than for in-group. 
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11.4 Discussion 
 
11.4.1 Summary of results 
The experiment aimed to investigate the OIs formed after observing meaningless 
and communicative actions, performed by an actor belonging to either same 
ethnicity (in-group) as the participants (Italian) or a different ethnicity (out-group) 
(East Asian and African). Based on the findings of previous studies on OIs and 
mirror neurones, it was hypothesised that a higher number of OIs will be formed 
following observation of actions performed by in-group actor (Italian) (Lindner et 
al., 2012). It was also hypothesised that a higher number of OIs will be formed 
following observation of communicative actions, as was found in the previous 
experiment in this thesis.  
The results of the current study have found OIs to be present after observation of 
both types of actions, showing that it is possible to form memories of self-
performance through observation of actions of others and with high confidence 
(as 'Remember' judgements were chosen significantly more than 'Know' 
judgments). The highest number of OIs formed was recorded for communicative 
actions, which was in line with the original hypothesis of mirror neurones and OIs 
and the results of previous experiments of this thesis (Experiment 1, Experiment 
3 and Experiment 4). The analysis of correct source attribution revealed that 
execution of communicative and meaningless actions yielded a similar number 
of correct attributions as self-performed. 
The results of in-group and out-group misattributions showed that significantly 
more OIs were formed following observation of actions performed by out-group 
actors (East Asian and African) than the in-group actor (Italian). This does not 
support the initial hypothesis, and is also not in line with the findings of a similar 
study on this subject (Lindner et al., 2012). Lindner et al. (2012) found the 
opposite effect (more OIs made for the in-group condition) in a similar paradigm 
and attributed this effect to the mirror neurone activation not being as strong for 
out-group actors as in-group actors during the action observation, which 
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consequently did not yield as high a number of misattributions as for the in-group 
condition.  
However, a difference in the stimuli used in the current study and Lindner et al. 
(2012), makes it challenging to compare the two results. In the current study, the 
actions were both communicative and meaningless actions, whereas Lindner et 
al. (2012) used only meaningful actions (as it is assumed based on the examples 
given). More importantly, Lindner et al. (2012) did not include other characteristics 
apart from the skin colour in the stimuli, where in the current study actors’ faces 
were included in the videos. According to Desy and Lepage (2012), physical 
characteristics such as skin colour are not as strong a factor in prejudice towards 
a race, which is more likely to be present where other features are present, e.g. 
a face. Seeing a face could hint at more cultural biases than only a skin tone.  
However, the question remains as to why the number of misattributions was 
higher for the out-group condition in the current study.  
Some imitation research also shows different neural activation during imitation of 
actions of individuals of different races, with the activation being higher for the 
members of out-group (Losin et al., 2012). This is thought to be linked with 
possible compensation mechanisms required to imitate actions of unfamiliar 
groups (Losin et al., 2012). Additionally, Earls et al. (2013) found that imitating 
actions of own-race actors rather than other race, resulted in higher activation in 
brain areas associated with action imitation, such as inferior parietal lobule and 
superior parietal lobule.  
In light of the different findings between this and Lindner (2012), future studies 
should look at the OIs in the context of race further. It would be interesting to 
investigate the effect of the magnitude of cultural features present in the 
observation (e.g. absence of face).  
Examining the underlying neural activity during observation of actions performed 
by actors of different races and comparing it to the source attribution of these 
actions could shed light on whether or not any mirroring mechanisms could stand 
behind the OI effect.  This study provided little support for this but more research 
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is needed as, as far as I am aware, this is only the second study looking at in-
group and out-group stimuli to study OIs. 
11.4.1 Conclusion 
The current study showed that action observation can result in false memories of 
self-performance. This was found after observation of both communicative and 
meaningless actions. However, the OI formation was significantly higher for 
communicative actions. This finding is in line with the results of previous 
experiments of this thesis, and could possibly suggest involvement of mirror 
neurones. It is unclear why the highest number of misattributions was formed 
following the observation of out-group individuals. If mirror neurones were 
involved in the formation of OIs it was predicted the highest number of OIs should 
be made for in-group communicative actions, which was not seen here. Future 
research should address this by investigating underlying neural activity in OI 
formation and group membership. 
11.5 Highlights 
 Previous studies have shown that humans demonstrate different neural 
activation during observation of different races. 
 Observation of in-group individuals resulted in higher activation of areas 
associated with mirror neurone activity than observation of out-group 
individuals (Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010). 
 Lindner et al. (2012) found significantly reduced numbers of OIs following 
observation of out-group individual compared to in-group individuals. 
 It was hypothesised that the highest number of OIs would be formed 
following observation of communicative actions performed by the in-group 
actor. 
 The results showed that observation of communicative actions resulted in 
significantly more OIs than meaningless actions. 
 All OIs were made with significantly more high confidence judgements 
('Remember') than lower confidence judgements ('Know'). 
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 Significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections were made for the actions 
performed by out-group actors than ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ recollections 
for in-group actors. 
 Guess responses however show that participants are more likely to 
‘Guess’ that they had performed an action for all action types in the out-
group condition than in the in-group condition. 
 Significantly more OIs were formed following observation of out-group 
individuals, regardless of the action type that was observed. 
 The finding is not in line with the previous literature. 
 More research on OI and in-group/out-group action observation is needed 
as this is only the second study investigating this. 
 Future studies should investigate the neural activity underlying 
observation of action execution by actors of different race membership. 
 
Some of this material can be found in Mitrenga et al. (in prep.) – ‘The social aspect 
of observation inflations. Misattributing the actions of in-group and out-group 
actors’. 
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Chapter 12 
General discussion and summary 
 
12.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the newly researched type of source 
monitoring error, namely the observation inflation (OI) effect. In this effect, the 
observation of actions being performed results in formation of memories of one 
actually performing those actions themselves. This thesis comprises of a series 
of experiments that investigated this effect under different conditions. Under 
investigation was whether (i) observation of different types of actions (meaningful, 
meaningless and communicative) can influence the memories of self-
performance, (ii) older age makes one more susceptible to OIs; (iii) instruction at 
the recall stage can influence the formation of OIs; (iv) whether OIs can be 
influenced by actor’s race and (v) the OI effect can occur in reverse i.e. can 
performed actions be remembered as observed? I have termed this effect as self-
action inflations (SAIs). All the experiments implemented the R-K-G 
questionnaire to investigate the recollective experience of the OIs and SAIs 
formed. This chapter will summarise the main objectives and results of each 
experiment. Following that, limitations, implications and ideas for future will be 
presented. 
12.2 Summary of all the Experiments 
Limited literature on the subject of OIs suggests that the effect is caused by errors 
in source monitoring (Lindner et al., 2010; Lindner and Davidson, 2014). Lindner 
et al. (2010) proposed that the source confusion errors could be formed due to 
mirror neurone activity and that when one observes the action, similar or the 
same brain activity is present as to when the action was actually performed. 
Hence, the observed actions could be misremembered as actually having been 
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performed by the participants as a result of this mirror neurone activity causing 
source confusion. 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 6) focused on creating an experimental design that would 
allow studying OIs and the possible involvement of mirror neurones in this effect.  
To test this behaviourally an experimental design involving observation and 
execution of different action types was created. The types of actions used in 
Experiment 1 were meaningful, meaningless and communicative actions. These 
types of actions were chosen as the mirror neurone and imitation research 
suggest that they are all processed differently (Ferrari et al., 2005; Rumiati and 
Tessari, 2002). Mirror neurone research has shown that the observation of 
communicative and meaningful actions results in higher brain activation in the 
motor areas in the brain than when meaningless actions are being observed 
(Andric et al., 2013; Husain et al., 2012). Additionally, research on imitation shows 
an imitation advantage of meaningful and communicative actions over 
meaningless actions (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002; Carmo and Rumiati, 2009).  
The experimental stimuli were then created to fit within the three action type 
categories. The videos depicting a female actor performing the actions were 
recorded by the researcher.  A pilot study was run to ensure the actions were 
portraying clear and unambiguous meaningful, meaningless and communicative 
actions. The participants taking part in the pilot study were asked to rate the 
videos of actions on a 1–10 scale of how meaningful they considered the actions 
to be. Additionally and importantly, the participants stated what they considered 
the goal/outcome of the action to be. The 30 communicative and 30 meaningful 
actions that scored the highest on the meaningfulness scale were chosen as 
stimuli.  Also, 30 meaningless actions that scored the lowest were chosen as 
meaningless stimuli.  
If meaningful and communicative actions activate mirror neurones as shown in 
the literature (e.g. Montgomery et al., 2007; Ferrari et al., 2005) to a higher extent 
than meaningless actions (which may present with little or no mirror neurone 
activity), the matching activation could then result in confusion of the sources of 
the memory and consequently misattribution of observed actions as self-
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performed (the OI effect).  Therefore, it was hypothesised that communicative 
and meaningful actions would result in higher levels of OIs than meaningless 
actions. 
In the first phase of Experiment 1, the actions were randomly assigned between 
the two conditions – 'observe' and 'perform' in which participants performed a set 
of actions and observed a set of actions. In the ‘perform’ condition, participants 
were instructed to perform the actions described in statements presented on the 
computer screen, for example ’Highlight a sentence in the document’. The objects 
needed for execution of meaningful and meaningless actions were provided to 
participants. In total, participants performed 30 actions. In the ‘observe’ condition, 
participants were instructed to watch the videos of actions being displayed on the 
computer screen. In total, participants observed 30 videos of actions. The second 
phase of the experiment, which took place either one day, one week or two weeks 
after the test phase, consisted of a source memory test, where participants were 
asked which actions they remembered performing themselves. The source 
memory questionnaire included (i) statements that described actions which 
participants had performed in the experiments; (ii) statements that described 
actions participants had observed in the experiments and (iii) actions that were 
neither performed nor observed by participants. All action statements were 
written in the first person, suggesting to participants that they performed the 
actions, for example ‘I stapled a document’. Following the initial Yes/No 
recognition of each action statement, participants had to then decide whether 
they ‘Remembered’, ‘Knew’ or ‘Guessed’ that they performed the actions.  
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that participants formed memories of self-
performance as a result of observation of all three types of actions (OIs). 
However, participants were more likely to form OIs for actions that were 
communicative and meaningful rather than meaningless. This result partially 
supported the initial hypothesis, that more communicative actions will be 
remembered as self-performed than meaningless actions. Experiment 1 also 
found that overall source memory accuracy declines as the time delay of testing 
increases, showing that more OIs were formed after two weeks’ time delay rather 
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than one week and one day. This is similar to the results of Lindner et al. (2010) 
who found that more OIs were made after a two week than one week testing 
delay. This is also in line with result of other studies that show that memory 
accuracy deteriorates with time (Porter et al., 2010).  
The results of Experiment 1 support the speculative hypothesis that mirror 
neurones could potentially be involved in the OI effect, since higher numbers of 
OIs were formed after observation of communicative than meaningful and 
meaningless actions.  Seemingly, the source monitoring errors are causing the 
OIs and the source attribution becomes more challenging possibly, if the mirror 
neurone hypothesis holds, due to the shared sensorimotor experience during 
observation and execution of actions.  
Regarding the correct source attributions of actions that were actually performed 
in Experiment 1, the highest number of correctly recalled actions was found after 
performing communicative actions followed by meaningful actions. Fewest 
correct source attributions were made after executing meaningless actions. This 
is an interesting finding, as the communicative actions resulted in both the highest 
number of correct source attributions but also the highest number of OIs.  This 
suggests that memory for communicative actions has a strong aspect of self-
reference attached to it. Manzi and Nigro (2008) showed that performed actions 
are recalled at a higher accuracy than observed actions, and the recall rates for 
performed actions are higher than for misattributions to the incorrect source. This 
effect could be due to a self-performance advantage, which shows that the 
actions that are performed by the individual are generally remembered better than 
observed actions (Manzi and Nigro, 2008). This was demonstrated by the results 
of Experiment 1, where actions that were actually performed by participants were 
recalled at higher rates than OIs. Importantly, this effect was only present for the 
communicative and meaningful actions, which again suggests that the three 
types of actions are processed differently. The lower rate of correct source 
attribution of meaningless actions could be a result of the unfamiliarity.  
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Furthermore, Experiment 1 showed than in addition to making misattributions of 
self-performance, participants formed false memories for actions that were 
neither observed nor performed by them.  
The general conclusions from Experiment 1 were that observation of actions can 
results in memories of self-performance (OIs). The OIs were significantly higher 
after observing communicative and meaningful rather than meaningless actions. 
The pattern of OI formation for different action types might suggest involvement 
of mirror neurones. If mirror neurone activity was making the source monitoring 
more challenging, the same effect should be visible in reverse. This means that 
the misattribution of performed actions as observed being performed by 
somebody else would be possible. This then formed the main objective of 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 7), where misattributions of performed actions as 
performed by somebody else were studied.  
In Experiment 2, the same set of experimental stimuli and procedure was used, 
with the exception of source memory questionnaire. The questionnaire this time, 
asked participants if they recalled observing a person performing a given action, 
instead of asking them if they remember performing the actions themselves (for 
example, the participant had to answer whether they remember observing 
‘sticking a note to a wall’). The R-K-G recollection/confidence judgements were 
also investigated as in Experiment 1.  
The results showed that participants misattributed actions that they performed 
themselves in the experiment as performed by others. This phenomenon was 
termed self-action inflation (SAI). The results revealed that participants formed 
more SAIs for meaningless actions and communicative actions rather than 
meaningful actions. This result is only partially in line with results of Experiment 
1, where the meaningless actions were the least misattributed actions as self-
performed. This was a surprising finding and problematic for the mirror neurones 
hypothesis. 
The possible cause for the high SAIs after performing meaningless actions could 
be the ‘it-had-to-be’ you effect (Manzi and Nigro, 2008). In this effect, actions of 
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unique nature are unfamiliar to the individual and are consequently attributed to 
other persons. Due to the characteristics being so unfamiliar, they tend to be 
judged as unlikely to have been performed (Manzi and Nigro, 2008).  Because 
meaningless actions are unfamiliar and unique to participants, it is more difficult 
to attribute the actions to oneself. Even though the actions are actually performed 
by participants (which would suggest a stronger and more accurate memory for 
them), the brief execution of those actions in the experimental procedure did not 
seem to result in accurate memory of them.  
Communicative actions on the other hand, are familiar actions that are observed 
or performed in everyday life. Contrary to meaningful actions, they only consist 
of hand manipulation and do not involve objects. Object presence could make 
the actions more distinguishable and make them easier to be attributed to the 
correct source. While the meaningful actions involved object manipulation, the 
memory trace for those actions might have been stronger and participants 
remembered them better as self-performed. This is reflected in the correct recall 
of observed actions, where the meaningful actions were recalled correctly as 
observed at the highest rate in Experiment 2.  
Similarly as with the OIs, SAIs increased over time, showing the highest level of 
misattributions after two weeks than one day and one week.  
Interestingly, the mean number of errors formed between Experiment 1 and 2 
significantly differed, showing that significantly more SAIs were formed in 
Experiment 2 than OIs in Experiment 1. This is interesting since the two 
experiments were identical in the procedure, varying only in wording of the 
questionnaire.  
The results suggest that it is easier to attribute actions to other people than to 
oneself. Similar result was found by Manzi and Nigro (2008) who found that 
misattribution of self-performed actions as observed (SAI) was significantly 
higher than misattribution of observed actions to oneself (OI).  
If the original mirror neurone hypothesis held, then the same pattern of 
misattribution as observed in Experiment 1 should have been observed for the 
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SAIs in Experiment 2. This hypothesis however was not supported, as it was 
found that significantly more communicative as well as meaningless actions 
resulted in SAIs than meaningful actions. This could be potentially a result of a 
biased questionnaire suggesting a source of memory to participants. 
One of the aims of this thesis was to create a paradigm that would allow testing 
the OI effect as accurately and efficiently as possible. Since the mean OIs in 
Experiment 1 were relatively low a better paradigm was needed to induce higher 
numbers of inflations.  Therefore the effect was further tested in a cohort of elderly 
participants (mean age = 72.87) in Experiment 3, as it was expected that the 
elderly will make more OIs than young participants. Hence, this would allow 
investigating the OIs for different types of actions better. According to source 
memory literature, the source monitoring accuracy declines with age (Haj et al., 
2012; Nedelko et al., 2013).  
The same experimental procedure was used as in Experiments 1 and 2, with the 
exception of the source memory test which participants took only after a two week 
time delay. This was done because both in Experiment 1 and 2, the two week 
time delay resulted in the highest number of misattributions when compared to 
one day and one week testing delays. 
The results of Experiment 3 revealed that the elderly participants formed 
significantly more OIs after observing communicative than meaningful and 
meaningless actions. This finding is in line with the results of Experiment 1, 
however, in Experiment 3 the difference in the OIs formed for communicative and 
meaningful actions reached statistical significance.  This further supports the 
hypothesis that mirror neurone activity could make the source monitoring more 
challenging. Furthermore, compared to young participants in Experiment 1, 
elderly participants made significantly more OIs in Experiment 3 overall. This is 
supported by previous research on memory distortions in the elderly, showing 
that source monitoring accuracy decreases with age (Haj et al., 2012; Hashtroudi 
et al., 1989). 
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Additionally, Experiment 3 found that elderly participants formed significantly 
more false memories than younger adults. This shows that elderly are more likely 
to recall performing an action when in fact they neither observed nor performed 
it.   
Given that there was a seemingly strong bias from the wording of the 
questionnaire as seen by the results of Experiment 2, which showed that 
significantly more SAIs were formed than OIs in Experiment 1, it was assumed 
that the wording of the questionnaire could be potentially biasing the recall of 
actions since the stimuli and procedure in both experiments were the same. 
Eliminating the suggestibility from the questionnaire was the objective of the next 
experiment where participants had to make the decision about the source of their 
memory themselves.  This allows for a controlled investigation of OIs and SAIs. 
Experiment 4 therefore investigated the possible bias of the source memory 
questionnaire on the OIs and SAIs. The experiment followed the same procedure 
as Experiments 1, 2 and 3; however, the instructions on the source memory 
questionnaire were modified. Instead of source recognition of either self-
performed or observed actions, participants had to recall the source of the action. 
For each action participants had to answer whether they recall ‘observing’ or 
‘performing’ it. An example of wording of the action statement would be ‘Flashing 
a torch’ and the participants had to tick either 'I recall performing this action' or 'I 
recall observing this action'.  This was done to eliminate possible biased results 
due to wording of the questionnaire, resulting in strong suggestibility effects 
potentially hiding any real effects (as in Experiments 1, 2 and 3).  
The results of Experiment 4 revealed that the highest number of source memory 
errors overall was formed for communicative actions. Additionally, in Experiment 
4, OIs and SAIs were found to be as equally likely to be formed. Although there 
were more OIs formed compared to SAIs, the difference was not found to be 
statistically significant. This is a different result from that of Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2, where more SAIs were formed in Experiment 2 than OIs in 
Experiment 1. This result shows that the mean SAIs decreased in Experiment 4 
(as compared to Experiment 2) and increased for OI in Experiment 4 (as 
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compared to Experiment 1) making this a better and more controlled paradigm to 
investigate OIs and SAIs. 
As for the correct source attribution, participants demonstrated higher memory 
accuracy for the actions that they performed themselves than the action they 
observed. This means that participants were more accurate when remembering 
actions they performed themselves, which is in line with the self-performance 
advantage theory (Manzi and Nigro, 2008). Manzi and Nigro (2008) found a 
higher recognition rate for actions that were self-performed than observed; and 
also Senkfor et al. (2002) who found participants had the highest recall accuracy 
for performed rather than observed actions.  
Experiment 4 controlled for any methodological issues hiding potential effects. 
The results have also supported the speculative hypothesis that mirror neurones 
may stand behind OI and SAI formation, as the results show that both action 
observation and action execution result in source misattributions. In particular, 
the high level of misattributions formed for communicative actions may suggest 
mirror neurone involvement in the OI and SAI effects. The results of Experiment 
4 also highlighted the importance to control for suggestibility in questionnaires in 
source memory error research. 
It was of interest in Chapter 10 to investigate the recollective experience of OIs, 
SAIs and correct source attribution for performed and observed actions formed 
in Experiment 1 (Chapter 6), 2 (Chapter 7), 3 (Chapter 8) and 4 (Chapter 9). The 
R-K-G recollection procedure was included in each source memory questionnaire 
for each experiment, where participants were required to specify whether they 
'Remembered', 'Knew' or 'Guessed' that they performed or observed the actions.  
This is a common procedure used in false memory research and as far as I am 
aware has not been used in any research investigating inflations (apart from 
Manzi and Nigro, 2008) nor in any mirror neurone research (as mirror neurones 
research in relation to memory tends to study implicit memory e.g. priming, rather 
than episodic recollection).  
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The most important findings from this analysis was that in the control Experiment 
4 (Chapter 9) it was found that significantly more OIs were recalled with 
‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollection and this difference was the strongest for 
communicative actions i.e. communicative OIs were remembered (incorrectly) 
with strong qualitative details with a strong feeling of knowing and high confidence 
that the 'errors'/inflations were indeed correct.  Although speculative, this 
potentially provides support for the mirror neurone hypothesis because if 
observation of communicative actions results in higher mirror neurone activity 
than meaningless and meaningful actions, this could lead to experience similar 
to actually performing those actions. This shared sensorimotor activation could 
then manifest itself with highly detailed memories of performance, even though 
the actions were only observed. Thus, the high rate of ‘Remember’ recollections 
could suggest highly detailed false memories, possibly a result of higher mirror 
neurone activation than meaningful and meaningless actions. 
Interestingly and surprisingly, a different pattern of recollections was found for 
SAIs in the same experiment. The results revealed that SAIs were recalled with 
a similar number of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses.  This is a different result 
from that of OIs recollection in the same experiment, which showed significantly 
more OIs were recalled with ‘Remember’.   It is clear that the results of the OI 
experiment here can potentially support the involvement of mirror neurones in the 
formation of inflations as the OIs for communicative actions not only resulted in 
significantly more ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollections, but the ‘Remember’ 
recollection rate was significantly higher than that for meaningful and 
meaningless actions. However, again it would be expected that if mirror neurones 
were involved, the result would also be seen in reverse and in the controlled 
paradigm of Experiment 4, there was no suggestion that this was the case.  More 
research on SAIs is now needed to investigate again whether there are biases of 
some kind from the experimental design or these are true effects of action 
inflation and recollection judgments are genuinely different between the SAIs and 
OIs. 
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The results of Experiment 1 and 3 are in line with those of Manzi and Nigro (2008), 
whose study focused on the recollective experience of correct recall of performed 
and observed actions. Manzi and Nigro (2008) did not find any significant 
difference in the number of 'Remember' and 'Know' recognitions of 
misattributions, which means participants were equally likely to recall the actions 
with either of recollections. Also, it was found that misattributions of observed 
actions as performed (termed OIs in this thesis) were more likely to be recalled 
as 'Remembered' than actions that were performed as observed (termed as SAIs 
in this thesis). Regarding the correct source attribution, the results reported in this 
thesis are also in line with Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) results, showing that the 
correct recognition of both performed and observed actions is most likely to be 
recalled as ‘Remembered’. 
However, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 were possibly biased by the wording 
of source memory questionnaire which suggested the source of memory to 
participants. In Experiment 4, where this was controlled for by giving the 
participants the option to differentiate between the sources of their memory 
(observed vs. performed), the results have shown that significantly more OIs were 
recalled with ‘Remember’ than ‘Know’ recollection. The retrieval procedure 
implemented in Experiment 4 is methodologically similar to the one used in Manzi 
and Nigro’s (2008) study, however, based on the examples given, the actions 
used in Manzi and Nigro’s (2008) study were only of meaningful nature. The type 
of action used in their experiment and experiment of this thesis could affect the 
pattern of recollection reported.  
Additionally, in Experiment 5 the social context of OIs was investigated, where 
the misattributions were studied following observation of actors of different races. 
In the experiment, participants observed 54 videos of actions performed by 
Italian, East Asian or African actors. Participants were also required to perform 
54 actions. Both observed and performed actions were either of meaningless 
nature or communicative emblems. The results of a source memory test revealed 
that overall (i) participants formed significantly more OIs after they observed 
communicative rather than meaningless actions and (ii) significantly more OIs 
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were formed following of out-group actor (African and East Asian) than in-group 
actor (Italian). The results were only partially in line with the initial hypothesis, in 
that significantly more OIs were formed for communicative than meaningless 
actions. However, the higher level of inflations for the out-group actors was 
surprising and against initial hypothesis and previous research in this subject 
area. This is not clear why such pattern of inflations was found and it is necessary 
to extend the research on OIs and race more since, as far I am aware, this is only 
a second experimental study that has researched OIs in the context of race. The 
experiment of Lindner et al. (2012) on this subject has found an opposite result, 
where more OIs were made after observing in-group actor. This is proposed to 
be a consequence of overlapping brain activity between performance and 
observation of actions of members of own race, in contrast with other races 
(Lindner et al., 2012).  
To summarise, Experiment 1 studied the hypothesis that mirror neurones could 
potentially be involved in the OI effect (Lindner et al., 2010). To investigate this, 
the pattern of misattributions of observed actions as self-performed was 
investigated for different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless and 
communicative) that were observed. Experiment 1 revealed that observation of 
actions can result in memories of performing those actions. Additionally, 
participants formed significantly more OIs after observation of meaningful and 
communicative actions than meaningless actions. To test the mirror neurone 
hypothesis further, the effect was looked at in reverse, i.e. if self-performed 
actions can be misattributed as actions performed by others (SAIs) in Experiment 
2. The results revealed that performance of meaningless and communicative 
actions were the most likely to result in SAIs. Because the numbers of OIs formed 
in Experiment 1 were very low with many participants scoring at the floor level, 
the effect was investigated in the group of elderly who could potentially form more 
OIs. Similarly, as for Experiment 1, Experiment 3 showed that significantly more 
OIs were formed following observation of communicative actions than meaningful 
and meaningless actions. Additionally, elderly participants in Experiment 3 
formed significantly more OIs overall than young participants in Experiment 1 
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showing that this is a good cohort in which to study inflations.  In Experiment 4, 
different source retrieval instructions were tested in a modified questionnaire.  
This was important as results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggested there was a 
strong bias from the wording of the questionnaire in the test phase of the 
experiment. The results of Experiment 4 showed the highest number of 
misattributions, regardless of the error type, was made for communicative 
actions. This further supports the possible role of mirror neurones in source 
memory error formation. Additionally, in Experiment 1, 2, 3 and 4, the memory for 
self-performed actions was characterised with higher source recall accuracy, 
suggesting better memory for actions that were self-performed. The results of 
Experiment 5 further supported the notion that action observation can result in 
memories of self-performance. It further supported the speculative hypothesis of 
mirror neurones, since significantly more OIs were formed for communicative 
actions than meaningless actions.  
In Chapter 10, the recollective pattern of OIs and SAIs was analysed. In 
Experiment 4, the control experiment, significantly more OIs were recalled as 
‘Remembered’ than ‘Known’  and significantly more communicative actions were 
recalled as ‘Remembered’ than meaningful and meaningless actions, which 
supports the initial mirror neurone hypothesis. If observation of communicative 
actions triggered strong mirror neurone response, this could potentially result in 
stronger memories of self-performance than in case of meaningless or 
meaningful actions. The ‘Remember’ response indicates strong recollective detail 
of memory.  However regarding the findings in Experiment 4 for SAIs, which 
showed no significant difference in the number of recollection judgements made 
overall, is problematic for the mirror neurone hypothesis, since it was expected 
that the same pattern of recollection would be present for OIs and SAIs in the 
Experiment 4. This warrants further investigation. 
12.3 Limitations, implications and future directions 
The general assumption that different types of actions will result in different 
patterns of OIs and SAIs was based on the hypothesis proposed by Lindner et 
al. (2010) that mirror neurones may stand behind OIs. This is a novel concept 
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proposed as an explanation for source memory error formation, researched in, 
as far as I am aware, only a small number of studies (Lindner et al., 2010; Schain 
et al., 2012; Lindner and Davison, 2014). Mirror neurones are active when one is 
performing an action and observes the same action being performed by 
somebody else (Ferrari et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996). The perceived action 
is then 'experienced' by an observer, at least at the neural level. Since the 
discovery of mirror neurones in the 1990s (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 
1996), mirror neurones have been extensively researched in behavioural studies, 
(Brass et al., 2001), brain imaging studies (Ferrari et al., 2003) and also in single 
cell recordings (Mukamel et al., 2010). Studies on mirror neurone activity and 
action type have found a higher level of mirroring activity when individuals 
observe actions that are meaningful and communicative (Montgomery et al., 
2007; Husain et al., 2012) and that observation of communicative actions can 
elicit the strongest mirror neurone activity (Ferrari et al., 2005).  
Communicative actions used in the experiments discussed in this thesis, can be 
considered communicative emblems (Andric et al., 2013). The communicative 
emblems convey the meaning of the actions through gestural symbol. Previous 
studies have found that communicative emblems are likely to be processed in the 
same way at the neural level as speech and gestures accompanying speech 
(Andric et al., 2013). This can give the communicative emblems the advantage 
of triggering the neural brain activity to a higher extent than meaningful actions. 
Thus the initial general hypothesis was that meaningful and communicative 
actions would result in more OIs than meaningless actions, because of possible 
brain activity being mirrored during observation of those actions. This hypothesis 
is speculative at this stage but was supported by the results of experiments in this 
thesis, showing that (i) observation of communicative actions resulted in 
significantly more OIs than observation of meaningful and meaningless actions 
(Experiment 1, Experiment 3 and the OIs in the controlled Experiment 4). 
Additionally, when the effect was tested in reverse, it was observed that 
significantly more SAIs were formed for communicative actions in the controlled 
Experiment 4. These results support the hypothesis of the possible involvement 
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of mirror neurons in formation of source memory errors. The increased familiarity 
of actions and experience of performing them could result in the source of the 
action being more difficult to monitor or cause participants to mistake the actions 
as actually self-performed. 
Although the highest number of SAIs was for the communicative and 
meaningless actions in Experiment 2, which is potentially problematic for the 
mirror neurone hypothesis, this could be explained by a bias effect from the 
wording of the questionnaire, hence why Experiment 4 was carried out which 
controlled for this. The results of Experiment 5 are also problematic for the mirror 
neurone hypothesis, since it was initially hypothesised that more OIs will be 
formed for the actions performed by an in-group actor. The results revealed the 
opposite, where significantly more OIs were formed for the actors of out-group 
membership. If the mirror neurone activity is stronger during observation of 
actions of same race actors than other race actors, it would be logically plausible 
to expect same race actor’s actions would be more likely to be misremembered 
as self-performed. However, this is only a speculative hypothesis of the mirror 
neurone involvement that is why more research involving brain imaging is 
necessary.  
Even though most of the results of the experiments of this thesis support the 
hypothesis and suggest mirror neurones could be involved in the formation of OIs 
and SAIs, the data obtained is only behavioural and as for all behavioural studies 
investigating mirror neurone activity, neuronal activity was not directly measured.  
It has been reported that there is very little or no activity during observation of 
meaningless actions (Rizzolatti, 1999), but this has never been tested in the 
context of OIs or even source monitoring. Although, some of the behavioural 
results of experiments in this thesis support the possible involvement of mirror 
neurones, it should be tested further using brain imaging.  As far as I am aware, 
OIs have not yet been formally tested using imaging techniques.  Furthermore in 
this thesis the R-K-G recollection was investigated behaviourally. Future research 
should also look at neural activity underlying the R-K-G retrieval of different types 
of actions. Because mirror neurones are usually associated with forms of implicit 
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memory (e.g. priming) and the R-K-G measures episodic recollection, this issue 
should be investigated using imaging, a common technique employed in the R-
K-G procedure (e.g. Gimbel and Brewer, 2011; Rugg, 2012).  Imaging is used to 
investigate this procedure in part because of the very subjective nature of the R-
K-G judgements. However, the results of the R-K-G recollection judgements in 
this thesis do support mirror neurone involvement, at least in part, in that 
significantly more communicative actions were recalled as ‘Remembered’ than 
‘Known’; and significantly more ‘Remember’ recollections were made for 
communicative than meaningful and meaningless actions. 
Another issue to consider is whether the level of misattributions could have been 
biased by the real-life enactment and observation of those actions in everyday 
life. As discussed in Chapter 4, communicative and meaningful actions are highly 
familiar actions that are performed and observed regularly. Thus, it is likely that 
participants could have performed and observed those actions in the time period 
between the experiment and source memory questionnaire. Because the 
communicative emblems and meaningful actions are strongly associated with 
everyday interactions, it could make them more susceptible to interference from 
enactment and observation than meaningless actions. It has been previously 
demonstrated that performing both communicative and meaningful actions leads 
to a better recall of these actions, a so called ‘enactment effect’ (Senkfor et al., 
2008). It has been suggested that enactment of action and motoric information 
associated with it are stored in the long–term memory at the encoding, which then 
leads to a more efficient retrieval (Senkfor et al., 2008; Allen et al., 2007; 
Hornstein and Mulligan, 2004). For example, Senkfor (2008) showed that 
retrieval of actions that involved object manipulation but not pantomimes 
engaged the motor cortex to a much greater extent. Additionally, the research 
has shown that memory for goal-directed actions encoded through observation 
is equally detailed as memory encoded through enactment (Schult et al., 2014; 
Steffens, 2007). This shows that participants’ memory for actions that were 
observed/executed in the experiments, could have been affected by latter 
encounters of the same or similar actions during the period of testing time delay. 
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Especially since the highest number of misattributions was formed for 
communicative and meaningful actions that are likely to be encountered in 
everyday life. The meaningless actions on the other hand, are unfamiliar and are 
not likely to be observed or performed outside the experiments, thus the likelihood 
of them interfering with participant’s source memory is much lower. Although 
enactment and observation improve the memory for actions, in that participants 
are more likely to recall occurrence and details associated with them, it seems to 
have a negative effect on source memory. For example, Hornstein and Mulligan 
(2004) showed that enactment and observation of actions improves item memory 
for objects associated with the action when participants classified a list of objects 
as ‘new’ or ‘old’. However, significant number of the actions presented in the list 
was wrongly attributed between the performed and observed conditions. 
Hornstein and Mulligan (2004) found that observed actions were wrongly 
attributed as self-performed and also self-performed actions were misattributed 
as observed. Interestingly, it was found that significantly more misattributions of 
self-performed actions to other person were made, which is the same result as in 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 9), where significantly more SAIs were formed than OIs.  
This evidence fits in with the reconstructive theory of remembering and 
retroactive interference effect (Dewar et al., 2007; Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, 1975). 
The acquisition of new memories of actions following the experiment could have 
affected the already stored information in the long-term memory. In the 
experiments, the time between encoding of actions and subsequent recall in the 
source memory questionnaire was potentially filled with acquisition of new 
memories of the same actions that were presented in the experiment. This could 
interfere with memory source attribution and lead to formation of misattribution in 
the time period between the encoding of actions and recall. Hence, the higher 
level of misattributions was observed for meaningful and communicative actions.  
12.3.1 Experimental design 
Certainly, as discussed above, OI and now SAI research would benefit from using 
brain imaging techniques to observe the brain activity during the encoding of 
different types of actions and retrieval during the source memory tests. The 
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experiments of this thesis provide a good grounding in which to take this further 
and implement using brain imaging.  Part of the aims of this thesis was to create 
an effective paradigm to test OIs made for different types of actions as this has 
never been done before (as far as I am aware).  Overall, the experimental design 
turned out to be a successful tool for studying OIs for different types of actions. 
The experiments revealed that patterns of OIs and SAIs varied after either 
observation or execution of different types of actions (meaningful, meaningless 
and communicative). Furthermore, the results strongly show that to get the most 
significantly meaningful data from OI and SAI research (in particular to avoid floor 
effects) that the time delay between the study phase and the questionnaire should 
be two weeks, or should be tested in elderly participants (SAIs not tested in this 
cohort here but is an important area for future research). Similarly low numbers 
of OIs were found in Lindner et al. (2010) and Manzi and Nigro (2008) who found 
misattributions of observed actions as self-performed with a mean of 0.04 and 
self-performed actions as observed as being performed by somebody else – SAI 
- with a mean of 0.18 (Manzi and Nigro, 2008). From my own experience and 
because most of this type of research tends to be carried out at university 
institutions, it is usually easier to recruit young participants than elderly, so to take 
this research forward, whether it be more behavioural studies or using the 
aforementioned imaging techniques, a two week time delay between study phase 
and test phase should be implemented.  Further testing should also look at longer 
time delays to see if even more OIs and SAIs are made.  However this potentially 
comes with other challenges such as participant drop-out which was found in this 
study more at two weeks than at the shorter time delays.  This would be lessened 
with a stronger incentive for participants to return.   
12.3.2 Stimuli 
Another area for future study is manipulations to the video stimuli. In all 
experiments, participants were shown videos depicting a female actor performing 
different actions. Future experiments should control for the gender of the actor to 
eliminate any possible gender bias. Although there is a great amount of literature 
looking at the differences in gender and mirror neurone activity, the objective of 
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these studies is not the gender bias based on the sex membership of the actor 
performing the action. The past research shows some sex differences in mirror 
neurone activity, particularly that female brains exhibit larger gray matter volume 
in the areas of mirror neurone activity – pars opercularis and inferior parietal 
lobule (Cheng et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2008;  Hadjikhani et al., 2006; Yamasue 
et al., 2009).  However, Cheng et al. (2009) found that although females 
suppressed the mu rhythm during observation of hand movements to a higher 
degree than males, the perceived sex differences of the presented hand (either 
female, male or androgynous) did not elicit a significantly different response 
between the sexes (Cheng et al., 2009). Additionally,  Lindner et al. (2010) in their 
OI study initially tested if sex of the actor executing the action has any influence 
on the pattern of OIs formed and found no gender effect in their results (Lindner 
et al., 2010).   Therefore it seems unlikely that there will be any effect of gender 
of the actor, but this is yet to be investigated regarding different types of actions 
and OIs and has never been investigated at all with SAIs.  Given the large number 
of SAIs made for meaningless actions as compared to OIs in the initial experiment 
investigating SAIs, Experiment 2, an effect that goes away when the bias from 
the questionnaire is controlled for in Experiment 4, it seems that SAIs may be 
more susceptible to biases than OIs.  This makes sense in the context of the 'it 
had to be you' effect (Manzi and Nigro, 2008). Therefore a gender bias should be 
investigated in this type of inflation. 
Another methodological aspect that could be investigated in the future is the 
perspective from which the action execution videos were recorded. In the 
experiments discussed in this thesis, all of the communicative actions were 
depicted from the third person perspective (camera facing the actor), with the 
actor's face visible in all the video recordings. This was not the case with the 
meaningful and meaningless actions, where not all the videos included the actor's 
face, as the nature of the action did not require the face to be visible to execute 
the action. For example in some of the actions only hands manipulating the 
objects were visible (e.g. hands moving a stapler and stapling a document). 
Interestingly, Schain et al. (2012) found that OI effect was reduced where more 
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discriminatory features were available during the observation, i.e. facial features 
available instead of only hands. Additionally, when given extra instructions to 
focus on the face during action observation, the OI was eliminated (Schain et al., 
2012). This is interesting as in the experiments of this thesis, the communicative 
actions which all include a visible face, resulted in the highest formation of OIs. 
Since the results of Experiment 5 were different to those of Lindner et al. (2012), 
future work should study the OIs in the context of race more.  In order to find out 
whether mirror neurones play a role in the OIs effect, the underlying neural activity 
should be investigated during observation of actors of different races performing 
the actions. 
12.3.3 Neuropsychological patients 
Importantly, these results demonstrate the malleability of memory and that it is 
possible to confuse the source of performed and observed actions.  
Future research on SAIs could look at this effect in the context of schizophrenia. 
Similar effects of ‘underattribution’ is common in schizophrenia patients, where 
self-performed actions are misattributed to other entities (Jeannerod and 
Pacherie, 2004). This failure in source monitoring then constitutes the 
hallucinations that schizophrenics experience (Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004).  
Regarding the OIs, future research could have implications for people that make 
memory errors at a pathological level, for example patients with Alzheimer's 
disease. The OIs can have dangerous consequences for the elderly, for example, 
if a person observes someone else taking a medication but then falsely 
remembers having taken the medication oneself (example taken from Lindner, 
2010). Therefore of great interest for this research is to look at this paradigm in 
these patient groups.  There is some research into mirror neurones and 
schizophrenia (e.g. Mohring et al., 2015; Andrews et al., 2015; Mehta et al., 
2014)) and as far as I am aware, there is very little in Alzheimer's disease 
research.  Using neuropsychology techniques in these patient cohorts will provide 
information about the brain areas and brain mechanisms involved in OIs and SAIs 
and will allow further investigation into mirror neurone involvement in OIs and 
SAIs. 
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12.3.4 Conclusions 
Overall, the experiments of this thesis have demonstrated that observation of 
action alone can result in memories of self-performance (OIs), and that 
performing an action can be remembered as an action having been performed 
by another person (SAIs). This supports the finding of previous experiments on 
OIs (Lindner et al., 2010; Schain et al., 2012; Lindner and Davison, 2014). In 
addition to this, the experiments revealed that OIs and SAIs differed based on 
the type of action that is observed or performed. It was found that actions that are 
meaningful and communicative in nature are more likely to result in inflations. 
This result implies that mirror neurones could potentially stand behind OIs 
although much more research is needed as this is far from conclusive, especially 
given the result from the study of in-group and out-group action performance.  
This thesis has created a successful paradigm that can now be used in future 
study to further investigate source confusion errors using a variety of techniques. 
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Appendix 1: Source Memory Questionnaire 
(Experiment 1, Chapter 6)  
 
    
INSTRUCTIONS 
In Part 1 of the experiment you either observed or performed actions.  Below is a short 
questionnaire designed to see how many actions you remember performing yourself. 
Please answer YES if you recall performing any of these actions and NO if you do not 
recall performing these actions.  
If your answer is YES, please decide the type of recollection you have for the particular 
action.  
There are 3 potential responses: 
 
(1) Remember: when you can retrieve qualitative details associated with 
performing the action. This can be any thoughts you had at the time or how you 
felt like when performing the action. 
(2) Know: when you have a recollection of performing action, but you cannot 
retrieve any details about it. The action is familiar to you but you do not have 
any specific memories associated with it.  
(3) Guess: when you answered ‘yes’, because you guessed that you performed the 
action. 
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Please answer these questions: 
 
YES NO 
 
Remember 
 
Know 
 
Guess 
 
1. I stuck a note to my nose.     
2. I turned on a lamp.     
3. I wrote down my address.     
4. I tapped my wrist with index 
finger as if I was trying to tell 
somebody to hurry up.  
    
5. I plugged in the lamp.     
6. I saluted.     
7. I screwed the light bulb into a 
lamp. 
    
8. I showed thumbs up.     
9. I stuck a note to a wall.     
10. I pointed to the door.      
11. I hid a sweet inside a book.     
12. I placed right hand on my chest 
as if I was swearing something 
to somebody.  
    
13. I moved my index finger as if I 
was threatening somebody. 
    
14. I pulled on my hair as if I was 
stressed.  
    
15. I pinched my nose with a 
toothpick. 
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16. I pointed to forehead with my 
index finger as if I was trying to 
tell somebody they are stupid.  
    
17. I painted with lipstick on a light 
bulb. 
    
18. I smiled.     
19. I poured tea into a mug.     
20. I rolled a pen on a desk.        
21. I folded a corner of a document 
page. 
    
22. I wrote down my name. 
    
23. I moved my index finger across 
my throat as if I was threatening 
somebody.  
    
24. I highlighted a sentence in a 
document.   
    
25. I waved hands towards me to 
call somebody. 
    
26. I showed thumbs down. 
    
27. I wrote with pen in the air above 
my head. 
    
28. I placed USB stick on top of my 
head. 
    
29. I highlighted a sentence in a 
book. 
    
30. I rolled torch on a desk.     
221 
 
 
 
31. I moved index finger in circles 
next to my ear as if I was trying 
to tell somebody they are stupid. 
    
 
32. I laughed. 
    
33. I wrote in the air above my head 
with a finger. 
    
34. I shook my head.      
35. I closed my nose with fingers as 
if I was telling somebody that 
something smells bad.  
    
36. I mixed the coffee with spoon.     
37. I stapled a document.     
38. I crossed my fingers as if I was 
wishing somebody good luck. 
    
39. I flashed a torch.       
40. I nodded with agreement.      
41. I folded a page in a book.     
42. I shrugged my shoulders.     
43. I poured juice into a cup.      
44. I snapped my fingers as if I was 
trying to remember something. 
    
45. I opened a can.     
46. I wrote down a date of my birth.     
47. I sharpened a pencil.      
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48. I waved my hand as if I was 
greeting somebody. 
    
49. I opened a bottle.     
50. I put a coin to a piggybank.      
51. I combed my hair.     
52. I shook a bottle.     
53. I put batteries inside a torch.     
54. I broke a toothpick.     
55. I put sugar into a coffee.     
56. I folded a page in half.      
57. I lit a candle.        
58. I put a sweet inside a coffee.      
59. I smelled a flower.     
60. I touched my forehead with hand 
as if I was expressing disbelief 
or shock.  
    
61. I ate a sweet.      
62. I put staples inside a stapler.     
63. I attached a key ring to a pen.     
64. I watered a plant.     
65. I brushed my arm with a 
toothbrush. 
    
66. I moved my fingers as if I was 
trying to tell somebody they 
speak too much.  
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67. I touched my forehead with a 
stapler. 
    
68. I placed a tissue on top of my 
head.  
    
69. I touched my ear with USB 
cable. 
    
70. I tore a page from a book.     
71. I pinched my thumb with a 
toothpick. 
    
72. I put an orange inside a mug and 
drunk from it. 
    
73. I put a pen inside a bottle.     
74. I placed a bulb on top of a bottle.     
 
75. I shook my fists in the air as if I 
was expressing victory or joy. 
    
76. I wrote with a finger on my arm.     
77. I made a circle with my index 
finger and thumb as if I was 
telling somebody ‘okay’.   
    
78. I stirred the spoon in the air.     
79. I brushed a light bulb with a 
toothbrush.  
    
80. I drew on a coin with a pencil.     
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Appendix 2: Source Memory Questionnaire 
(Experiment 2, Chapter 7)  
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In Part 1 of the experiment you either observed or performed actions.  Below is a short 
questionnaire designed to see how many actions you remember observing. 
Please answer YES if you recall observing any of these actions and NO if you do not 
recall observing these actions.  
If your answer is YES, please decide the type of recollection you have for the particular 
action.  
There are 3 potential responses: 
 
(4) Remember: when you can retrieve qualitative details associated with observing 
the action. This can be any thoughts you had at the time or how you felt like 
when observing the action. 
(5) Know: when you have a recollection of observing action, but you cannot 
retrieve any details about it. The action is familiar to you but you do not have 
any specific memories associated with it.  
(6) Guess: when you answered ‘yes’, because you guessed that you observed the 
action. 
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Please answer these questions. 
 
I recall observing a person:  
 
YES NO 
 
Remember 
 
Know 
 
Guess 
 
1. Sticking a note to their nose.     
2. Turning on a lamp.      
3. Writing down their address.     
4. Tapping their wrist with index 
finger as if they were trying to 
tell somebody to hurry up.  
    
5. Plugging in the lamp.     
6. Saluting.      
7. Screwing the light bulb into a 
lamp. 
    
8. Showing thumbs up.     
9. Sticking a note to a wall.     
10. Pointing to the door.      
11. Hiding a sweet inside a book.     
12. Placing right hand on their chest 
as if they were swearing 
something to somebody.  
    
13. Moving their index finger as if 
they were threatening somebody. 
    
14. Pulling on their hair as if they 
were stressed.  
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15. Pinching their nose with a 
toothpick. 
    
16. Pointing to forehead with their 
index finger as if they were 
trying to tell somebody they are 
stupid.  
    
17. Painting with lipstick on a light 
bulb. 
    
18. Smiling.     
19. I poured tea into a mug.     
20. I rolled a pen on a desk.        
21. Folding a corner of a document 
page. 
    
22. Writing down their name.      
23. Moving their index finger across 
their throat as if they were 
threatening somebody. 
    
24. Highlighting a sentence in a 
document.   
    
24. Waving hands towards them to 
call somebody. 
    
25. Showing thumbs down.     
26. Writing with pen in the air above 
their head. 
    
27. Placing USB stick on top of 
their head. 
    
28. Highlighting a sentence in a     
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book. 
29. Rolling torch on a desk.     
30. Moving index finger in circles 
next to their ear as if they were 
trying to tell somebody they are 
stupid. 
    
31. Laughing.     
32. Writing in the air above their 
head with a finger. 
    
33. Shaking their head.     
34. Closing their nose with fingers 
as if they were telling somebody 
that something smells bad. 
    
35. Mixing the coffee with spoon.     
36. Stapling a document.     
37. Crossing their fingers as if they 
were wishing somebody good 
luck. 
    
38. Flashing a torch.       
39. Nodding with agreement.     
41. Folding a page in a book.     
42. Shrugging their shoulders.     
43. Pouring juice into a cup.     
     
45. Opening a can.     
46. Writing down a date of their     
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birth. 
47.  Sharpening a pencil.     
48.  Waving their hand as if they 
were greeting somebody. 
    
49. Opening a bottle.     
50.  Putting a coin to a piggybank.     
51.  Combing their hair.     
52.  Shaking a bottle.     
53. Putting batteries inside a torch.     
54.  Breaking a toothpick.     
55.  Putting sugar into a coffee.     
56. Folding a page in half.     
57. Lighting a candle.        
58. Putting a sweet inside a coffee.     
59.  Smelling a flower.     
60.  Touching their forehead with 
hand as if they were expressing 
disbelief or shock. 
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61.  Eating a sweet.     
62.  Putting staples inside a stapler.     
63. Attaching a key ring to a pen.     
64. Watering a plant.     
65. Brushing their arm with a 
toothbrush. 
    
66.  Moving their fingers as if they 
were trying to tell somebody they 
speak too much. 
    
67.  Touching their forehead with a 
stapler. 
    
68. Placing a tissue on top of their 
head. 
    
69.  Touching their ear with USB 
cable. 
    
70.  Tearing a page from a book.     
71.   Pinching a thumb with a 
toothpick. 
    
72. Putting an orange inside a mug 
and drinking from it. 
    
73. Putting a pen inside a bottle.     
74.  Placing a bulb on top of a 
bottle. 
    
75.  Shaking their fists in the air as if 
they were expressing victory or joy. 
    
76.  Writing with a finger on their     
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arm. 
77.  Making a circle with their index 
finger and thumb as if they were 
telling somebody ‘okay’.   
    
78.  Stirring the spoon in the air.     
79.  Brushing a light bulb with a 
toothbrush. 
    
80. Drawing on a coin with a pencil.     
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Appendix 3: Source memory questionnaire in 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 9) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In Part 1 of the experiment you either observed or performed actions.  Below is a short 
questionnaire designed to see which actions you remember performing and observing. 
Please answer ‘observe’ if you recall observing an action and ‘perform’ if you recall 
performing it.  
Please decide the type of recollection you have for the particular observed or 
performed action.  
There are 3 potential responses: 
 
(7) Remember: when you can retrieve qualitative details associated with observing 
or performing the action. This can be any thoughts you had at the time or how 
you felt like when observing or performing the action. 
(8) Know: when you have a recollection of observing or performing action, but you 
cannot retrieve any details about it. The action is familiar to you but you do not 
have any specific memories associated with it.  
(9) Guess: when you answered ‘yes’, because you guessed that you observed or 
performed the action. 
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Please answer 
these questions. 
 
I recall : 
Observing this action. Performing this action.  
I do not 
rememb
er this 
action. 
 
Remember 
 
Know 
 
Guess 
 
Remember 
 
Know 
 
Guess 
1. Sticking a note 
to a nose. 
       
   
2. Turning on a lamp.         
3. Writing down 
address. 
       
4. Tapping wrist with 
index finger to tell 
somebody to hurry 
up.  
       
5. Plugging in a lamp.        
6. Saluting.         
7. Screwing a light 
bulb into a lamp. 
       
8. Showing thumbs 
up. 
       
9. Sticking a note to a 
wall. 
       
10. Pointing to the door.         
11. Hiding a sweet 
inside a book. 
       
12. Placing right hand 
on chest to swear 
something to 
somebody.  
       
13. Moving index 
finger as if 
threatening 
somebody. 
       
14. Pulling on hair as if 
were stressed.  
       
15. Pinching nose with 
a toothpick. 
       
16. Pointing to forehead 
with index finger to 
try to tell somebody 
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they are stupid.   
17. Painting with 
lipstick on a light 
bulb. 
       
18. Smiling.        
19. Pouring tea into 
a mug. 
       
20. Rolling a pen 
on a desk.   
       
21. Folding a corner of a 
document page. 
       
   
22. Writing down name.         
23. Moving index finger 
across throat as if 
threatening somebody. 
       
24. Highlighting a 
sentence in a document.   
       
25. Waving hands to 
call somebody. 
       
26. Showing thumbs 
down. 
       
27. Writing with pen in 
the air above head. 
       
28. Placing USB stick on 
top of head. 
       
29. Highlighting a 
sentence in a book. 
       
30. Rolling torch on a 
desk. 
       
31. Moving index finger 
in circles next to ear 
to tell somebody they 
are stupid. 
       
32. Laughing.        
33. Writing in the air 
above head with a 
finger. 
       
34. Shaking head.        
35. Closing nose with 
fingers to tell 
somebody that 
       
234 
 
 
 
something smells bad. 
36. Mixing the coffee 
with spoon. 
       
37. Stapling a document.        
38. Crossing fingers to 
wish somebody good 
luck. 
       
39. Flashing a torch.          
40. Nodding with 
agreement. 
       
40. Folding a page in a 
book. 
       
41. Shrugging shoulders. 
       
42. Pouring juice into a cup.        
44. Snapping fingers as if trying 
to remember something. 
       
45. Opening a can.        
46. Writing down a date of birth.        
47.  Sharpening a pencil.        
48.  Waving hand to greet 
somebody. 
       
49. Opening a bottle.        
50.  Putting a coin into a 
piggybank. 
       
51.  Combing hair.        
52.  Shaking a bottle.        
53. Putting batteries inside a 
torch. 
       
54.  Breaking a toothpick.        
55.  Putting sugar into a coffee.        
56. Folding a page in half.        
57. Lighting a candle.           
58. Putting a sweet inside a 
coffee. 
       
59.  Smelling a flower.        
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60.  Touching forehead with 
hand to express disbelief or 
shock. 
       
61.  Eating a sweet.       
 
62.  Putting staples inside a 
stapler. 
       
63. Attaching a key ring to a pen.       
 
64. Watering a plant.        
65. Brushing arm with a 
toothbrush. 
       
66.  Moving fingers to tell 
somebody they speak too much. 
       
67.  Touching forehead with a 
stapler. 
       
68. Placing a tissue on top of 
head. 
       
 
69.  Touching ear with USB 
cable. 
       
70.  Tearing a page from a 
book. 
       
71.   Pinching a thumb with a 
toothpick. 
       
72. Putting an orange inside a 
mug and drinking from it. 
       
73. Putting a pen inside a 
bottle. 
       
74.  Placing a bulb on top of a 
bottle. 
       
75.  Shaking fists in the air to 
express victory or joy. 
       
76.  Writing with a finger on 
arm. 
       
77.  Making a circle with index 
finger and thumb to tell 
somebody ‘okay’.   
       
78.  Stirring the spoon in the 
air. 
       
79.  Brushing a light bulb with 
a toothbrush. 
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80. Drawing on a coin with a 
pencil. 
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Appendix 4: Source memory questionnaire in 
Experiment 5 (Chapter 10)  
 
ISTRUZIONI 
Nella prima  parte dell’esperimento ha osservato o eseguito delle azioni. Di 
seguito trova un breve questionario per vedere quante azioni ricorda di aver 
eseguito. La preghiamo di decidere il tipo di memoria che ha per l’azione 
specifica eseguita.  
Risponda SI se ricorda di aver eseguito una di queste azioni e NO se non ricorda 
di aver eseguito queste azioni.  
Se la risposta è SI, decida il tipo di ricordo che ha per quella specifica azione.   
Ci sono 3 tipi di risposte possibili: 
(1) Ricordo: quando è in grado di ricordare dettagli qualitative associati 
all’esecuzione dell’azione, come quello che ha pensato in quel momento 
o come si è sentito nell’eseguire l’azione.  
(2) So: quando ha un ricordo di aver eseguito l’azione, ma non riesce a 
recuperare alcun dettaglio a riguardo. L’azione le risulta familiare ma non 
ha ricordi specifici associati a essa.  
(3) Credo: quando ha risposto ‘sì’, perché ha supposto di aver osservato o 
eseguito l’azione.  
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Per favore risponda alle seguenti domande: 
 
SI NO 
 
Ricordo 
 
So 
 
Credo 
 
1. Mi sono baciato la punta delle dita e le ho aperte 
come per dire che qualcosa era meraviglioso. 
    
2. Mi sono spazzolato il braccio con uno spazzolino da 
denti.  
    
3. Ho eseguito dei movimenti sopra la mia testa come 
se stessi giocando a basket e lanciando la palla in un 
canestro. 
    
4. Ho messo una banana sul mio orecchio come se 
stessi parlando al telefono.   
    
5. Ho spostato le mani dal mio corpo come per dire a 
qualcuno ‘basta’.  
    
6. Ho messo un libro sulla mia testa.      
7. Mi sono chinato in Avanti.     
8. Ho eseguito movimenti circolari con un cucchiaio sul 
palmo della mia mano.   
    
9. Ho mosso la mano come per dire ‘ciao’ a qualcuno.      
10. Ho eseguito movimenti come se stessi tagliando un 
libro.    
    
11. Ho mosso le mani verso me stesso come se stessi 
dicendo a qualcuno di avvicinarsi.  
    
12. Mi sono messo un CD sulla spalla.       
13. Ho contato con le dita.      
14. Mi sono spazzolato i capelli con una forchetta.       
15. Ho strofinato la mia guancia con un ditto come per 
dire che qualcosa era delizioso.  
    
 
 
 
 
16. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi bevendo,     
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tenendo una tazza vicino alla mia guancia.  
 
17. Ho mosso le mani lontano dal mio corpo come per 
dire a qualcuno che non sapevo qualcosa. 
    
18. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi guidando 
usando una bottiglia come volante.   
    
19. Ho messo l’indice e il police tesi vicino alla mia bocca 
come se stessi fingendo di bere. 
    
20. Mi sono toccata la fronte con una pinzatrice.      
21. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi pescando.      
22. Ho imitato l’atto del mangiare con una forchetta, 
muovendola verso il braccio anzi che verso la bocca.   
    
23. Ho battuto l’indice sul polso come se stessi dicendo a 
qualcuno che era in ritardo.   
    
24. Mi sono messo della cuffie sugli occhi.        
25.  Ho mosso le mie mani su e giu  come se stessi 
pregando.   
    
26. Mi sono disegnato sul dito con un evidenziatore.       
27. Alzare le spalle.         
28. Ho fatto un movimento con le dita sotto al mento 
come per dire a qualcuno che non mi importava.  
    
29. Ho mosso una garza di fianco al mio collo.     
30. Ho sventolato la mano all’altezza degli occhi come 
per dire a qualcuno ‘ non importa’.   
    
31. Ho toccata il mio orecchio con un cavo.       
32. Mi sono coperto gli occhi con la mano come per dire 
a qualcuno che non stavo guardando.  
 
 
    
  
33. Ho appiccicato un foglietto al mio naso.      
34. Ho toccata il mio police con l’indice come per dire 
‘OK’. 
    
35. Ho messo un’arancia in una tazza e ho finto di bere.      
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36. Ho premuto il ditto indice sulle mie labra come per 
dire a qualcuno di fare silenzio.   
    
37. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi fumando 
una penna.    
    
38. Ho salutato.      
39. Ho picchiettato sul mio polso con un’arancia.      
40. Ho messo le mani sotto un lato della mia faccia come 
se stessi dicendo a qualcuno che avevo sonno.    
    
41. Mi sono pinzato il naso con una molletta.       
42. Mi sono tirato la pelle sotto l’occhio come se stessi 
dicendo a qualcuno di stare attento.     
    
43. Scuotere la testa.       
44. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi scattando 
delle foto con una penna.    
    
45. Fare movimenti come per stirare sul braccio.       
46. Ho messo la mano destra sul petto come se stessi 
giurando qualcosa a qualcuno.     
    
47. Ho spruzzato del deodorante in un bicchiere.       
48. Incrociare le dita per augura re buona fortuna.       
49. Ho messo la mano con il police il mignolo aperti 
vicino al mio orecchio come se stessi parlando al 
telefono.  
    
50. Ho scosso una bottiglia d’acqua vuota.       
51. Ho mosso il ditto indice e il ditto medio come se 
stessi imitando una camminata.   
    
52. Mi sono pizzicato il naso con uno stuzzicadenti.        
53. Ho messo due dita davanti ai miei occhi e le ho 
spostate in Avanti come se stessi dicendo a qualcuno 
che lo stavo guardando.  
    
54. Ho fatto rotolare una penna sulla mia testa.        
55. Ho unito le mie dita e ho mosso la mano su e giu 
come se stessi chiedendo a qualcuno cosa volesse.    
    
56. Ho messo assieme le mie dita e ho disegnato una 
linea nell’aria come per dire che qualcosa era 
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perfetto.    
57. Schioccare le dita come se si tentasse di ricordare 
qualcosa.   
    
58. Ho eseguito movimenti come se fumassi, muovendo 
una sigaretta verso le mie sopracciglia.  
    
59. Spazzolare una lampadina con uno spazzolino da 
denti 
    
60. Ho strofinato le mie dita tra loro come per dire ‘soldi’.     
61. Muovere l’indice in cerchio vicino all’orecchio per 
dire a qualcuno che e` stupido.   
    
62. Ho fatto un ventaglio con delle carte e le ho messe 
dietro la mia testa.  
    
63. Ho mosso il mio indice e il pollice da un lato all’altro 
come per dire al qualcuno ‘ niente’.  
    
64. Ho scritto con una penna su un CD.     
65. Ho imitato l’atto dello sparare.   
66. Far rotolare un accendino sulla faccia.  
    
67. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se pettinassi, dalla 
fronte al mente.  
    
68. Ho strofinato le mie mani tra loro, come per 
comunicare anticipazione.  
    
69. Muovere i pugni in aria come per esprimere vittoria o 
gioia.    
    
70. Mi sono messo un fazzoletto sulla testa.      
71. Mi sono messo le dita in bocca per esprimere 
disgusto.  
    
72. Ho mosso le dita come se stessi tagliando con le 
forbici.   
    
73. Ho attaccato un portachiavi al mio orecchio. 
74. Sfregare un fiammifero sul braccio.   
    
75. Ho fatto dei movimenti come se stessi mangiando 
con la mano. 
    
76. Ho messo una lampadina sul collo di una bottiglia.     
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77. Ho messo la mano accanto all’orecchio come se stessi 
cercando di ascoltare. 
    
78. Mi sono coperto l’occhio con un cucchiaio.     
79. Muovere un block notes sul braccio.      
80. Ho mosso le braccia come se stessi guidando.     
81. Ho attaccato un portachiavi a una penna.      
82. Ho mosso le dita su e giu  come per dire a qualcuno 
che parlava troppo.  
    
83. Mettere una caramella nel caffe`.   
 
    
84. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi giocando a 
tennis con una tazza.  
    
85. Mi sono coperto le orecchio come per dire a qualcuno 
che non lo stavo ascoltando.  
    
86. Pollici verso il basso     
87. Mi sono pizzicato il pollice con uno stuzzicadenti.      
88. Ho picchiettato sulla mia fronte con l’indice come per 
dire a qualcuno che era pazzo. 
    
89. Ho scritto nell’aria con il dito.     
90.  Ho messo la mano sulla fronte e l’ho mossa come a 
esprimere sollievo.  
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91. Ho incrociato gli indici all’altezza della bocca e li ho 
baciati da entrambi i lati, come per giurare. 
    
92. Ho bucato una busta con una penna.     
93. Ho girato il palmo su e giu  come per dire ‘piu  o 
meno’. 
    
94. Ho messo delle graffette in un salvadanaio.     
95. Ho disegnato con un evidenziatore su un piatto.      
96. Ho mosso velocemente la mano all’altezza degli 
occhio come se stessi minacciando qualcuno di 
picchiarlo.  
    
97. Ho incrociato i miei polsi come per dire che 
qualcuno e  stato arrestato. 
    
98. Pollici su.      
99. Ho picchiettatto sulla mia fronte con il palmo verso 
il basso come per dire che qualcuno e  pazzo. 
    
100. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se tagliassi il 
mio polso.  
    
101. Ho applaudito.      
102. Mi sono scritto sul braccio con il dito.  
103. Tirarsi I capelli come se si fosse stressati.   
    
104. Ho mosso il mio dito indice come se stessi 
minacciando qualcuno. 
    
105. Ho scritto su una moneta con una penna.      
106. Ho mosso la mano con il palmo aperto davanti a 
me come per dire a qualcuno di fermarsi. 
    
107. Mi sono messo una chiavetta usb sulla testa.     
108. Ho nascosto una caramella in un libro.     
109. Dipingere con il rossetto su una lampadina.      
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110.   Ho fatto passare una torcia sul mio braccio.      
111. Ho spazzolato una lampadina con uno 
spazzolino da denti.  
    
112. Ho messo una penna in una bottiglia.       
113. Mi sono strofinato la guancia con una gomma 
per cancellare.  
    
114. Ho scritto nell’aria con una penna.      
115. Ho eseguito movimenti come se mi stessi 
radendo sul petto-  
    
116. Attaccare un biglietto al muro.      
117. Ho illuminato una bottiglia con una torcia-       
118. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se cercassi di 
aprire qualcosa, con la chiave rivolta verso l’alto.   
    
119. Mi sono messo un dito sul labbro e ho guardato 
in alto, come se stessi pensando a qualcosa.  
    
120. Ho ripetutamente aperto e chiuso il mio palmo 
rivolto verso l’alto come per dire a qualcuno che 
avevo paura.   
    
121. Indicare la porta.       
122. Mi sono toccato le orecchie con le dita e  mi sono 
mosso seguendo un ritmo come se stessi ascoltando 
della musica.  
    
123. Ho steso il braccio e alzato l’indice come per dire 
a qualcuno di aspettare.   
    
124. Far rotolare una penna sulla scrivania.      
125. Ho eseguito dei movimenti come se stessi 
distribuendo qualcosa a qualcuno.   
    
126. Mi sono dato un pugno in testa come per dire a 
qualcuno che era testardo.   
    
127. Rompere uno stuzzicadenti.     
128. Ho eseguito dei movimenti, come se stessi 
giocando a tennis.   
    
 
